Cover page

Series page

To Loch Lomond Bentley,

RAF pilot,


who paid the ultimate price in defense of the democracies

Title page

Copyright page

About the Author

Loch Kingsford Johnson is the Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia, as well as a Meigs Distinguished Teaching Professor. He is the author of more than 200 articles and essays, and the author or editor of more than 30 books, on U.S. national security. The books include, most recently, American Foreign Policy and the Challenges of World Leadership (Oxford, 2015); Essentials of Strategic Intelligence (ABC-Clio/Praeger, 2015, editor); A Season of Inquiry Revisited: The Church Committee Confronts America's Spy Agencies (Kansas, 2015); The Threat on the Horizon: An Inside Account of America's Search for Security After the Cold War (Oxford, 2011); and The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford, 2010, editor). He has published editorials in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, the Baltimore Sun, and elsewhere.

Professor Johnson served as special assistant to the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (1975–76); as a staff aide on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1976–77); as the first staff director of the Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight, U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (1977–79); as a senior staff member on the Subcommittee on Trade and International Economic Policy, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (1980); and as special assistant to Chairman Les Aspin of the Aspin–Brown Commission on the Roles and Missions of Intelligence (1995–96). He was the Issues Director in a presidential campaign (1976); served as a foreign policy adviser to President Jimmy Carter in his 1980 re-election campaign (coauthoring the Presidential Briefing Book on Foreign Policy used during the presidential debates); and is currently a consultant to several government and civic organizations.

Professor Johnson has won the “Certificate of Distinction” from the National Intelligence Study Center in Washington, DC; the “Studies in Intelligence Award” from the Center for the Study of Intelligence in Washington, DC; the “Best Article Award” from the Century Foundation's Understanding Government Project; and the V.O. Key “Best Book” Prize (with Charles S. Bullock III) from the Southern Political Science Association. He has served as secretary of the American Political Science Association, and has led its Intelligence Studies Organized Group. He has also been president of the International Studies Association, South.

Professor Johnson is senior editor of the international journal Intelligence and National Security, and he serves on the editorial advisory board for several other journals, including the Journal of Intelligence History and the Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda, and Security Studies. In 2008–09, he was named a Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar, and is now on the Phi Beta Kappa National Board for the Visiting Scholar Program. He has been a Distinguished Visiting Scholar at Yale University and at Oxford University. In 2012, he was selected as the inaugural “Professor of the Year” by the consortium of fourteen universities in the Southeast Conference (SEC). At the 2014 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, he was awarded the “Distinguished Professor” prize, a recognition bestowed occasionally by the Intelligence Studies Section; and, in 2015, he was presented with a Lifetime Achievement Award from the International Association for Intelligence Education.

Born in Auckland, New Zealand, Professor Johnson received his PhD in political science from the University of California, Riverside. In postdoctoral activities, he was awarded an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellowship. He has also studied nuclear weapons policy at Harvard University and MIT. Professor Johnson has lectured at more than 140 universities and think-tanks worldwide. At the University of Georgia, he led the founding of the School of Public and International Affairs in 2001, the first new college at the university since the 1940s.

Figures and Tables


1.1 Basic human motivations and the quest for national security intelligence: a stimulus–response model

1.2 The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) in 2016

1.3 The CIA during the Cold War

1.4 The CIA's Operations Directorate during the Cold War

2.1 The intelligence cycle

2.2 The relationship between a nation's sense of acceptable risk and its resources committed to intelligence collection and analysis

2.3 Frequency of NIEs by year, 1950–2005

3.1 Herblock on blow back

3.2 The ebb and flow of covert actions by the United States, 1947–2010

3.3 A partial ladder of escalation for covert actions

4.1 Key recommendations in the Huston Plan, 1970

5.1 An example of a statement accompanying a presidentially approved covert action: the contra portion of the Iran–contra finding, 1981

5.2 Auth on the relationship between Congress and the CIA prior to 1974

5.3 The cycle of intelligence shock and reaction by congressional overseers, 1975–2006

5.4 A typology of roles assumed by intelligence overseers in the U.S. Congress

5.5 Illustrations of role migration and stability among intelligence overseers in Congress, 1977–2004 196


5.1 Type of stimuli and oversight responses by lawmakers, 1974–2016

6.1 National security intelligence: a reform agenda for the United States 211


ATC air traffic control
BENS Business Executives for National Security
CA covert action
CAS Covert Action Staff
CASIS Canadian Association of Security and Intelligence Studies
CE counterespionage
CHAOS cryptonym (codename) for CIA domestic spying operation
CI counterintelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (the “Agency”)
CIAB Citizens’ Intelligence Advisory Board (proposed)
CIG Central Intelligence Group
COCOM combatant commander (Pentagon)
COINTELPRO FBI Counterintelligence Program
comint communications intelligence
COS Chief of Station (the top CIA officer in the field)
CTC Counterterrorism Center (CIA)
D Democrat
DA Directorate of Administration
DBA dominant battle field awareness
DC District of Columbia (Washington)
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
DCIA or D/CIA Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
DDI Deputy Director for Intelligence
DDNI Deputy Director of National Intelligence
DDO Deputy Director for Operations
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS Department of Homeland Security; also, Defense Humint Service (DoD)
DI Directorate of Intelligence (CIA)
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAC Defense Intelligence Agency Center
DNC Democratic National Committee
DNI Director of National Intelligence
DO Directorate of Operations (CIA), also known at times earlier in the CIA's history as the Clandestine Services and the National Clandestine Services
DoD Department of Defense
DS Directorate of Support
DS&T Directorate for Science and Technology (CIA)
elint electronic intelligence
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FISA Court Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
fisint foreign instrumentation intelligence
GAO Government Accountability Office (U.S. Congress)
geoint geospatial intelligence
GID General Intelligence Directorate (the Jordanian intelligence service, also known as the Mukhabarat)
GPS Global Position Service
GRU Soviet Military Intelligence
HPSCI House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
humint human intelligence (espionage assets)
IC Intelligence Community
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
IG Inspector General
imint imagery intelligence (photography)
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Department of State)
ints intelligence collection methods (as in “sigint”)
IOB Intelligence Oversight Board
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile
IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004)
ISA Inter-Services Intelligence (the Pakistani intelligence service); also, International Studies Association
ITT International Telephone and Telegraph (an American corporation)
I & W indicators and warning
JENNIFER Codename for CIA Soviet submarine retrieval operation in the 1970s (also known as Project AZORIAN)
KGB Soviet Secret Police and Foreign Intelligence: Committee for State Security
KJ Key Judgment (NIE executive summary)
KSM Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the Al Qaeda terrorist said to have mastermined the 9/11 attacks
MAGIC Allied codebreaking operations against the Japanese in World War II
masint measurement and signatures intelligence
MI5 British Security Service
MINARET cryptonym for NSA warrantless telephone taps against Americans (pre-1975)
MIP Military Intelligence Program
MI6 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS – United Kingdom)
MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
NCA National Command Authority
NCS National Clandestine Service
NCTC National Counterterrorism Center
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NIC National Intelligence Council
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NIM National Intelligence Manager (ODNI)
NIO National Intelligence Officer
NIPF National Intelligence Priorities Framework
NIP National Intelligence Program
NOC non-official cover
NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center
NRO National Reconnaissance Office
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Council
NSI National Security Intelligence
NSL national security letter
OBE overtaken by events
OC official cover
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OLC Office of Legal Counsel (Justice Department)
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
osint open-source intelligence
OSS Office of Strategic Services
PDB President's Daily Brief
PDD Presidential Decision Directive
PFIAB President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (as of 2008, PIAB)
phoint photographic intelligence
PIAB President's Intelligence Advisory Board
PM ops paramilitary operations
PRC People's Republic of China
PRISM Codename for controversial NSA sigint program targeting, without a court warrant, suspected terrorists – including some Americans (post-9/11)
RFE Radio Free Europe
R Republican
RL Radio Liberty
SA special activities
SAM surface-to-air missile
SCIF sensitive compartmented information facility
SDO support to diplomatic operations
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SHAMROCK cryptonym for NSA program to read international cables from and to American citizens (pre-1975)
sigint signals intelligence
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SMO support to military operations
SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOG Special Operations Group (CIA)
SOVA Office of Soviet Analysis (CIA)
SR-21 U.S. spy plane (see U-2)
SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
STELLARWIND generic cryptonym for controversial NSA warrantless wiretaps and metadata collection programs (post-9/11)
SVR Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (KGB successor)
techint technical intelligence
telint telemetry intelligence
TIARA tactical intelligence and related activities
TIMBER SYCAMORE CIA PM operation against Syria
TOR Terms of Reference (for NIE drafting)
215 Code number for NSA communications metadata program targeting U.S. citizens (post-9/11)
UAE United Arab Emirates
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle (drone)
USIA United States Information Agency (Department of State)
U-2 CIA spy plane (with later Air Force Variations known as the A-12 and the SR-71)
VC Viet Cong
WMD weapons of mass destruction
YAF Young Americans for Freedom (student group)

Roadmap to a Hidden World

National security intelligence is a vast, complicated, and important topic, with both technical and humanistic dimensions – all made doubly hard to study and understand because of the thick veils of secrecy that surround every nation's spy apparatus. Fortunately, from the point of view of democratic openness as well as the canons of scholarly inquiry, several of these veils have lifted in the past four decades. The disclosures have been a result of public government inquiries into intelligence failures and wrongdoing (especially those in 1975 that looked into charges of illegal domestic spying in the United States), accompanied by a more determined effort by academic researchers to probe the dark side of government. The endnotes in the chapters of this volume are a testament to the burgeoning and valuable research on national security intelligence that has accrued from steady scholarly inquiry into intelligence organizations and their activities.

Much remains to be accomplished, and – quite properly – national security imperatives will never permit full transparency in this sensitive domain. In a democracy, though, the people must have at least a basic comprehension of all their government agencies, even the shadowy world of intelligence. Within the boundaries of maintaining the sanctity of properly classified information, it is incumbent on scholars, journalists, and public officials to help citizens understand the hidden dimensions of their governing institutions.

The Cold War was, in large part, a struggle between espionage organizations in the democracies and in the communist bloc, illustrating the centrality of a nation's secret agencies.1 Sometimes spy services have been the source of great embarrassment to the democracies, as with America's Bay of Pigs disaster (1961), along with the questionable assassination attempts against foreign leaders carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, known as “the Agency” by insiders), acting under ambiguous authority from the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. Harmful to the reputation of America's democracy, too, were the domestic espionage scandals of the mid-1970s, the Iran–contra scandal a decade later, and, most recently, revelations about torture and other forms of prisoner abuse, as well as dragnet “metadata” collection of information about American citizens by the National Security Agency (NSA), employed by the CIA and military intelligence agencies in the struggle against global terrorism. Intelligence mistakes of analysis can have enormous consequences as well, as when the United Kingdom and the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, based in part on a faulty assessment that Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator, was developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that could soon strike London and Washington. Further, intelligence organizations and operations are a costly burden on taxpayers – some $80 billion a year in the United States, according to statements by America's Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in 2010. For all of these reasons, national security intelligence deserves the attention of the public, closer study by the scholarly community, and improved accountability inside democratic regimes.

The challenge is daunting. To some extent, a society's intelligence agencies and its community of scholars are at loggerheads: the government prefers secrecy, while scholars hope for access to information – openness. Still, recent experience underscores that a nation can encourage intelligence scholarship and still have an effective secret service. Indeed, the more a public knows about intelligence, the more likely it is that citizens will support the legitimate – indeed, vital – protective services of these agencies, as long as they operate within the boundaries of the law and accepted ethical probity.

In 2009, a survey of scholarship on intelligence in the United States concluded:

The interdisciplinary field of intelligence studies is mushrooming, as scholars trained in history, international studies, and political science examine such subjects as the influence of U.S. and foreign intelligence on national decisions during the cold war, the Vietnam War, and Watergate; how spycraft shaped reform efforts in the Communist bloc; the relationship of intelligence gathering to the events of September 11, 2001; and abuses and bungles in the “campaign against terrorism.” As the field grows, it is attracting students in droves.2

More recently, a study of the intelligence studies literature finds “path-breaking” new research that has brought in scholars from multiple disciplines and has attracted the attention of more women researchers.3

Hundreds of British, Canadian, and American universities and colleges now offer formal courses on national security intelligence, and these classes are always in high demand. The interest stems in large part from the widely reported intelligence failures related to the 9/11 attacks and the flawed predictions about WMD in Iraq that preceded the Second Persian Gulf war in 2003. Students want to know why these failures occurred and what can be done to prevent intelligence errors in the future. Many of them hope to join their governments in some capacity, whether as diplomats, lawmakers, staff aides, intelligence officers, or soldiers, to engage in activities that will help protect the democracies against attacks and assist the cause of international peace. Others realize that governmental decision-making is based on information and, whether in the groves of academe or within a think-tank, they want to pursue a life of learning about the relationship between information and decisions. Some, raised on James Bond movies, are drawn to the study of national security intelligence because it is a fascinating topic – although they soon discover that the writings of the sociologist Max Weber, an expert on bureaucracy, provide greater insight into the real world of spy organizations than the dramatic license exercised by novelist Ian Fleming.

In recent years, the most important development in the study of national security intelligence has been the effort by scholars to move beyond spy memoirs toward a rigorous application of research standards that address such questions as how nations gather and analyze information on threats and opportunities at home and abroad, and how and why they engage in covert action and counterintelligence operations. Important, as well, as least for democratic nations, has been the question of how to erect safeguards against the abuse of power by secret agencies, at home and abroad. Moreover, studies on intelligence are increasingly offering empirical data, testable hypotheses, and theoretical frameworks – the underpinnings of rigorous scholarly inquiry.4

Further, scholars in the field have been conducting in-depth interviews with intelligence practitioners, and have benefited in addition from the extensive number of intelligence documents released by governments in recent decades. Among these documents are, for example, in the United States: the Church Committee Report in 1975–6 (on domestic spying, covert action, and secret assassination plots); the Aspin–Brown Commission Report in 1996 (on counterintelligence and, more broadly, the state of U.S. intelligence after the Cold War); the Kean Commission Report in 2004 (on the 9/11 intelligence failures); and the Silberman–Robb Commission in 2005 (on WMD in Iraq). In the United Kingdom, the list of valuable new government reports includes the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Report and the Intelligence and Security Committee Report (both in 2003), as well as the Butler Report and the Hutton Report (both in 2004) and the Chilcot Committee (2010), with its report published in 2016 – all of which examined the flawed aspects of British intelligence reporting on WMD in Iraq prior to the outbreak of war in 2003. In Canada, the McDonald Commission Report on domestic intelligence abuse is another valuable source for intelligence researchers (1981).

When the leaders of a nation make a decision, the quality of information before them can be a significant determinant of success or failure. Researchers engaged in intelligence studies seek to know more about this information: where it comes from, its accuracy, how it is used (or misused), and what might be done to improve its reliability and timeliness. The discipline of intelligence studies attempts, as well, to learn more about covert action, which has led to much controversy in world affairs, as with the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961. More recently, America's use of Predator and Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones), armed with Hellfire and other types of missiles, is a new and highly lethal form of covert action, unleashed against Taliban and Al Qaeda jihadists in mountainous regions of northwest Pakistan and Afghanistan, and sometimes inflicting deaths accidentally among noncombatants. As well, drone attacks have been carried out by the Pentagon and the CIA against terrorist targets on the Horn of Africa and across the Maghreb in Northwest Africa, as well as in Syria and Iraq – wherever radical terrorist factions opposed to the democracies are encamped or engaged in their dark arts. Intelligence researchers also study the question of treason: why it occurs and what counterintelligence methods can be employed to reduce its incidence. Further, they explore the question of how democracies can best maintain a balance between the secret operations of intelligence agencies, on the one hand, and the privileges of a free and open society, on the other hand – the ongoing search by the democracies for a workable equilibrium between security and liberty.

National security intelligence is a rich and exciting field of study, for researchers, policymakers, government reformers, intelligence professionals, students, and attentive citizens in every democratic regime. This volume offers an introductory look at this subject, with hopes of encouraging further study by scholars of all ages, along with a renewed dedication to intelligence reform by government officials and citizen activists.

The second edition of this book, like the first, begins in Chapter 1 with an overview of the three major intelligence missions: collection-and-analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence – each of which is replete with its own challenges and controversies. This opening chapter also looks at the multiple dimensions of intelligence, including as a cluster of organizations, as a product, and as a set of activities. Further, Chapter 1 introduces the seventeen agencies that make up America's “Intelligence Community” (IC); suggests why accountability is vital to ensure that these secret organizations adhere to the basic principles of democracy (which has not always been the case); and explores why the American intelligence services have been plagued by a lack of both structural integration and a culture of working together seamlessly toward providing the President and other policy officials with accurate and timely information.

The next three chapters examine more closely each of the core missions, beginning in Chapter 2 with collection-and-analysis. The concept of an “intelligence cycle” is introduced as a useful way to envision how the United States gathers information from around the world and moves it toward helpful analytic reports for the White House and other high councils of government. The steps that intelligence takes while moving from the field to the Oval Office (“the Oval” in Washington lingo) are susceptible to many potential mistakes and distortions, as this chapter reveals.

Chapter 3 takes up the most controversial of the mission triad in the world of intelligence: the use of covert action, such as secret drone attacks in Pakistan. Can, and should, the United States seek to channel the flow of history in a favorable direction by way of hidden interventions abroad – which is the essence of the covert action mission?

Then Chapter 4 peers into the heavily veiled topics of counterintelligence and counterterrorism. These intelligence disciplines are designed to protect the United States from hostile spies and terrorists. The failure of America to thwart the terrorist attacks aimed at New York City and Washington, DC in September 2001, as well as the many other terrorist assaults this nation and its allies have suffered since 9/11, are painful reminders of how significant – and difficult – this responsibility for shielding the democracies can be.

Finally, Chapter 6 reviews why national security intelligence will continue to be a subject of central concern in international affairs, for as long as this world remains a fragmented, uncertain, and dangerous place. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how intelligence activities in the United States and in other open societies might be reformed, both to enhance their effectiveness in providing security for the democratic nations and to ensure the allegiance of the secret services to the core principles of liberty and privacy in these nations.

Much has happened in the world since Polity published the first edition of this book in 2012. This second edition addresses in greater depth the subject of cybersecurity, a growing threat driven home to Americans and their allies by the ceaseless activities of computer hackers against the democracies by autocratic foreign governments, terrorist organizations, and old-fashioned criminals using this new “safe-cracking” tool. Russia has even been accused by U.S. authorities of trying to tamper with the American presidential election of 2016 by hacking into the computers of the Democratic National Committee (DNC), as well as the election boards of various U.S. states (such as Arizona).

Of interest, too, in this new edition are the controversies that have arisen over warrantless wiretaps conducted by the NSA, as well as its massive collection of “metadata” consisting of telephone and social media communication logs of citizens in the democracies – however innocent these individuals might be. The secret agencies in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other democracies adopted this dragnet approach to intelligence collection after the 9/11 attacks – a fact revealed in a leak of classified internal documents in 2013 by a U.S. government contractor, Edward J. Snowden.

Coming to light as well since the first edition has been the extent to which the CIA adopted torture as a counterterrorism interrogation technique in the aftermath of 9/11, along with the rendition of suspected terrorists who have been swept off the streets of their hometowns overseas and kidnapped to foreign prisons for harsh questioning. Critics of these operations wonder if, in combating terrorism, the United States has lost its way, becoming more like the very terrorist factions opposed by democracies and staining the good reputation for ethical behavior that the open societies have enjoyed in many parts of the world. Deep questions of morality have accompanied these startling disclosures, including concerns about the emergence of “surveillance states” even within the free nations. As this book emphasizes, intelligence is not only about security; it is also about safeguarding the traditional democratic values of fair play and the honoring of ethical considerations.

The role of intelligence in support of America's two longest wars – in Iraq and in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks – is given added attention in this second edition. So is the unsettling rise of so-called ISIS, a terrorist organization concentrated in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, but with aspirations to create a new “caliphate” or Islamic nation in the Middle East – an empire based on a narrow form of Islamic radicalism with little tolerance for anything modern, such as the rights of women to an education, to a professional career, or even to drive an automobile. The ISIS leaders have inspired “lone wolf” terrorist attacks in the West, including in recent years mass killings in Paris; Brussels; San Bernardino, California; Nice; and Orlando, Florida. Other topics given closer scrutiny in this edition are the complex relationship between intelligence officers and the policymakers they serve; and the important legal and ethical debates surrounding the use of drones to kill suspected terrorists, some of whom have been citizens of the democratic nations.

The second edition, moreover, has expanded sections on the organizational tensions that exist within the U.S. Intelligence Community, especially between the Department of Defense and the CIA; on the expansion of CIA paramilitary covert actions; on the technical means of gathering intelligence; and on how intelligence can become a political football, “politicized” by some individuals to advance their policy initiatives – even if it means “cooking” (slanting) the information to suit their own political ends. Here is the cardinal sin of intelligence.

While this second edition is a little longer than the first, I have been determined not to turn these pages into an encyclopedic treatise. My goal from the beginning has been to provide a manageable primer on the subject of national security intelligence, without drowning the reader in too many details. Once the fundamentals of intelligence presented in this book are understood, the reader can then turn to the more detailed works offered in the “Suggested Readings” section at the end of this volume.

The study of intelligence is an exciting and meaningful pursuit. The subject ranges across many topics and academic disciplines. It has a certain flare that only secret operations, hidden rendezvouses with foreign agents, long-distance spying by glittering satellites in space, mole-hunting, and drone-warfare can impart. Welcome to the second edition, and to the mysterious and fascinating world of modern-day espionage.

Athens, Georgia



With pleasure, I acknowledge the well-springs of my understanding about national security intelligence, namely: the authors of the works that are cited in this book; the many intelligence officers who have responded to my endless questions and requests for interviews over the years since 1975; and lawmakers Les Aspin, Frank Church, Wyche Fowler, and Walter F. Mondale (who also served as Vice President during the Carter Administration) who provided wise counsel on the view from Capitol Hill. This work has benefited, too, from my own opportunities to work as a staff aide in the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the White House during the 1970s and 1990s. I would like to express my appreciation as well to Dr. Louise Knight, who originally approached me about writing this book for Polity. She is a wonderful editor and I am grateful for her guidance and friendship. Helpful, too, at Polity was Nekane Tanaka Galdos, who provided valuable guidance throughout the preparation of this second edition, and to Sarah Dancy for her sure-handed copyediting. As well, I want to thank Marie Milward and Lieutenant Colonel James Borders – both PhD recipients in International Affairs at the University of Georgia – for their research assistance and insights; and Markus M. L. Crepaz, head of the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, for his support and encouragement. My greatest debt, as always, is to Leena S. Johnson, my discerning “in-house editor” and wife of many blissful years; and to Kristin E. Swati, our daughter, and her husband Jamil Swati – both a constant source of infectious enthusiasm and good judgment. Their encouragement and unbending support made life much easier for me as an author.