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Political Sociology series

William T. Armaline, Davita Silfen Glasberg, and Bandana Purkayastha, The Human Rights Enterprise: Political Sociology, State Power, and Social Movements

Daniel Béland, What is Social Policy?
Understanding the Welfare State

Cedric de Leon, Party & Society: Reconstructing a Sociology of Democratic Party Politics

Miguel A. Centeno and Elaine Enriquez, War & Society

Nina Eliasoph, The Politics of Volunteering

Hank Johnston, States & Social Movements

Richard Lachmann, States and Power

Siniša Malešević, Nation-States and Nationalisms: Organization, Ideology and Solidarity

Andrew J. Perrin, American Democracy: From Tocqueville to Town Halls to Twitter

John Stone and Polly Rizova, Racial Conflict in Global Society

War & Society

Miguel A. Centeno
Elaine Enriquez











polity

Acknowledgments

We have many people to thank for their contributions to the development of this book. Our gratitude goes out to Randall Collins and Siniša Malešević, who each gave invaluable feedback on early material. We also would like to thank two anonymous reviewers who provided thorough readings and productive critique of the manuscript. Their responses improved the book considerably. Jonathan Skerrett has gone beyond the call of duty in his patience and support as an editor. Thanks are also due to the myriad students and assistants-in-instruction of the Princeton University course on which this book is based, The Western Way of War.

Miguel Centeno has far too many people to thank and fears that any listing will unjustly exclude too many. Students, colleagues, staff, family, and friends have lived for years under the specter of the “war book.” I hope they find the result worth their patience and good will (but reading not required!). Three women helped raise me and taught me most of what I know: Ana Maria Gutierrez, Marta Souza, and Amalia Dahl – I owe them all everything.

In addition to those listed above, Elaine Enriquez would like personally to thank Lauren Lynch, who graciously provided space and time to complete this manuscript, and whose hospitality and patience were unending. I dedicate this book to the many people in my life who have served in the military and with whom I have had countless invigorating discussions – Joann Enriquez and Christopher-Ian Reichel among them.

Introduction

This book is the culmination of over a decade and a half of teaching the course The Western Way of War at Princeton University. The course, as does this book, analyzes the development of warfare in the Western world – Europe, the Americas (primarily the United States), and, to some extent, Japan. Other societies are touched upon, but for the most part this book is a survey of wars and conflicts in these parts of the world. It uses the historical comparative method to glean sociological insights about the nature of warfare and how it reflects and shapes social dynamics and institutions.

Hundreds of undergraduate students have heard these arguments, read the books referenced, and contributed to the thought-provoking discussion that the topic deserves. It is a pleasure to put those years of claims and evidence into book form for other students of war and history, academic and lay alike. We do so in the hope that this work encourages a re-awakening of interest in war on the part of sociology.1

After a discussion of the nature of war and its origin, we have organized the book around two separate claims. The first is that the history of human warfare is one of increasing size, complexity, and organization over the longue durée. Most certainly the first coordinated efforts at violence were little more than collections of individuals – men fighting for a common cause that was temporary and circumscribed. Whatever the source of hostilities, whether scarcity of resources or the need to defend a settlement, these conflicts were limited in scale.

As group conflicts developed, it was still the actions of prominent characters – fighters like the valiant warriors Achilles and Hector and leaders like Alexander the Great – which affected the turn of warfare. Warriors were called to fight, and outcomes could depend on the actions of a few.

Eventually, through a mutually reinforcing relationship of conflict, capital, and politics, war developed into actions between nation states involving armies. Particularly in Europe, we see the development of a series of armies, from mercenary to standing, at the service of a single political entity. These wars of armies would, in turn, be an important foundation for nationalism and statecraft.

The increasing scope and complexity of conflict would continue until history would see veritable wars of societies. European colonialism would forever alter the trajectories of civilizations, from Latin America to Africa to the Pacific. Warfare on a scale heretofore unknown would follow the turn of the twentieth century and would involve the very real threat of total annihilation. Industrialized genocide would become a fact of the human chronicle, and utter destruction would touch the lives of the European peninsula and beyond – not once, but twice.

This, however, brings us to our second claim and organizing principle. Parallel to this historical arc of increasing scale and complexity of conflict, the nature of war has proven to be at all times paradoxical. Its essence is brutal, destructive, and chaotic. Yet war also demands the very best of its participants – heroism, bravery, and inventiveness. It has often been enacted for the greater good, for the betterment of a society, and to protect and extend life. And, incredibly, through its drive for greater lethality, it has been an engine of stunning creation.

The increased numbers of men fighting over greater and greater distances would see the development of a number of state institutions and technological innovations. Census, taxation, citizenship, and the technologies of destruction and communication would all be a result of constant battle. Modern communication systems, including the Internet and global positioning systems, are the direct products of the practice of warfare. And participation in war, ironically, has led many to a better life than they would have otherwise had, socially and economically.

World War II is without question the apotheosis of the massification of war that we trace throughout this book. And now that we are already more than half a century beyond its closure, we conclude the book looking to the future of war. We argue that, particularly as a function of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the nature of war has changed. The empires of Europe came to an end, often violently, in part because the politics and morality of post-war Europe simply could not sustain such forced colonization and occupation. Guerrilla warfare and insurgency are now the hallmarks of conflict in the world, although there are still certainly the threats of large land wars. But attendant with the development of fantastic technologies of war has come a dramatic change in military composition, particularly in the West. We argue that these three developments – the end of empire, insurgency, and a dramatic shift in military service – are what characterize this new future of war in the world.

The literature of war is vast – so vast as to be daunting to all but the most dedicated pupil. We sincerely hope that this volume allows the reader some appreciation of all that makes the subject so fascinating to so many people – its drama, its pathos, and its brilliance. This book may answer some questions, but the greatest of them all – what means war? – may never be satisfied.

Notes