COVER
TITLE PAGE
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
FOREWORD
PREFACE
PART I: RELIABILISM, INTERNALISM, AND EXTERNALISM
1. 1 INTERNALISM, RELIABILISM, AND DEONTOLOGY
  1. 1 Internalism and the Reliabilist Revolution
  2. 2 Internalism’s burdens
  3. 3 Goldman’s Incomplete Diagnosis
  4. 4 The Roots of Subjectivism
  5. 5 Defending the GD conception
  6. References
2. REPLY TO MICHAEL WILLIAMS
  1. References
3. 2 GOLDMAN AGAINST INTERNALISM
  1. 1 What is internalism?
  2. 2 Logical and Probabilistic Relations
  3. 3 Epistemic principles (“J‐rules”)
  4. 4 Preservative memory
  5. References
4. REPLY TO BONJOUR
5. 3 HISTORICAL VERSUS CURRENT TIME SLICE THEORIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY
  1. 1 Introduction
  2. 2 The Distinction
  3. 3 Preservative Memory and Forgotten Evidence
  4. 4 Against Current Time Slice Epistemology: Justification and Reasoning Over Time
  5. References
6. REPLY TO KELLY
  1. References
7. 4 THE JUSTIFICATION OF MEMORY BELIEFS
  1. 1 Goldman’s Challenge: The Problem of Forgotten Evidence
  2. 2 A Challenge to Reliabilism: “Bad” Memory Cases
  3. 3 Justificatory Statuses
  4. 4 Problems for Reliabilism about Justified Retention
  5. 5 Epistemic Conservatism
  6. 6 Conclusion
  7. References
8. REPLY TO MCGRATH
9. 5 UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY
  1. 1 Testimony and reliability
  2. 2 An Empirical Case Against R‐NEC? The Relativity of Reliability
  3. 3 Finessing the Non‐Skeptical Constraint
  4. 4 Justification Without Reliability?
  5. 5 Conclusion: The Need for Social Epistemology
  6. References
10. REPLY TO FRICKER
  1. References
PART II: EPISTEMOLOGICAL TROUBLE‐SHOOTING AND SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY
1. 6 PROCESS RELIABILISM AND VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY
  1. 1 Bipartisan Epistemology
  2. 2 Process Reliabilism Compared with Virtue Epistemology
  3. References
2. REPLY TO SOSA
  1. References
3. 7 GOLDMAN ON EVIDENCE AND RELIABILITY
  1. 1 The Need for (Nondoxastic) Evidence
  2. 2 Reliability and Evidential Fit
  3. 3 Ex Ante Justification, Propositional Justification, Evidence, and Defeat
  4. 4 Conclusion
  5. References
4. REPLY TO LYONS
5. 8 A NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO THE GENERALITY PROBLEM
  1. 1 Introduction
  2. 2 Conee and Feldman’s Main Challenge
  3. 3 Conee and Feldman’s Challenge Undermined
  4. 4 Typing in Non‐Monotonic Taxonomies: A Response to Goldman’s Principal Objection
  5. 5 Discussion and Conclusion
  6. References
6. REPLY TO OLSSON
  1. References
7. 9 VERITISM AND EPISTEMIC VALUE
  1. Introductory Remarks
  2. 1 The Swamping Problem
  3. 2 Goldman on the Swamping Problem I: Conditional Probability
  4. 3 Goldman on the Swamping Problem II: Value Autonomization
  5. 4 How a Veristist should Respond to the Swamping Problem
  6. References
8. REPLY TO PRITCHARD
  1. References
9. 10 THE CONDORCET JURY THEOREM AND VOTER‐SPECIFIC TRUTH
  1. 1 Introduction
  2. 2 The Classical Condorcet Jury Theorem
  3. 3 A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem with Different Voter‐Specific Truths
  4. 4 Sketch Proof of the Asymptotic Part
  5. 5 Numerical Illustrations of the Generalized Jury Theorem
  6. 6 What Happens if Individual Competence Depends on the Voter‐Specific Truth?
  7. 7 Concluding Remarks
  8. References
10. REPLY TO LIST AND SPIEKERMANN
  1. References
PART III: COGNITIVE SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, AND METAPHYSICS
1. 11 KNOWLEDGE AND RELIABILITY
  1. 1 Intuitive Counterexamples to Reliabilism?
  2. 2 Believing and Accepting
  3. 3 Evaluating the Moment of Acceptance
  4. 4 Explicit Acceptance as a Merely Hypothetical Diagnostic Device
  5. 5 Reliabilism Versus another Rival
  6. References
2. REPLY TO NAGEL
3. 12 GOLDMAN ON KNOWLEDGE OF MIND
  1. 1 The Role of Testimony in Mental State Ascription
  2. 2 Goldman’s Early Theory of Introspection
  3. 3 Goldman’s Later Theory of Introspection
  4. References
4. REPLY TO HILL
  1. References
5. 13 UNDER INFLUENCE
  1. 1 When the Self Takes Over
  2. 2 When the Other Takes Over
  3. 3 Altercentric Errors in Simulation
  4. 4 Altercentric Bias from an Evolutionary Perspective
  5. 5 Conclusion
  6. References
6. REPLY TO VIGNEMONT AND MERCIER
7. 14 FINDING THE BODY IN THE BRAIN
  1. 1 Introduction
  2. 2 Motor Cognition
  3. 3 Mirroring Mechanisms
  4. 4 Embodied Simulation and Simulation Theory
  5. 5 Body and Language: Facts and Challenges
  6. 6 Social Cognition, Body and Language: Es as a Paradigm?
  7. 7 Conclusions
  8. References
8. REPLY TO GALLESE
  1. References
9. 15 EMBODIMENT IN PERCEPTION
  1. 1 Introduction
  2. 2 The Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognition
  3. 3 Visual Perception is a Poor Candidate for Embodiment
  4. 4 Body‐Based Scaling in Visual Perception
  5. 5 When Embodied Perception is not Embodied Cognition
  6. 6 Conclusion: Moving Forward, Moderately
  7. References
10. REPLY TO FIRESTONE
  1. References
11. 16 COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS
  1. 1 Metaphysics for Debunking
  2. 2 Case Study: Color
  3. 3 Case Studies: Temporal Passage, Spatial Unity
  4. References
12. REPLY TO SCHAFFER
APPENDIX: ALVIN GOLDMAN’S PUBLICATIONS
1. Books by Alvin Goldman
2. Books and Volumes about Alvin Goldman
3. Articles and Chapters by Alvin Goldman
INDEX
END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT

List of Illustrations

Chapter 08
1. Figure 8.1 Taxonomy for furniture.
2. Figure 8.2 A hypothetical taxonomy for belief formation.
3. Figure 8.3 A hypothetical non‐monotonic taxonomy.
Chapter 10
1. Figure 10.1 The probability of a majority vote for option 1 where n₁ = 2 and n₀ = 1.
2. Figure 10.2 The probability of a majority vote for option 1 where n₁ = 3 and n₀ = 2.
3. Figure 10.3 The probability of a majority vote for option 1 where n₁ = 10 and n₀ = 9.
Chapter 15
1. Figure 15.1 Eye‐height scaling in size and distance perception.
Chapter 16
1. Figure 16.1 Goldman’s picture (the relevance of cognitive science to metaphysics).
2. Figure 16.2 Schaffer’s picture (metaphysics as a partner in the debunking project).
3. Figure 16.3 Epistemological backstory for defeat.
4. Figure 16.4 Schaffer’s picture re‐drawn with a loop.

PHILOSOPHERS AND THEIR CRITICS

General Editor: Ernest Lepore

Philosophy is an interactive enterprise. Much of it is carried out in dialogue as theories and ideas are presented and subsequently refined in the crucible of close scrutiny. The purpose of this series is to reconstruct this vital interplay among thinkers. Each book consists of a temporary assessment of an important living philosopher’s work. A collection of essays written by an interdisciplinary group of critics addressing the substantial theses of the philosopher’s corpus opens each volume. In the last section, the philosopher responds to his or her critics, clarifies crucial points of the discussion, or updates his or her doctrines.

Dretske and His Critics
Edited by Brian P. McLaughlin
John Searle and His Critics
Edited by Ernest Lepore and Robert van Gulick
Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics
Edited by Barry Loewer and Georges Rey
Dennett and His Critics
Edited by Bo Dahlbom
Danto and His Critics
Edited by Mark Rollins
Perspectives on Quine
Edited by Robert B. Barrett and Roger F. Gibson
The Churchlands and Their Critics
Edited by Robert N. McCauley
Singer and His Critics
Edited by Dale Jamieson
Rorty and His Critics
Edited by Robert B. Brandom
Chomsky and His Critics
Edited by Louise M. Antony and Norbert Hornstein
Dworkin and His Critics
Edited by Justine Burley
McDowell and His Critics
Edited by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald
Stich and His Critics
Edited by Dominic Murphy and Michael Bishop
Danto and His Critics, 2nd Edition
Edited by Mark Rollins
Millikan and Her Critics
Edited by Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury, and Kenneth Williford
Goldman and His Critics
Edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith

This edition first published 2016
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Registered Office
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

Editorial Offices
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148‐5020, USA
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK
The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/wiley‐blackwell.

The right of Brian McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith to be identified as the authors of of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordancewith the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books.

Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book.

Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and authors have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services and neither the publisher nor the author shall be liable for damages arising herefrom. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data

Names: McLaughlin, Brian P., editor.
Title: Goldman and his critics / edited by Brian McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith.
Description: Hoboken : Wiley, 2016. | Series: Philosophers and their critics | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016025078 (print) | LCCN 2016025889 (ebook) | ISBN 9780470673676 (cloth) | ISBN 9781118609255 (pdf) | ISBN 9781118609170 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Goldman, Alvin I., 1938– Classification: LCC B945.G594 G65 2016 (print) | LCC B945.G594 (ebook) | DDC 191–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016025078

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Laurence BonJour
Professor Emeritus
Department of Philosophy
University of Washington, Seattle

Chaz Firestone
Graduate Student
Department of Psychology
Yale University

Elizabeth Fricker
Fellow and Tutor
Faculty of Philosophy
Magdalen College
University of Oxford

Vittorio Gallese
Professor of Human Physiology
Department of Neuroscience
University of Parma

Alvin I. Goldman
Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science
Department of Philosophy
Rutgers University

Christopher S. Hill
William Herbert Perry Faunce Professor
Department of Philosophy
Brown University

Thomas Kelly
Professor
Department of Philosophy
Princeton University

Christian List
Professor of Political Science and Philosophy
Departments of Government and Philosophy
London School of Economics

Jack C. Lyons
Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Arkansas

Matthew McGrath
Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Missouri, Columbia

Hugo Mercier
Ambizione Fellow
Cognitive Science Center
University of Neuchâtel

Jennifer Nagel
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto

Erik J. Olsson
Professor of Theoretical Philosophy
Lund University

Duncan Pritchard
Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Edinburgh

Jonathan Schaffer
Distinguished Professor
Department of Philosophy
Rutgers University

Ernest Sosa
Board of Governors Professor
Department of Philosophy
Rutgers University

Kai Spiekermann
Associate Professor of Political Philosophy
Department of Government
London School of Economics

Frédérique de Vignemont
CNRS Researcher
Insitut Jean Nicod

Michael Williams
Krieger‐Eisenhower Professor
Department of Philosophy
Johns Hopkins University

FOREWORD

My first and foremost thanks for this volume go to the co‐editors, Hilary Kornblith and Brian P. McLaughlin, who invested huge amounts of time and energy to this project, from conception to final execution. I have debts to each of them for many things over many years, but their work on this project exceeds everything that went before. To the authors of the volume’s chapters I am also exceedingly grateful. I could not have imagined a more astute and incisive assemblage of critics. I very much appreciate the careful and thorough pieces of philosophy (and cognitive science, in some instances) that they collectively directed toward a wide range of my writings. It is possible that I originally misread the proposed volume’s title. I thought it read “Goldman and His ‘Critics’,” with scare quotes around ‘Critics.’ So I wasn’t initially prepared for the tough‐minded seriousness of the critiques I encountered. Nonetheless, I pulled myself together and wrote replies with roughly comparable levels of seriousness; at any rate, as serious as could be mounted subject to my 1000‐word limit per reply. Thanks for the workout, my friends.

Alvin I. Goldman (September, 2015)

PREFACE

This volume contains sixteen essays on Alvin Goldman’s work and his replies to them. Many of the essays focus on Goldman’s contributions to epistemology, both individual and social. Others deal with his important contributions to philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of mind – especially simulation theory – and metaphysics. It is difficult to contain the range of Goldman’s interests and contributions within the covers of a single volume.

Goldman’s contributions to epistemology, beginning almost fifty years ago with “A Causal Theory of Knowing” (1967), completely changed the field. His externalism brought about a paradigm shift in epistemological theorizing from the centrality of the would‐be knower’s perspective to a third‐person view of the features in virtue of which a belief is justified. Part and parcel of this shift was a move away from what Goldman called a “current time slice view” of justification, according to which the justificational status of a belief at a given time depends exclusively on features of the believer at that time, in favor of a historical theory of justification, which makes a belief’s justificatory status depend on features of its causal ancestry. Goldman has elaborated and defended this externalist view in ever greater detail and depth over the years, and the debate between externalists and internalists continues to be a focus of discussion in the epistemological literature. It is thus appropriate that a number of papers here are addressed to that issue.

Once one adopts an externalist approach to epistemological issues, the exclusive focus on features of individual knowers that had been so prevalent within the epistemological literature begins to look misguided. Much that goes on within individuals is, to be sure, relevant to epistemological concerns. But features of the social environment are ripe for epistemological analysis as well, and, especially beginning with Knowledge in a Social World (1999), Goldman has played a crucial role not only in highlighting the importance of these social features, but in developing a full‐scale social epistemology. These concerns are reflected in a number of the contributions to this volume.

Goldman’s work in philosophy of mind and cognitive science rightly receive attention here as well. Goldman gave one of the earliest articulations and defenses of the simulation account of self‐knowledge, a view he presented most fully in Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading (2006), and which he further elaborated in the papers collected in Joint Ventures: Mindreading, Mirroring, and Embodied Cognition (2013).

Finally, Goldman’s work in metaphysics, influenced, as so much of his work is, by results in the cognitive sciences, is also the focus of attention here.

Throughout his career, Goldman’s work has been a model of interdisciplinary research and of scientifically informed philosophy. He has co‐authored work not only with other philosophers, but with economists, psychologists, neuroscientists, and lawyers. The breadth of his vision, the care and clarity with which he has worked out his ideas, the originality and scope of his views, have all contributed to the importance of his work. Goldman’s evident pleasure in interacting with other researchers, and the tremendous contributions he has made by way of those interactions, can be seen here in his replies to the contributors to this volume. We have all profited from these interactions over many years, and it is our pleasure that this volume should serve as a token of our appreciation for Goldman’s many seminal contributions.

We would like to thank Sam Carter for his help with editorial work and for preparing the index.

PHILOSOPHERS AND THEIR CRITICS

GOLDMAN AND HIS CRITICS

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

FOREWORD

PREFACE

PART I
RELIABILISM, INTERNALISM, AND EXTERNALISM