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<p>How to Use this Book xi</p> <p>Preface xiii</p> <p><b>Part I The Problem of Authority 1</b></p> <p><b>1 Happiness 3</b></p> <p>Doing Political Philosophy 4</p> <p>Happiness, Welfare, and the Aims of Government 5</p> <p>If You’re Happy Do You Know It? 5</p> <p>The Pursuit of Happiness 6</p> <p>Whose happiness? 7</p> <p>Can you measure pleasure? 8</p> <p>Future happiness 10</p> <p>Pleasure and pain 11</p> <p>Is happiness fulfilling your desires? 12</p> <p>Do the ends justify the means? 14</p> <p>Nozick’s Experience Machine 14</p> <p>Happiness and virtue 15</p> <p>The case of John Stuart Mill 17</p> <p>Capabilities 18</p> <p>Conflicts between liberty and happiness 22</p> <p>Conflicts between equality and happiness 22</p> <p>Happiness and Government 23</p> <p>Happiness and Public Goods 24</p> <p>Free Riding and Small Contributions 25</p> <p>Philosophical objections 26</p> <p>Should we evaluate political institutions according to their ability to make people happy? 27</p> <p>References and Further Reading 28</p> <p>Online Resources 30</p> <p><b>2 Freedom 31</b></p> <p>The Meaning of Freedom 34</p> <p>The Fundamental Question 34</p> <p>What Is Freedom? And Who Is Free? 35</p> <p>Subjective and objective freedom 36</p> <p>What counts as restraining freedom? 37</p> <p>Freedom and consent 38</p> <p>Republican liberty 39</p> <p>Private freedom and public freedom 40</p> <p>Negative and positive liberty 41</p> <p>Paternalism, the Harm Principle, and Moralism 42</p> <p>Paternalism 42</p> <p>The harm principle 44</p> <p>Moralism 48</p> <p>Can (and should) we avoid moralism? 50</p> <p>Conclusion 51</p> <p>References and Further Reading 52</p> <p>Online Resources 53</p> <p><b>3 Equality 54</b></p> <p>Introduction 55</p> <p>How Unequal Are People in the United States? 56</p> <p>Against Equality: A Politics of Procrustes? 57</p> <p>Unequal Treatment and Discrimination 59</p> <p>Equality as a Baseline? 61</p> <p>Equality of Resources and Luck Egalitarianism 62</p> <p>First objection: Disabilities 62</p> <p>Second objection: Slavery of the talented 63</p> <p>Third objection: Expensive tastes 63</p> <p>Equality of Opportunity 64</p> <p>Should we level down? 66</p> <p>What Does Equality of Opportunity Require? 67</p> <p>Inequalities in the Real World 68</p> <p>Inequality or Deprivation? 71</p> <p>Is Sufficiency Enough? 73</p> <p>Complex Equality 73</p> <p>Race, Gender, and the Social Construction of Inequalities 75</p> <p>Affirmative Action 76</p> <p>Conclusion 78</p> <p>References and Further Reading 78</p> <p>Online Resources 80</p> <p><b>4 Justice 81</b></p> <p>Justice: A Brief Introduction 82</p> <p>Rawls’s Theory of Justice 83</p> <p>The original principle and the veil of ignorance 84</p> <p>Rawls’s two principles of justice 85</p> <p>The Libertarian Critique: Individual Liberty Restricts Redistribution 87</p> <p>Utilitarian Critique: An Alternative Rationale for Redistribution 91</p> <p>Feminist Critique: The Public–Private Distinction and Power Relations 93</p> <p>Communitarian Critique: Alternatives to Individualism 96</p> <p>Cosmopolitan Critique: The Demands of Global Justice 97</p> <p>Conclusion 99</p> <p>References and Further Reading 99</p> <p>Online Resources 101</p> <p><b>Part II Core Values in Political Philosophy 103</b></p> <p><b>5 Democracy 105</b></p> <p>Democracy and Political Self?]Governance 107</p> <p>What Is Democracy? 108</p> <p>Who Gets to Participate? 108</p> <p>Constitutional Democracy and Rights 110</p> <p>Sources of rights 111</p> <p>Claim and liberty rights 113</p> <p>Interest and choice theories of rights 114</p> <p>Benefits of Democracy: The Instrumental Case 115</p> <p>Would a kind dictator be a bad thing? 115</p> <p>Do the people know best? 116</p> <p>Can representation help? 117</p> <p>Is Democratic Self?]Governance Intrinsically Valuable? 118</p> <p>Is There a Right to Democratic Self?]Governance? 119</p> <p>What Are the Implications of a Right to Democratic Self?]Governance? 120</p> <p>Voting and Representation: Interests or Ideals? 122</p> <p>Does Democracy Rest on a Paradox? 123</p> <p>Deliberative Democracy as a Solution? 125</p> <p>Distorting Democracy: Persistent Minorities and Electoral Inequalities 126</p> <p>Persistent minorities 126</p> <p>Electoral inequalities 126</p> <p>Do Democracies Decline and Fall? 128</p> <p>References and Further Reading 130</p> <p>Online Resources 131</p> <p><b>6 The Obligation to Obey the Law 132</b></p> <p>Breaking the Law 135</p> <p>Motives for breaking the law 135</p> <p>Ways of breaking the law 136</p> <p>Unjust laws 137</p> <p>Are we obligated just because it is a law? 137</p> <p>How strong are our legal obligations? 139</p> <p>Breaking the Law: A “How to” Guide 140</p> <p>Civil disobedience 140</p> <p>Violence 141</p> <p>What should be on the menu? 143</p> <p>What should we choose from the menu? 143</p> <p>Principles for ideal and nonideal agents 144</p> <p>Do We Have an Obligation at All? 147</p> <p>Consent 147</p> <p>Gratitude 150</p> <p>Fairness 150</p> <p>Duty 151</p> <p>Membership 152</p> <p>Conclusion 152</p> <p>References and Further Reading 153</p> <p>Online Resources 154</p> <p><b>7 Political Violence: War, Torture, and Punishment 155</b></p> <p>Umkhonto we Sizwe 157</p> <p>What Is Violence? 159</p> <p>When (If Ever) Is Violence Justified? 161</p> <p>Pacifism 162</p> <p>Gandhi’s pacifism 163</p> <p>Russell’s “relative pacifism” 163</p> <p>Ius ad bellum: “Just War” and the Justification of Large?]Scale Violence 164</p> <p>Testing Just War Theory 166</p> <p>Vagueness 167</p> <p>Manipulability 167</p> <p>Ius in bello: Justice in the Conduct of War 168</p> <p>Cultural Conflicts and the Laws of War 170</p> <p>Pushing the Limits, I: Preemptive War 171</p> <p>Pushing the Limits, II: When Are Captured Combatants “Prisoners of War?” 172</p> <p>Pushing the Limits, III: Torture, “Enhanced Interrogation,” and Ticking Bombs 173</p> <p>Punishment 175</p> <p>Rationales for punishment 176</p> <p>Positive future consequences 176</p> <p>Desert 177</p> <p>Sending a message 178</p> <p>War, torture, and punishment in political context 179</p> <p>References and Further Reading 180</p> <p>Online Resources 182</p> <p><b>Part III Specific Topics 183</b></p> <p><b>8 Who Counts? 185</b></p> <p>Who Gets Justice? 187</p> <p>The Guano Ring 188</p> <p>Animals 189</p> <p>Moral Standing and Moral Personhood 191</p> <p>Degrees of Moral Standing? The Constitutive View 195</p> <p>Comparative Moral Standing: The Constitutive View 195</p> <p>Comparing Characteristics and Abilities 196</p> <p>Objections to the Constitutive View 197</p> <p>Hard Case I: Fertilized Ova and Fetuses 198</p> <p>Hard Case II: Childhood and Disability 201</p> <p>Hard Case III: Distant Peoples and Future Generations 204</p> <p>Hard Case IV: Posthumans? 205</p> <p>Hard Case V: Ecosystems and the Natural World 205</p> <p>Upshot 208</p> <p>References and Further Reading 208</p> <p>Online Resources 209</p> <p><b>9 Religion and Politics 210</b></p> <p>Religion and Politics 213</p> <p>Is Religion Special? 214</p> <p>The limits of toleration 216</p> <p>Neutrality and religion 218</p> <p>Neutrality of intent 219</p> <p>Exemptions for nonreligious reasons 221</p> <p>Multiculturalism 222</p> <p>Justifications for multiculturalism 223</p> <p>Which policies would multiculturalism recommend? 224</p> <p>Criticisms of multiculturalism 225</p> <p>Freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, or freedom of culture? 226</p> <p>Is Religion Suspect in Politics? 227</p> <p>Four sample views on the environment 228</p> <p>Reasons everyone can accept 229</p> <p>Overlapping consensus 230</p> <p>Should religion and philosophy be treated the same? 230</p> <p>Arguing fairly 232</p> <p>Conclusion 233</p> <p>References and Further Reading 233</p> <p>Online Resources 234</p> <p><b>10 Money, Lies, and Political Corruption 236</b></p> <p>Lying Politicians 238</p> <p>What is a lie? 238</p> <p>Why do people lie? 240</p> <p>Utility 240</p> <p>Intentions 241</p> <p>Hugo Grotius and the rights approach 241</p> <p>Virtue 242</p> <p>A license to lie? 242</p> <p>Sneaky ways to win an election 243</p> <p>When is lying justified? 245</p> <p>Dirty hands 246</p> <p>Bribery and Corruption 247</p> <p>Is Blagojevich that different? 250</p> <p>Individual versus institutional corruption 250</p> <p>Campaign finance 251</p> <p>Ethics and institutions 252</p> <p>Just following orders 252</p> <p>Who is responsible? 253</p> <p>Compromise 254</p> <p>Conclusion 254</p> <p>References and Further Reading 255</p> <p>Online Resources 257</p> <p>Index 258</p>

<p><b>Alex Tuckness</b> is a Professor at Iowa State University in the departments of Political Science and<br />Philosophy. His research focuses on toleration, mercy, punishment, international humanitarianism, and public service ethics. He is the author of <i>Locke and the Legislative Point of View </i>(2002) and <i>The Decline of Mercy in Public Life</i> (with John Michael Parrish, 2014) as well as numerous articles.</p> <p><b>Clark Wolf</b> is Professor at Iowa State University in the departments of Philosophy and Political Science. His research focuses on issues in the theory of justice, the philosophy of law, and bioethics. His work on law, intergenerational justice, political liberalism, intellectual property, reproductive ethics, and environmental ethics have appeared in <i>Ethics </i>and other major journals.</p>

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