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<p>Preface vii</p> <p>Acknowledgments xii</p> <p><b>1 Introduction 1</b></p> <p><b>2 Refining the Issues 16</b></p> <p>2.1 What are the Boundaries? 16</p> <p>2.2 What is Cognition? 22</p> <p>2.3 The Possibility of Extended Cognition 25</p> <p>2.4 Conclusion 29</p> <p><b>3 Original Content 31</b></p> <p>3.1 Part of the Mark of the Cognitive: Non-Derived Content 32</p> <p>3.2 The Basics on Derived and Underived Content 35</p> <p>3.3 Dennett’s Critique of Original Content 39</p> <p>3.4 Clark’s Critique of Original Content 46</p> <p>3.5 Anti-Representationalism in Dynamical Systems and Mobile Robotics 51</p> <p>3.6 Conclusion 55</p> <p><b>4 Cognitive Processes 57</b></p> <p>4.1 Individuating Process Types in Science 58</p> <p>4.2 Individuating Processes in Cognitive Psychology 60</p> <p>4.3 A Broader Category of Cognition 70</p> <p>4.4 Conclusion 74</p> <p><b>5 The Mark of the Cognitive, Extended Cognition Style 76</b></p> <p>5.1 Cognition as Information Processing, as Computation, and as Abiding in the Meaningful 76</p> <p>5.2 Operationalism 79</p> <p>5.3 Is This Merely a Terminological Issue? 83</p> <p>5.4 Conclusion 85</p> <p><b>6 The Coupling-Constitution Fallacy 88</b></p> <p>6.1 Some Examples of the Coupling-Constitution Fallacy 93</p> <p>6.2 Replies to the Coupling-Constitution Fallacy 99</p> <p>6.3 Conclusion 105</p> <p><b>7 Extended Cognitive Systems and Extended Cognitive Processes 106</b></p> <p>7.1 Dynamical Systems Theory and Coupling 107</p> <p>7.2 Haugeland’s Theory of Systems and the Coupling of Components 112</p> <p>7.3 Clark’s Theories of Systems and Coupling 119</p> <p>7.4 Conclusion 130</p> <p><b>8 Cognitive Equivalence, Complementarity, and Evolution 133</b></p> <p>8.1 Cognitive Equivalence 133</p> <p>8.2 The Complementarity Argument 143</p> <p>8.3 Evolutionary Arguments 147</p> <p>8.4 Conclusion: The Importance of the Mark of the Cognitive 150</p> <p><b>9 Inference to the Best Explanation and Extended Cognition 152</b></p> <p>9.1 What is the Theory of Enactive Perception? 153</p> <p>9.2 Noë’s Evidence for Enactive Perception 156</p> <p>9.3 The Case against Enactive Perception: Paralysis 166</p> <p>9.4 Conclusion 172</p> <p><b>10 Future Directions 174</b></p> <p>Bibliography 180</p> <p>Index 187</p>

"Where is human cognition located? Is human cognitive processing literally constituted (at least partly) by non-neural portions of the environment? The contemporary debate about extended cognition and the extended mind focuses on these questions, among others. Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa's new book, The Bounds of Cognition (BC), contributes wonderfully to this debate. The book is critical of the extended approach; but Adams and Aizawa (A&A) also work toward a positive view, one that allows, in principle, for extended cognition, while yielding very little of it when fed the empirical facts."(<i>Philosophical Psychology,</i> November 2010)<br /> <br /> “<i>The Bounds of Cognition</i> is the most thorough-going, forceful, and compelling critique of EMH so far.” ( <i>Erkenntnis</i>, September 2009) <p>"[This book] is without question a worthy and timely challenge to extended cognition, as well as to areas in related enterprises such as embodied cognition, situated cognition, dynamical systems theory and artificial life.... I recommend the book highly to anyone interested in these issues." (<i>Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences</i>, June 2009)</p> <p>"This is a well written, well argued book. Written by philosophers mainly for philosophers.... It makes a serious contribution to the extended cognition debate that anyone with a serious interest in the issue needs to study." (<i>Journal of Consciousness Studies</i>, January 2009)</p> <p>"Advocates of EMT must undoubtedly examine the arguments and criticisms that Adams and Aizawa offer in careful detail, because <i>The Bounds of Cognition</i> is the most forceful and most convincing criticism of their position so far." (<i>Metapsychology</i>, October 2008) <br /> </p> <p>“The [authors] wrote this book as a reasoned challenge … .[It] offers an excellent overview of the promise, limits, and problems of bounded cognition. Recommended.” (<i>Choice)</i><!--end--></p> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br />

<p><b>FREDERICK ADAMS</b> is Professor of Cognitive Science & Philosophy and Chair of Linguistics and Cognitive Science at the University of Delaware. He is also director of the Delaware Program in Cognitive Science. He publishes in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. <p><b>KENNETH AIZAWA</b> is Charles T. Beaird Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at Centenary College of Louisiana and is the author of <i>The Systematicity Arguments</i> (2003).

<p>One is naturally inclined to say the tools that surround us—everything from paper and pencils to computers, clothing, and keys—complement our cognitive processing. That is common sense. <p><i>The Bounds of Cognition</i> articulates and defends a theory of "the mark of the cognitive," a common sense approach to cognitive science that differentiates between cognitive and non-cognitive processes. Addressing the limits of the embodied mind, the mark of the cognitive is a refreshing alternative approach to "extended cognition" whose advocates—including a growing number of leading philosophers and psychologists—argue that cognitive processing is not "brain bound," and the mind extends beyond the boundary of the brain and body. <p>Putting their theory of the cognitive into practice, the authors analyze and expose some of the fallacies and shortcomings of extended cognition literature. The Bounds of Cognition is a timely and relevant text that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition while allowing flexibility in exploring the nature of cognition.

"Adams and Aizawa have written a book that is going to leave more than a few researchers in the burgeoning field of embodied cognition scratching their heads and wondering how they could have said those things. In a detailed study, Adams and Aizawa question the very foundations of embodied cognition while on the way elaborating a series of challenges that those who wish to continue in the pursuit of embodied cognition must first address."<br /> -<i>Lawrence A. Shapiro, University of Wisconsin</i><br /> <p>"Adams and Aizawa provide a timely and important critique of an emerging set of views and arguments often referred to as the ‘extended mind.’ Anyone interested in the current state of arguments about the extended mind and the future direction of cognitive science will want to read this book. I look forward to responding to the arguments."<br /> -<i>Richard Menary, The University of Wollongong, Australia</i></p>

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