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Acknowledgements xvii <p><b>Part I Foundations</b></p> <p><b>1 Introduction 3</b></p> <p>1.1 A Brief History of Metaphysics 3</p> <p>1.2 Why Do Metaphysics? 5</p> <p>1.3 How to Use the Book 9</p> <p><b>2 Truthmakers 13</b></p> <p>2.1 Introduction 13</p> <p>2.2 Five Arguments for Classical Truthmaker Theory 19</p> <p>2.3 The Challenge of Deflationism 25</p> <p>2.4 Truthmaker Maximalism 30</p> <p>2.5 Alternatives to Truthmaker Maximalism 36</p> <p>2.6 Conclusion and Preview 44</p> <p>Notes 45</p> <p><b>3 Grounding, Ontological Dependence, and Fundamentality 47</b></p> <p>3.1 Is Grounding Real? 49</p> <p>3.2 Relation between Grounding and Truthmaking 55</p> <p>3.3 Relation between Grounding and Ontological Dependence 58</p> <p>3.4 Conceptual vs. Extra-Conceptual Grounding 62</p> <p>3.5 Alternatives to Grounding? 65</p> <p>3.6 Can Grounding Relations be Grounded? 69</p> <p>3.7 Connections between Grounding and Entailment 71</p> <p>3.8 How is Grounding Different from Causal Explanation? 72</p> <p>3.9 Conclusion: Grounding and Ontological Economy 72</p> <p>Notes 73</p> <p><b>Part II Dispositions</b></p> <p><b>4 Conditionals 77</b></p> <p>4.1 Counterfactual Conditionals: Semantics, Logic, and Metaphysics 78</p> <p>4.2 Hypotheticalism 84</p> <p>4.3 Anti-Hypotheticalism and Laws of Nature 86</p> <p>4.4 Strong Hypotheticalism: Counterfactual Accounts of Powers and Dispositions 90</p> <p>Notes 92</p> <p><b>5 Laws of Nature 94</b></p> <p>5.1 Strong Nomism: The Dretske-Armstrong-Tooley (DAT) Theory of Laws 94</p> <p>5.2 Neo-Humeism: Reduction of Conditionals, Laws, and Powers 99</p> <p>Notes 105</p> <p><b>6 Powers and Properties 106</b></p> <p>6.1 Advantages of Strong Powerism 106</p> <p>6.2 The Individuation of Properties 108</p> <p>6.3 Objections to Strong Powerism 118</p> <p>6.4 Conclusion 121</p> <p>Notes 121</p> <p><b>Part III Universals and Particulars</b></p> <p><b>7 Universals 125</b></p> <p>7.1 Introduction 125</p> <p>7.1.1 What properties must explain 126</p> <p>7.2 Realism 128</p> <p>7.3 Universals and the Problem of Intentionality 142</p> <p>7.4 Properties as the Ground of Causal Powers 145</p> <p>Notes 145</p> <p><b>8 Reductive Nominalism and Trope Theory 147</b></p> <p>8.1 Reductive Nominalism 147</p> <p>8.2 Trope Theory 165</p> <p>8.3 Conclusion 169</p> <p>Notes 169</p> <p><b>9 Particulars and the Problem of Individuation 171</b></p> <p>9.1 Introduction 171</p> <p>9.2 Facts 172</p> <p>9.3 Substances 175</p> <p>Notes 200</p> <p><b>10 Relations, Structures, and Quantities 201</b></p> <p>10.1 Accounts of Relational Facts 201</p> <p>10.2 Non-Symmetrical Relations and the Problem of Order 206</p> <p>10.3 Structural Universals and Constituent Ontology 215</p> <p>10.4 Determinables, Quantities, and Real Numbers 219</p> <p>10.5 Conclusion and Preview 225</p> <p>Notes 225</p> <p><b>Part IV The Nature of Reality</b></p> <p><b>11 Nihilism and Monism 229</b></p> <p>11.1 Nihilism and Aliquidism 229</p> <p>11.2 Monism 237</p> <p>Note 252</p> <p><b>12 The Non-Existent and the Vaguely Existing 253</b></p> <p>12.1 Does Everything Exist? 253</p> <p>12.2 Ontic Vagueness 271</p> <p>12.3 Conclusion 280</p> <p><b>13 Solipsism, Idealism, and the Problem of Perception 281</b></p> <p>13.1 Defining the Mental and the External 282</p> <p>13.2 Solipsism and Phenomenalism 284</p> <p>13.3 Theories of Perception 286</p> <p>13.4 Arguments against Phenomenalism 306</p> <p>13.5 Arguments against Solipsism 309</p> <p>13.6 Conclusion and Preview 312</p> <p>Notes 313</p> <p><b>Part V Modality</b></p> <p><b>14 Possibility, Necessity, and Actuality: Concretism 317</b></p> <p>14.1 Introduction 317</p> <p>14.2 Concretism:Worlds as Universes 321</p> <p>14.3 Problems for Concretism 327</p> <p>14.4 Conclusion 331</p> <p>Note 331</p> <p><b>15 Abstractionism:Worlds as Representations 332</b></p> <p>15.1 Magical Abstractionism 333</p> <p>15.2 Structural Abstractionism 341</p> <p>15.3 Aristotelian Theories of Possibility 348</p> <p>15.4 Conclusion 350</p> <p>Note 351</p> <p><b>16 De Re Modality and Modal Knowledge 352</b></p> <p>16.1 Modality De Re: Transworld Identity and Counterpart Theory 352</p> <p>16.2 Modality and Epistemology: Possibility and Conceivability 363</p> <p>16.3 Conclusion 369</p> <p>Notes 369</p> <p><b>Part VI Space and Time</b></p> <p><b>17 Is Space Merely Relational? 373</b></p> <p>17.1 The Nature of Location 373</p> <p>17.2 Spatial Substantivalism 375</p> <p>17.3 Spatial Relationism 381</p> <p>17.4 Absences and Vacuums 386</p> <p>17.5 Conclusion 388</p> <p>Notes 389</p> <p><b>18 Structure of Space: Points vs. Regions 390</b></p> <p>18.1 Constructing Points from Regions 391</p> <p>18.2 Points vs. Regions 394</p> <p>18.3 Arguments against Points as Fundamental 397</p> <p>18.4 Voluminism vs. Volume-Boundary Dualism 408</p> <p>18.5 Conclusion 414</p> <p>Note 414</p> <p><b>19 The Structure of Time 415</b></p> <p>19.1 Is Time Composed of Instants or Intervals? 415</p> <p>19.2 Instants as Dependent Entities 425</p> <p>19.3 Does Time have a Beginning? 427</p> <p>19.4 Conclusion 429</p> <p><b>20 Time’s Passage 430</b></p> <p>20.1 Tensers and Anti-Tensers 432</p> <p>20.2 Varieties of Anti-Tensism 435</p> <p>20.3 Varieties of Tensism 437</p> <p>20.4 Presentism 439</p> <p>20.5 Arguments for Tensism 442</p> <p>20.6 Conclusion 456</p> <p>Note 457</p> <p><b>21 Arguments for Anti-Tensism 458</b></p> <p>21.1 How Fast Does Time Flow? 458</p> <p>21.2 Truthmakers for Truths about the Past 461</p> <p>21.3 The Theory of Relativity 469</p> <p>21.4 Epistemological Problems for Tensism 473</p> <p>21.5 McTaggart’s Paradox 474</p> <p>21.6 Brute Necessities of Time 476</p> <p>21.7 Conclusion 478</p> <p><b>Part VII Unity</b></p> <p><b>22 Material Composition: The Special Question 481</b></p> <p>22.1 The Existence of Composite Things 482</p> <p>22.2 Are Composite Things an “Ontological Free Lunch”? 482</p> <p>22.3 Redundancy 485</p> <p>22.4 Fundamental Heaps 490</p> <p>22.5 Fundamental Artifacts 497</p> <p>22.6 Living Organisms vs. Mereological Nihilism 499</p> <p>22.7 Finding an Intelligible Principle of Composition 504</p> <p>Notes 513</p> <p><b>23 Composition: The General Question 514</b></p> <p>23.1 Formal Mereology: Le´sniewski, Goodman, and Leonard 514</p> <p>23.2 Three (or Four) Answers to the General Composition Question 518</p> <p>23.3 Accounting for the Correct Principles of Mereology 523</p> <p>23.4 Parthood and Truthmaking 529</p> <p>Notes 530</p> <p><b>24 Change and Persistence 531</b></p> <p>24.1 Does Anything Change? Does Anything Persist? 532</p> <p>24.2 How Objects Change Properties: Substratism vs. Replacementism 537</p> <p>24.3 The Metaphysics of Motion 551</p> <p>Notes 554</p> <p><b>25 The Persistence of Composite Things 555</b></p> <p>25.1 Mereological Constancy and Inconstancy 556</p> <p>25.2 Coincident Things 564</p> <p>25.3 Conclusion 573</p> <p>Note 574</p> <p><b>Part VIII Causation</b></p> <p><b>26 The Existence and Scope of Causation 577</b></p> <p>26.1 Are there Causes? 577</p> <p>26.2 The Scope of Causation 583</p> <p>Note 589</p> <p><b>27 Causation: A Relation between Things or Truths? 591</b></p> <p>27.1 Causal Explanationism 592</p> <p>27.2 Causal Connectionism 605</p> <p>Notes 611</p> <p><b>28 Discrete and Continuous Causation 613</b></p> <p>28.1 Is All Causation Discrete? 614</p> <p>28.2 The Nature of Discrete Causation 614</p> <p>28.3 Is All Causation Continuous? 616</p> <p>28.4 The Nature of Continuous Processes 618</p> <p>28.5 Processes and the Direction of Continuous Causation 621</p> <p>28.6 Are Processes an Exception to Hume’s Epistemic Principle? 622</p> <p>28.7 Conclusion: The Consequences of Causation 623</p> <p>Notes 623</p> <p><b>29 Conclusion: The Four Packages 624</b></p> <p>Appendix A 633</p> <p>Appendix B 651</p> <p>References 655</p> <p>Index 671</p>

<p><b>R<small>OBERT</small> C. K<small>OONS</small></b> is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of <i>Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality</i> (1993) and <i>Realism Regained</i> (2000), co-author of <i>Metaphysics: The Fundamentals</i> (with Tim Pickavance, 2014), and co-editor of <i>The Waning of Materialism</i> (with George Bealer, 2010). <p><b>T<small>IMOTHY</small> P<small>ICKAVANCE</small></b> is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Talbot Department of Philosophy at Biola University. He is co-author of <i>Metaphysics: The Fundamentals</i> (with Robert Koons, 2014).

<p><i>The Atlas of Reality: A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics</i> presents an extensive examination of the key concepts, principles, and arguments of metaphysics, traditionally the very core of philosophical thought. Representing the first exhaustive survey of metaphysics available, the book draws from historic sources while presenting the latest cutting-edge research in the field. Seminal works of philosophers such as David Lewis, Alvin Plantinga, Kit Fine, Peter van Inwagen, John Hawthorne and many others are covered in depth, without neglecting the critical contributions of historical figures like René Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Bertrand Russell, and more. <p>Written in an accessible manner without sacrificing rigor, readers at all levels will gain illuminating insights into metaphysical topics ranging from the problem of universals, individuation and composition, and relations and qualities, to time, space, causation, existence, modality, and idealism. The authors also articulate the emergence of several coherent metaphysical theses, including neo-Aristotelian, neo-Humean, and more recent alternatives put forth by W. V. O. Quine and David M. Armstrong. Competing views are clearly and fairly represented, and key axioms and methodological assumptions are flagged and cross-referenced, providing scholars with an invaluable tool for future research in metaphysics. <p>Unprecedented in breadth of topic coverage and depth of analyses, <i>The Atlas of Reality</i> is an essential resource for those seeking a thorough understanding of one of the most compelling, influential, and enlightening sub-fields of philosophy in today’s world.

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