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<p>Preface ix<br /><br /><b>1 Introduction I: The Structure of Good 1</b><br /><br />1.1 Acts versus consequences, and agent relativity 3</p> <p>1.2 The Working of ethical considerations 6</p> <p>1.3 Teleological structure 10</p> <p>1.4 Does good exist? 17</p> <p>Notes 20</p> <p><b>2 Introduction II: Weighing Goods 22</b></p> <p>2.1 Locations of good, and separability 22<br /><br />2.2 Three dimensions of locations 25<br /><br />2.3 Dimensions with varying lengths 29</p> <p>2.4 What things are good? 32</p> <p>2.5 An outline of the argument 32</p> <p>Notes 58</p> <p><b>3 Similarity Arguments 39</b></p> <p>3.1 Parfit, Section 1 40</p> <p>3.2 Parfit, Section 2 48</p> <p>3.3 Harsanyi 51</p> <p>Notes 58</p> <p><b>4 The Separability Theorems 60</b></p> <p>4.1 Two examples 60<br /><br />4.2 Definitions and theorems 65<br /><br />4.3 The significance of additive separability 70<br /><br />4.4 The rectangular field assumption 80</p> <p>Notes 81</p> <p>Appendix to Chapter 4: Proofs 82</p> <p><b>5 Expected Utility and Rationality 90</b></p> <p>5.1 Axiomatic expected utility theory 90<br /><br />5.2 The sure-thing principle 94<br /><br />5.3 Individuation of outcomes 95<br /><br />5.4 Transitivity of preferences 100<br /><br />5.5 Rational requirements of indifference 104<br /><br />5.6 Individuation and the sure-thing principle 107<br /><br />5.7 The dispersion of value amongst states of nature 110<br /><br />5.8 The rectangular field assumption 115</p> <p>Notes 117</p> <p><b>6 The Coherence of Good 121</b></p> <p>6.1 The goodness of uncertain prospects 122<br /><br />6.2 Betterness and rational preferences 131<br /><br />6.3 The argument for coherence 136<br /><br />6.4 Representing betterness by utility 139<br /><br />6.5 Bernoulli’s hypothesis 142</p> <p>Notes 148</p> <p><b>7 Coherence Against the Pareto Principle 151</b></p> <p>7.1 The conflict 152<br /><br />7.2 Two better principles 154<br /><br />7.3 Welfare economics 159</p> <p>Notes 164</p> <p><b>8 The Principle of Personal Good 165</b></p> <p>8.1 Qualifications 165<br /><br />8.2 The beginning of a defence 167</p> <p>Notes 173</p> <p><b>9 Equality 174</b><br /><br />9.1 A utilitarian case for equality 175<br /><br />9.2 Types of egalitarianism 177<br /><br />9.3 Equality under uncertainty 185<br /><br />9.4 Fairness and equality 192</p> <p>Notes 200</p> <p><b>10 The Interpersonal Addition Theorem 202</b></p> <p>10.1 Proof 203<br /><br />10.2 Connecting dimensions 209<br /><br />10.3 The utilitarian principle of distribution 213<br /><br />Notes 222</p> <p><b>11 Utilitarian Metaphysics? 224</b></p> <p>11.1 The intertemporal addition theorem 224<br /><br />11.2 The principle of temporal good 228<br /><br />11.3 The metaphysical argument 230<br /><br />11.4 Conclusion 237</p> <p>Notes 240</p> <p>Bibliography 241</p> <p>Index 251 </p>

<b>John Broome</b> is White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University.

This study uses techniques from economics to illuminate fundamental questions in ethics, particularly in the foundations of utilitarianism. Topics considered include the nature of teleological ethics, the foundations of decision theory, the value of equality and the moral significance of a person's continuing identity through time.

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