001

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Table of Contents
 
The Chartered Institute for Securities & Investment
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Preface
Acknowledgments
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction
 
1.1 SETTING THE SCENE: ABOUT THIS BOOK
1.2 DIAGRAMMATICAL OVERVIEW OF DEAL LIFECYCLE STAGES
1.3 ROLE-BASED ROADMAP TO THE BOOK
 
Part I - The credit crisis and beyond
Chapter 2 - Looking back: What went wrong?
 
2.1 OVERVIEW
2.2 DATA, DISCLOSURE, AND STANDARDIZATION
2.3 PAPER REPORTS
2.4 ELECTRONIC REPORTS
2.5 DATA FEEDS
2.6 DEFINITIONS
2.7 REPORTING STANDARDS
2.8 UNDERWRITING STANDARDS
2.9 DUE DILIGENCE
2.10 DEAL MOTIVES
2.11 ARBITRAGE
2.12 RATING SHOPPING
2.13 OVERRELIANCE ON CREDIT RATINGS
2.14 MODELS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND BLACK BOXES
2.15 PROPRIETARY ANALYSIS
2.16 RISK MANAGEMENT AND RISK MITIGANTS
2.17 SENIOR MANAGEMENT AWARENESS
2.18 LACK OF DRILLDOWN CAPABILITY AND GROUP-WIDE CONTROLS
2.19 MARK TO MARKET, MARK TO MODEL, AND PRICING OF ILLIQUID BONDS
2.20 GOVERNMENT SALVAGE SCHEMES: WHAT’S NEXT?
2.21 RE-REMICS: PRIVATE VS. PUBLIC RATINGS
2.22 CONCLUSION
 
Chapter 3 - Looking ahead: What has happened since?
 
3.1 CURRENT INITIATIVES: AN OVERVIEW
 
Chapter 4 - Sound practice principles
 
4.1 DATA
4.2 DEFINITIONS
4.3 STANDARDS
4.4 INVESTOR FOCUSED
4.5 MOTIVATION AND DEAL DRIVERS
4.6 ANALYSIS
 
Part II - Deal lifecycle
Chapter 5 - Strategy and feasibility
 
5.1 STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
5.2 KEY SIGNS FOR SECURITIZATION
5.3 DEAL STRUCTURE TYPE
5.4 ASSET CLASSES
5.5 PRIVATE ISSUANCE, PUBLIC ISSUANCE, OR CONDUIT FINANCING
5.6 CREDIT ENHANCEMENT AND PRICING
5.7 ASSET READINESS AND FEASIBILITY STUDIES
5.8 DOCUMENTATION REVIEW
5.9 TARGET PORTFOLIO AND DEAL ECONOMICS
5.10 INDICATIVE RATING AGENCY AND FINANCIAL MODELING
5.11 RATINGS MODELS
5.12 RATING METHODOLOGIES
 
Chapter 6 - Pre close
 
6.1 TYPICAL EXECUTION TIMING
6.2 EXECUTION RESOURCES
6.3 TRANSACTION COUNTERPARTIES
6.4 TRANSACTION DOCUMENTS
6.5 DEAL CONFIGURATION
 
Chapter 7 - At close
 
7.1 DEAL DOCUMENTS, MARKETING, AND ROADSHOW
7.2 PRE-SALE REPORT
7.3 DEAL PRICING AND CLOSE
7.4 NEW-ISSUANCE REPORTS
 
Chapter 8 - Post close
 
8.1 SERVICING AND REPORTING
8.2 DEAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
8.3 THE PERFORMANCE ANALYTICS PROCESS
8.4 DEAL REDEMPTION
 
Part III - Toolbox
Chapter 9 - Understanding complex transactions
 
9.1 STRUCTURE DIAGRAMS
9.2 ANALYTICAL CAPABILITIES
9.3 THE RISK OF OVERRELIANCE ON RATINGS
9.4 ANALYTICAL ROADMAP
9.4.1 Credit portfolio and risk management
 
Chapter 10 - Data
 
10.1 THE “MEANING” OF DATA
10.2 STATIC INFORMATION
10.3 DYNAMIC DATA POINTS
10.4 DATA PROVIDERS
 
Part IV - Analytical tools
Chapter 11 - Vendors
Chapter 12 - ABSXchange
 
12.1 INTRODUCTION
12.2 PERFORMANCE DATA
12.3 POOL PERFORMANCE
12.4 PORTFOLIO MONITORING
12.5 CREATING BENCHMARK INDEXES
12.6 CASH FLOW ANALYTICS
12.7 SINGLE-BOND CASH FLOW ANALYSIS
12.8 SINGLE CASH FLOW PROJECTION RESULTS
12.9 ADVANCED FUNCTIONALITY
 
Chapter 13 - Bloomberg
Chapter 14 - CapitalTrack
 
14.1 CHANGING THE DATA MODEL USED FOR STRUCTURED FINANCE INSTRUMENT ADMINISTRATION
14.2 THE BIG FLY IN THE OINTMENT
14.3 CAPITALTRACK—THE NEW MODEL
 
Chapter 15 - Fitch Solutions
 
15.1 PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
15.2 RESEARCH SERVICES
15.3 STRUCTURED FINANCE SOLUTIONS
15.4 RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MODELS
 
Chapter 16 - Intex
 
16.1 COMPANY HISTORY
16.2 OVERVIEW
16.3 CASH FLOW MODELS AND DATA
16.4 NEW DEVELOPMENTS/RELEASES
16.5 PARTNERS
 
Chapter 17 - Lewtan Technologies
 
17.1 PIONEERS IN A FAST-GROWING INDUSTRY
17.2 BROADENING THE HORIZON
17.3 A GLOBAL SOLUTION
17.4 RESPONDING TO REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
17.5 STREAMLINING WORKFLOWS WITH AUTOMATION TOOLS AND DATA FEEDS
17.6 ABSNet SCHEDULED EXPORT
17.7 HOME PRICE DEPRECIATION AND THE NEED FOR BETTER TOOLS
17.8 THE DEMAND FOR GREATER GRANULARITY
17.9 A BRIGHTER FUTURE
 
Chapter 18 - Moody’s Wall Street Analytics
 
18.1 ABS/MBS INVESTORS TOOLS: STRUCTURED FINANCE WORKSTATION
18.2 CDO INVESTORS’ TOOLS
18.3 ABS/MBS ISSUER TOOLS
18.4 CDO TOOLS FOR ASSET MANAGERS
18.5 CDOEdge FOR STRUCTURERS
18.6 CDOnet UNDERWRITER
 
Chapter 19 - Principia Partners: The Principia Structured Finance Platform
 
19.1 PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT
19.2 RISK MANAGEMENT: CASH FLOW AND EXPOSURE ANALYSIS
19.3 OPERATIONS AND ADMINISTRATION
19.4 SUMMARY
 
Chapter 20 - Trepp
 
20.1 COMPANY HISTORY
20.2 PRODUCT SUITE
20.3 TREPP FOR CMBS
20.4 TREPP DERIVATIVE
20.5 TREPP LOAN
20.6 POWERED BY TREPP
20.7 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
20.8 TREPP’S MARKET AFFILIATIONS
20.9 THE FUTURE
 
Chapter 21 - Author’s toolbox
 
21.1 OVERVIEW
21.2 RATINGS TOOLS
 
Chapter 22 - Bloomberg’s structured finance tools: Tricks and tips
 
22.1 STRUCTURE PAYDOWN FUNCTION (SPA)
22.2 SUPER YIELD TABLE (SYT)
22.3 MORTGAGE CREDIT SUPPORT (MTCS)
22.4 COLLATERAL PERFORMANCE FUNCTION (CLP)
22.5 CMBS LOAN DETAIL SCREEN (LDES)
22.6 DELINQUENCY REPORT (DQRP)
22.7 COLLATERAL COMPOSITION GRAPH (CLCG)
22.8 CASH FLOW TABLE (CFT)
22.9 CLASS PAY DOWN (CPD)
22.10 RATING CHANGES (RATT)
22.11 MORTGAGE API EXCEL WORKBOOKS (MAPI)
 
Chapter 23 - Websites and other resources
 
23.1 TRADE BODIES
23.2 FREE DATA PORTALS
23.3 VENDORS
23.4 STRUCTURED FINANCE PERIODICALS AND OTHER USEFUL RESOURCES
23.5 RATING AGENCIES
 
Appendix A - Glossary
Appendix B - Ratings
Appendix C - List of abbreviations
Appendix D - Bibliography
Index

“Krebsz has provided a thorough and helpful reference book on all aspects of structured finance. For the layman, the opening chapters will provide a useful account of the processes and motivations behind structured finance products. For those involved in the ongoing management of data and risk processes, the detail in later chapters on systems and infrastructure available is unique and it is good to find all of this information in one place.”
Faten Bizzari, Principal at Eastfield Capital Ltd
 
 
“Markus Krebsz has achieved a rare feat. He has written a book about securitization that is practical and useful for practitioners but at the same time provides enlightenment to the general reader.
When the structured finance markets froze up as a result of sub-prime contagion in July 2007, many practitioners walked away, assuming the game was over for good. But Krebsz, who has worked for a variety of global financial institutions, remained a firm believer, always confident the market would come back—albeit perhaps in modified form. He took advantage of the lean years to write this book.
The book provides real value-added for market practitioners of what is a mind-numbingly complex area, including easy-to-follow lifecycle charts of structured products, detailed checklists, graphs, and illustrations. In the second half he also talks you through how to use some of the new analytical and risk management tools available from Principia Partners, Bloomberg, and others.
Given the recent dribbles of new issuance, Krebsz was right to persevere with the market, and one of his main predictions (which almost verges on a plea) is that when securitization does fully return, it will be characterized by transparency, standardization, and simplicity—traits which seemed noticeable by their absence during the rapid growth years of 2003–07. In the introduction to his chapter on Bloomberg he reveals how the expected transformation of the market has been galvanized by the shift in power away from issuers and towards investors. Clearly, if the investors are in charge, they are going to be a lot more discriminating about what they actually buy.
Krebsz is a passionate believer in the need for a healthy securitization market. If all market participants and investors were to read, learn, and inwardly digest this book, common sense would doubtless prevail.”
Ian Fraser, Financial Times correspondent and consulting editor at Bloomsbury Publishing’s Qfinance
 
 
“. . . an authoritative text on the practicalities of securitization, providing a wealth of detailed information on the lifecycle of a typical deal. As the market for structured finance products comes gradually back to life, this book is likely to become a valuable reference for market participants.”
Professor Alexander J. McNeil, Department of Actuarial Mathematics and Statistics, Heriot-Watt University
 
 
“This is a fantastically researched in-depth publication that I learned a great deal from reading and will continue to consult on an ongoing basis. No matter which angle you come from this should be a must-read for all market participants both old and new.”
Martin Sampson, European ABS Business Manager, Bloomberg L.P.
 
 
“. . . a book that is both encyclopaedic in its coverage of the structured products business and a model of clarity of exposition.”
Paul Wilmott, financial engineer and founder of Wilmott.com

The Chartered Institute for Securities & Investment
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The CISI also currently works with a number of academic institutions offering qualifications, membership and exemptions as well as information on careers in financial services. We have over 40 schools and colleges offering our introductory qualifications and have 7 University Centres of Excellence recognised by the CISI as offering leadership in academic education on financial markets.
You can contact us through our website www.cisi.org
Our membership believes that keeping up to date is central to professional development. We are delighted to endorse the Wiley/CISI publishing partnership and recommend this series of books to our members and all those who work in the industry.
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Ruth Martin
Managing Director

Dedication
I am dedicating this book to my fiancée and partner Sally and my son Jimmy. My attention for them vanished when I went into “writing mode”, and it is their patience, understanding, and support that helped me to keep going throughout and eventually—after 4 long years—to complete this project.
Our Jack Russell terrier Heidi has kept me fantastic company during protracted writing sessions (evenings and early mornings) and deserves a place here for her loyalty.
A big Herzlichen Dank to my parents Ursula and Hans who have supported me throughout my life and career and to my sister Michaela whose own perspective on life has helped me adjust the way I see things.
This book is dedicated to all of you—with love.

Preface
If you can’t wait to delve into the substance of the book, I suggest you go straight to Chapter 1: Introduction. However, if you would like to find out more about the background to the book, why it was written, and how it evolved during writing (at the height of the credit crunch in a largely frozen structured finance market), then the preface to the book will paint the picture of my personal journey whilst writing—and pausing—and writing again about a market that was at the time of writing going through both major revolutionary and evolutionary changes, which served to set the backdrop to the book.
The original idea for this book dates back to early 2007 and, by the time the initial proposal was approved by my publisher, the structured finance markets had started to crumble—big time. Nevertheless, I continued working on an early draft until October 2008. Despite there being little new public issuance and virtually closed secondary structured finance markets, I still felt it right to continue.
However, the collapse of Lehman Brothers and its impact on global financial markets forced me to take a step back and give thought to some fundamental questions: given that the structured finance markets had since November 2007 dried up, with very limited public issuance and non-existent secondary-market trading, I wondered whether it would ever return and, if so, when. Seasoned market participants’ view on this issue was clearly divided: some said “yes” (with some reservations), others said “no way” and decided on—or in many cases were forced into having—a career change, where anything other than structured finance would do.
If the market was not going to come back, then writing a book about it would be a waste of my time, the publisher’s time and resources, and of course your time and money because there would be no reason for you to buy it? On the other hand, if it was going to return would there still be a need for such book and, if so, why?
Instead of writing about a subject I feel I know very well, I found myself researching many unknowns and uncertainties. For instance, what would the regulatory environment look like? Bad press, negative publicity, and increasing political global pressure seemed to be heavily focused on this particular market, and “securitization” was being likened to “subprime” by many people at that time. All of which was doing few favors for the majority of otherwise largely unaffected asset classes.
As a consequence of all this research, I concluded that the structured finance market would come back eventually, but it would not bear much resemblance to what it used to look like before mid-2007. In fact, fundamental changes would be necessary to get it back; otherwise, it would not return at all. The key areas I mostly expected to change were standardization, transparency, and simplicity.
Standardization
I expected everything to be much more standardized in terms of asset classes, pre-issuance and post-issuance information, deal reporting, and analytical approaches and models.
 
 
Transparency
Another area that I would expect to fundamentally change is the provision of transaction-specific information. This will include information on bond performance (e.g., details on such credit enhancement draws as monoline insurance wraps), such as underlying collateral information like loan-by-loan information. For the first time in this market, investors are now in the powerful position to demand performance-related information from issuers as a condition for them to return to the market and start investing again. What is more, issuers find themselves obliged to listen to investors’ demands for this kind of information, or else they would be faced with a situation in which the majority of investors would be clearly reluctant to invest in issuers’ products. Furthermore, many global initiatives by trade bodies such as AFME/ESF, SFIMA and many more—with input from Bloomberg and other third-party vendors—will help to set new standards and provide templates and best practice models for standardized deal information.
 
 
Simplicity
One of the key features of some asset classes was the complex nature of the structures. Deal structures had become overly complex for various reasons pre credit crisis, but going forward there will be no place in the market (or investor appetite) for deals that have been structured in such an opaque fashion. Some of these deals were structured intentionally to achieve artificial asymmetry of information, either by using structures that were so complicated that no one could really understand and follow them or by using “black-box” models that were nigh on impossible for investors to grasp—no matter how sophisticated they considered themselves. You may also call this “arbitrage on information”—more on this in Chapter 4 on sound practice principles.
 
 
The “box-to-line ratio”
When I first started as an apprentice and newbie in the structured finance market back in 2001, my then manager—who happened to be the senior risk manager for “special products”—occasionally used to decline credit approvals for instruments where the structural complexity was simply too unwieldy to quantify and the underlying risks too difficult to understand. He used to call this the “box-to-line” ratio; if there are too many “boxes” (i.e., too many counterparties performing different functions in the deal) and too many “lines” (i.e., too many multi-dimensional relationships between these counterparties), we should steer clear of the deal. In a sense, I guess he was right and, since investors will increasingly be required by law to rely on their own structural analyses rather than just on research provided by credit rating agencies, simplicity will be an important factor for the return of the future market.
 
 
Arbitrage mechanisms
“Arbitrage” has been inherent in many transactions and simply means that one or more counterparties to a transaction can (and will) profit from any imbalance in the transaction. Such imbalances can appear in many shapes and forms not all of which are necessarily detrimental:
Timing arbitrage. Someone may receive funds that legally belong to somebody else but is contractually required not to pass these funds on immediately.
Informational arbitrage. Somebody may have access to or simply has more information available than someone else and may be tempted to act on the basis of this knowledge. Such asynchronous information can make all the difference when executing a trade; the line between this and “insider trading”—which is illegal—can be thin.
Different regulatory treatments (e.g., different regulatory rules used for banks using the standardized or foundation approach vs. the internal ratings based approach led to the application of different multiplication factors when calculating the required capital reserve). As a result one investor’s strategy may be more focused on investing in higher grade assets (i.e., assets with investment-grade ratings) whereas others may be specifically looking to invest in lower grade bonds (i.e., with speculative-grade ratings). This is also occasionally referred to as “regulatory arbitrage”, which can also occur as a result differences in legal jurisdictions and in cross-border transactions.
Declaration of “interest”
Finally—before bringing the preface to a close and jumping straight into the main body of this publication—let me declare my “interest” and make a “confession”: you will see from reading the book that I strive to maintain a fair and constructive level of criticism concerning the rating agencies—at least, concerning the three major ones (i.e., Moody’s Investor Services, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings).
First, you may be aware or have seen in my bio that I worked for Fitch Ratings from 2004 to 2006—first, as a performance analyst and, then, as a primary ratings analyst for corporate and infrastructure securitization. During little more than those 2 years I gained great insight into the credit rating agency business and was able to refine and polish my analytical skills. The atmosphere at Fitch was great and it was an interesting place to be and a great company to work for. I was also passionate about my work there and, hence, got pretty upset to see the demise of the agencies when they became scapegoats for the collapse of the market. Don’t get me wrong, they for sure contributed to the collapse, but it was by no means their sole fault. After leaving Fitch, my passion for the structured finance market evolved and, whilst I still respect the work that is done by the agencies, I have also become one of their critics, albeit a measured one. Although critical, I still consider myself a “friend” of the agencies and hope some of my criticism will be read and interpreted as constructive rather than destructive. The service the agencies provide will continue for a long time, but the framework within which they operate has already changed and further changes are highly likely. So, please, when I criticize the agencies in the following pages, keep in mind that this criticism comes from passion for them rather than dislike of them.
Furthermore, note that all references to ratings apply (unless otherwise stated) only to the structured finance area, which differs considerably from how corporate ratings are assigned.
A second point you may pick up on is that I dedicate quite a few pages to Bloomberg and its services (Chapters 13 and 22). I can assure you this is not a marketing pitch for Bloomberg and (unfortunately) I will not get any commission for the number of times the firm gets mentioned in this book. However, I am happy to confess to being a Bloomberg beta-user and over the past 2.5 years have been in close discussions with the firm to develop customized solutions in collaboration with them for the structured finance market. Bloomberg has always been receptive and—more than once—came up with brilliant and innovative solutions that will benefit the structured finance market for years to come. Bloomberg has kindly supported my efforts by providing me with reprint licenses for a considerable number of screenshots and I am truly grateful for such support. Ultimately, I hope that you will be able to benefit from this symbiosis and end up using some or all of these tools in your day-to-day business.
Third, you may have noted that this book is published by Wiley under the umbrella of the Chartered Institute of Securities & Investment—CISI (www.cisi.org). I am an ordinary member of the CISI who sits on the Institute’s Risk Forum and IT Forum Committees. Furthermore, I undertook the technical review for the CISI’s Risk in Financial Services workbook and the senior review for both the CISI’s Operational Risk (13th edition) workbook and the IT in Investment Operations workbook. In such capacities, I have been conducting volunteer and charitable activities for the CISI, but I am not an employee of the Institute. Having said that, I am a great supporter of what the CISI does and stands for and, hence, will recommend some of the Institute’s other publications as and when applicable throughout the book.
 
 
 
Disclaimer
Before you rush off and try out the tools referred to in Part IV of the book (some of which are available for download on the companion website www.structuredfinanceguide.com), note that I will not assume any liability for using these tools. Although carefully written and developed, they rely to some extent on third-party applications (e.g., Bloomberg and Excel) and, hence, some of the code will naturally be subject to change.
For instance, whilst some old BBG code was based on “blpb” and “bdp”, current codes use “bdp” and “bps” functions which make things considerably faster and more efficient. In addition, Bloomberg offers “code conversion tools” as part of its Excel plug-ins and you may need to tweak some of the downloadable files to get them working. Some of the suggested functionality (e.g., the “BBG Portfolio Uploader” or the “MTGE Bond List Generator”) contains Bloomberg’s proprietary code and macros, hence I will not be able to supply this as a downloadable file due to copyright and software licensing restrictions.
Nevertheless, I can direct you to the relevant function or function code which will enable you to download the newest version. Again, as functionality is constantly improving you may find that tools work slightly differently than described in the book. If you experience difficulties with any of the Bloomberg functions, I suggest you get in touch with the firm’s helpdesk. Otherwise, check out the book’s companion website www.structuredfinanceguide.com to look for updates.
 
 
 
The year of regulation: 2010
2010 turned out to be the year of regulation: the only things that remained static in the structured finance market were the constant regulatory proposals, impact assessments, the setting up of many working groups around the globe by various trade bodies, regulators, central banks, and the like, and the hundreds of working group meetings—all aimed at getting the market back on its feet.
Section 3.1 provides a brief, but by no means exhaustive, list of initiatives that will have a major influence in years to come (some, such as Basel III, until 2018 and beyond) and will determine the shape, look, and feel of the new market. Many of these initiatives were only set in stone in the second half of 2010 and some will undergo impact assessments before they take their final shape and became regulatory rule(s). So, you will have to forgive me if I cannot draw a more precise and more detailed picture of the future market landscape, simply because there are too many uncertainties in terms of practical implementation and actual impact on the market. Some of these initiatives will continue at least until 2012, so be wary of the muddied waters you will find yourself in if you work in this particular sector of the capital markets.
 
 
 
Conclusion
As of July 2010—3 years after starting to write this book—I can see the first clear signs of the structured finance market gently returning (at least some parts of it): there was some issuance of ABS notes in 2008 and 2009, approximately USD900bn of which was issued in the U.S. (representing a 50% increase over 2007 U.S. issuance levels) and around USD65bn was issued in Europe, which was 87% less than 2007 issuance volumes (source: AFME/ESF).
In stark contrast are the figures for European ABS issuance financed and retained by the European Central Bank and the Bank of England, who have since become two of the world’s largest special investment vehicles (SIVs): around USD1,100bn of European ABS issuance in 2008 and 2009 was retained by the European Central Bank and around USD535bn by the Bank of England (source: CABS/Bloomberg).
Moreover, whereas the U.S. market has seen previous ABS investors recently returning to the market, Europe is still lacking a similar private investor base, meaning the pricing for European ABS remains expensive compared with pre–credit crunch levels. For instance, a AAA-rated auto loan ABS transaction priced at +5 to 10 basis points over the 1-month EURIBOR in Europe compares with a similar AAA-rated bond priced at +100 to 160 basis points over 1-month EURIBOR in the U.S.
By mid-June 2010 there appears to be a thin but healthy pipeline of transactions lined up for issuance in the second half of this year and 2011. What surprised me most is that one rating agency indicated that they have been asked (as of June 2010) to rate around 20 collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)—one of the asset classes that suffered the greatest losses during the credit crunch. However, they also made it pretty clear to me that, while these deals are CDOs in nature, the issuers requested the agencies call them anything but CDOs; so, instead, they will now be called either structured credit financing of corporate loans (old name CLOs) or structured project financing (previously these transactions were either called “synthetic CDOs” or “CDOs” or something similar). Not only does the market seem to be picking up in terms of issuance pipelines, but I also noticed recently an increased number of adverts for deal structurers, rating agency analysts, and other jobs that play a predominant part at deal lifecycle inception and early stages.
Only time will tell how large the future structured finance market will become and what it will look like, but I dearly hope that it will achieve organic but sustainable growth to maximize the benefits for the real economy (i.e., small businesses, firms generally, and ultimately individual consumers). I doubt it will ever reach the size pre credit crunch, but as my dear friend Nassim Nicholas Taleb (author of The Black Swan, Fooled by Randomness, and Dynamic Hedging) would suggest, too big is not beneficial and eventually doomed to failure—he was right about the 2007–2010 credit crunch.1
Markus Krebsz

Acknowledgments
First, I extend my gratitude to Wiley’s commissioning editor Jenny McCall who played a huge part in making this successful by encouraging me to finish the book over the past four years and the Chartered Institute for Securities & Investments for supporting this project.
I would also like to thank everyone who made my professional journey over the past two decades enjoyable—there are too many individuals to mention, but they will know when they read this.
Last but not least—thank YOU for buying this book and your interest and belief in the structured finance market. If you are working in this sector, please do your bit to represent it with the integrity it needs and the professionalism it deserves, particularly when you are dealing with “other people’s money”. This may be something that was often forgotten prior to the credit crunch but, nevertheless, is one of the most important foundations of this profession.
The following individuals (in alphabetical order) have all somehow inspired me or helped in their unique ways to make this book happen—although some may not even know they did. As such, I am privileged for having known them and grateful for having been able to work with them: Zeyn Adam, Marco Angheben, Patricia Perez Arias, Rui Barros, Faten Bizzari, Mark Bowles, Catriona Boyd, Dennis Cox, Frank J. Fabozzi, David Flett, Ciro Ferraz, Lillian Flores, Simon Furey, Charlie Genge, Jamie Harper, Usman Ismail, Mark Kahn, Chris Kilborn, Vas Kosseris, Vinod Kothari, Stephanie Kumar, Guillaume Langellier, James Leppard, Douglas Long, José Lourenço, Mitchell Maddox, Kerry McGrath, Doug McLean, Jean-Christian Mead, Ashley Meek, Ned Meyers, Gabriel Odediran, Graham Page, David Pagliaro, Stephen Peecock, David Pellatt, Lawrence Richter Quinn, Christina Reinke, Martin Sampson, Neil Shuttlewood, Lucy Smith, Neil Smith, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Janet Tavakoli, Harry Thurairatnam, Gemma Valler, Gary van Vuuren, Colin Warschau, Rick Watson, Gerald M. (Jerry) Weinberg, Paul Wilmott, Jim Wilner, Debra Wilson, and Mi Zhou.
Hope you will enjoy reading this book as much as I did writing it.

1
Introduction

1.1 SETTING THE SCENE: ABOUT THIS BOOK

First of all—and before I forget: Thank you for buying this book.—I much appreciate your interest and curiosity.
As the subtitle of this book implies, we will be taking a close look at a securitization and structured finance “deal”. But, hang on a minute, there are so many different deals out there, spanning across many different asset classes as well as jurisdictions, so why are we looking at one “deal”?
The answer is simple: Our starting point for this journey is a generic deal, with no particular focus on asset class, deal structure, or jurisdiction. Based on the generics, I will guide you through along the way and would hope to develop your understanding so that you are equipped with the right tools, are able to ask the right questions, and consequently receive the appropriate answers.
Thinking about this introduction, I realized that there is really no such structured finance or securitization “college” or “university” course out there that would equip practitioners with the necessary tools and skills to just go away and structure or manage a deal throughout the transaction’s lifecycle for their firms. Clearly, there are many independent providers of courses (including more recently the rating agencies themselves), but with those courses being more theoretical in nature and typically only lasting a short duration (i.e., 2 to 5 days), don’t expect to walk away as a qualified structurer, underwriter, rating agency analyst, or securitization lawyer from such seminars.
Furthermore, a lot—if not most—of the practical knowledge and skills that are needed for these kinds of fairly complex activities are typically acquired over a long period of time on the job and by working with more experienced colleagues. However, as a direct consequence of the credit crisis, many banks and other financial institutions were forced to wind down some—if not the majority—of their structured finance-related business areas leading directly to a huge drain on experienced resource.
The knowledge in this book has been accumulated over at least 10 years including the “good” years, when this was a highly buoyant market as well as the four solid years of the 2007–2010 credit crisis—which many commentators referred to as the worst one of the last century. I am very grateful and indeed feel privileged to have been able to see both sides of the coin and to have been able to learn from both of them.
Whilst I can understand that some people may wish they could turn the clocks back pre crisis, when many institutions as well as individuals were doing very well, I can also understand an adjustment was probably overdue and with the crisis the pendulum had overswung. What we have seen since are many serious attempts to restore some kind of equilibrium. The danger here is of course that the securitization and structured finance market will be hit too hard with new regulatory requirements and essentially become prohibitively regulated.
Structuring a transaction can take anything from 2 to 6 months whereas the resulting structured finance deal is likely to be around for much longer—anything from 5 to 25 years, in extreme cases even considerably longer (usually due to specific legal or other requirements in certain jurisdictions).
The book’s key aims are twofold:
• To provide a solidly grounded back-to-basics approach that allows you to gain a quick understanding of the underlying key principles and sound practices for conducting these types of transactions.
• To give you a tried and tested set of tools to get you started in the structured finance market.
Please note, however, that the market itself has always been—and continues to be—in constant flux and, more recently, it has become increasingly difficult—if not at times impossible—to keep up with global developments. This leads to a higher level of uncertainty in terms of the form and shape the future market will actually evolve into. Taking a more generic deal view helps here in ensuring that most of this will be applicable to you in one way or another, no matter whether you are based in Europe, the U.S., or Asia—as I take a global view here.
I personally hope that you get value out of the book. If you have any comments—good or critical—please feel free to send them to me via the book’s companion website www.structuredfinanceguide.com or contact me at www.markuskrebsz.info

1.2 DIAGRAMMATICAL OVERVIEW OF DEAL LIFECYCLE STAGES

The following section provides a diagrammatical overview of deal lifecycle stages for a generic structured finance transaction. I emphasize the focus on generic as there may be slightly different steps depending on the asset class and jurisdiction that are involved. Figure 1.1 gives you a general overview of these deal lifecycle stages and also provide a roadmap to the book.
Following this overview you will find a more detailed roadmap (Chapter 2) dependent on the particular role you may currently be playing in the market (i.e., originator, issuer, deal structurer, arranger, lawyer, rating agency analyst, investor, portfolio manager, researcher, regulator, financial journalist, or other interested parties).

1.3 ROLE-BASED ROADMAP TO THE BOOK

Assuming that you are currently playing a particular role in the structured finance market, you would typically be more interested in certain areas and chapters more than others. Hence, I hope that you will find the following guidance with a focus on your particular area useful.

1.3.1 Originator, issuer, deal structurer, arranger

If you look at these roles logically, you may see that most of the chapters covering pre-close and at-close lifecycle stages are likely to be of most interest to these types of market players.

1.3.2 Investor, portfolio manager, asset manager

Equally, from an investor’s, portfolio manager’s, and asset manager’s perspective anything post close of a transaction’s lifecycle is likely to be most interesting for the analysis of transactions. However, in light of recent regulatory changes (e.g., requiring investors to undertake their own due diligence), some chapters on asset readiness are likely to be of interest to these roles too.
Figure 1.1. Generic deal life cycle stages
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1.3.3 Lawyers, rating agency analysts, researchers, regulators, financial journalists and others that do not fit any of these categories

For the remaining readers, I’m afraid it pretty much depends what in particular you are after, so you are best advised to take a look in the table of contents as well as the comprehensive index at the back of the book to see if this helps.

Part I
The credit crisis and beyond

2
Looking back: What went wrong?

2.1 OVERVIEW

To answer the question, “Looking back: What went wrong?”, the answer can be succinctly given as “Quite a few things actually.”
But in all fairness, each of the following sore points on their own would probably not have led to the spectacular collapse of the structured finance market, in particular, and the global financial markets, in general. The combination of them, however, within the framework of globally operating and highly interconnected capital markets led to the chain of events that unfolded into the financial crisis 2007 to 2010.
This was then further exacerbated by a panicked reaction of the global financial regulators as well as market participants. For instance, the decision to withdraw formal support for Lehman Brothers in September 2008: I remember working for one of my clients who was at that time holding one of the largest portfolios of structured finance bonds—approximately 1,100 bonds worth around £45bn at the time—and many of these bonds were in one way or another exposed to Lehman credit risk as counterparties. The impact of Lehman’s bankruptcy on those bonds as well as countless transactions where it acted as credit default swap (CDS) or interest rate swap (IRS) counterparty was almost impossible to assess—you can imagine the tension in the air; something I will never forget.
Some call this “the law of unintended consequences” and I guess they are right. These panicky decisions were taken in a matter of days—sometimes hours—and the only people involved were usually senior government officials, central bankers, and the CEOs of all the big banks affected—not necessarily best placed though to understand the potential impact of their decisions on the market, particularly the structured finance market.
I don’t blame them: it’s just the way things were in those days in many institutions: information would be filtered before it actually hit the top level and in many cases senior management would only get to see part of the picture—not always able to properly understand the implications of what they did get to see. Another example was a client who was sitting on a sizable structured finance portfolio for years with senior management blissfully unaware of what “assets” were sitting in its books.
In order to develop best practice principles for the market post credit crunch it is important to understand what went wrong and why? Once the shortcomings have been identified, we will be able to look ahead and understand the requisites so that a better and more robust market develops.
Before we delve deeper into this in Section 2.2, please note that we will be taking a closer view at areas that are of particular importance for securitization and structured finance only. If you are after additional sources and reports covering the whole financial market and not only this subsector, then please refer to this book’s bibliography. Alternatively, search for “Financial crisis of 2007–2010” on Google which will help you identify the comprehensive coverage and the underlying problems that led to the credit crunch.

2.2 DATA, DISCLOSURE, AND STANDARDIZATION

When you as an individual are borrowing a substantial sum (e.g., for a mortgage) from your bank, the lender would like to become fairly comfortable that you will be able to repay the mortgage over the agreed period as well as ensuring that you have a sufficient regular income to service the interest payments for the term of the mortgage. You may call this process of gathering data and answers to relevant questions “due diligence”.
In order to support such due diligence activities as well as subsequent risk analysis your lender will typically request a considerable amount of information (i.e., data) so that he can support his decision and justify whether or not you have the creditworthiness and financial standing to service your principal as well as interest payments.
Some of the data used by lenders would be information about your financial history and possibly the use of a “credit score” of some kind, which simply puts you into one of various categories which expresses your presumed current credibility based on your past financial performance. This credit score would then be used as a measure to forecast and predict whether or not you may be able to repay the mortgage over the term of the loan.
You would expect the same lender to be even more prudent when using substantially larger amounts of (not quite his own money) to purchase, say, AAA-rated prime U.S. RMBS tranches. Amazingly, this was not always the case with structured finance investments as many investors turned to the credit rating agencies for such assessment instead.
For starters, rating agencies would typically receive larger amounts of data which enables them to undertake detailed analysis. Some of these data would have been treated almost as proprietary by the originators of such instruments and hence they would not offer the same level of information to investors of their structured finance bonds. Furthermore, rating agencies would also request considerable amounts of historical data in order to model the future expected (rating) performance of these structured finance bonds. The difficulty here though is that it is fairly difficult—in fact, almost impossible—to model future performance based on historical information because
• A rating model will always be a “model” and never be able to reflect true reality. In fact, as my dear friend Nassim Taleb would put it: “Models are always wrong, but some are harmful.” So please keep this in mind.
• People in the investment funds business know and understand this truth—hence they include a disclaimer in their prospectuses which states that “Past performance is no indication of future returns” which is not just a legal clause but a fundamental investment principle that should never be ignored.
Once the deals have been structured and issued to the market, there would be—depending on the asset class—considerable amounts of performance-related data (e.g., trustee, servicer, cash manager reports, etc.) available to investors. However, from an investor’s perspective, it can be a lengthy and tedious process to lift this information from these reports and change it into a comparable, digestible, and easy-to-process format to support the investor’s surveillance, performance, and risk analysis.
Even back in 2006 at the height of the market prior to its collapse there was a considerable amount of structured finance bond issuance in some asset classes which would report either in paper or near paper electronic format.

2.3 PAPER REPORTS

Paper reports can be sent by post or alternatively distributed as telefax. Paper reports do not generally provide an easy means of entering the information into a bank’s or financial institution’s proprietary performance analytics systems. You would literally need a team of “performance data coordinators” or similar who would lift (i.e., physically read) the information of these paper-bound reports and then enter them into the relevant systems. Even some of the rating agencies’ surveillance teams would process paper reports in such a fashion. You can imagine that this is not the most efficient process and in some case it can take considerable time from the receipt of those reports until they finally appear (e.g., on the rating agencies’ websites). Furthermore, if your institution has a file retention policy which, depending on the jurisdiction you are operating in, can be anything from 5 to 10 years after a transaction has matured (and some have maturity dates of 25 years or even longer), you will appreciate that the collection of various monthly investor reports for one single transaction can consume considerable storage space over the deal’s life. Let alone if you have several dozen of these transactions in your portfolio. Fortunately, the parties involved have recognized these issues and electronic reports are becoming much more common.

2.4 ELECTRONIC REPORTS

Reports in electronic format are considerably easier to distribute and store, but it depends a lot on the format of these files whether they are actually easier to use than paper files.
The most common electronic file formats are portable document format (PDF) and tagged image file format (TIFF) files. TIFF is used to store images and in this context are in essence scanned paper documents which are easy to distribute, but are similarly annoying to paper reports when processing them, as they are typically not searchable. Assume you have a 250-page portfolio manager’s report as a TIFF file and you are looking for certain key performance indicators: you will most likely have to flick through the pages on your screen to see whether you can find the data points you are after. Depending on the file format, you may be able to use optical character recognition (OCR) software in order to transpose such reports into an electronically readable format; but OCR software is usually not part of the standard desktop setup in a bank or financial institution.
Portable document files (PDF), on the other hand, are easily readable and electronically searchable and hence represent much better usability.
Both TIFF and PDF files have one major constraint: the data in these file formats are not easily exportable into Excel or similar programs and hence do not facilitate detailed analysis. Of course, you could use conversion software which transposes the information from PDF into Excel. In my experience, whilst such software may work with simple embedded PDF tables, it is not always possible to get the data into Excel without manual intervention.
Issuers of ABS deals are currently required to file their registration statements, current reports, and periodic reports in ASCII (American standard code for information interchange) or HTML (hypertext markup language). The SEC has in its proposed new ruling for ABSs (Release No. 33-197; 34-61858; File No. S7-08-10) suggested introducing a filing requirement in XML (extensible markup language) as an asset data file. XML is a machine-readable language and the SEC expects, by proposing this new disclosure requirement, that users of these data (such as investors) will be able to download this information directly into their proprietary spreadsheets and databases. As XML follows an openformat data structure, investors will be able to use off-the-shelf commercial software solutions to analyze it further or indeed are able to build their own analytical tools.
A key advantage of data in XML format is that the information can be processed automatically, without any great manual intervention. Further, it can also be “tagged” ensuring consistent structure of context and identity, which helps recognition and processing by a variety of analytical software.

2.5 DATA FEEDS

As an alternative to collecting individual files, and in particular if you are holding a large number of bonds (say > 500) and only have a limited amount of staff resources to look after the performance of such a portfolio, you may wish to consider a third-party vendor solution such as an automated data feed. Of course, such a service will usually come at considerable cost, but clearly can have additional advantages. These feeds can either come in the shape of an XML file which may be provided to you via FTP (e.g., ABSNet’s “scheduled export”) or you may be able to source the information directly into your proprietary applications via an application-programming interface (API), such as Bloomberg’s desktop and/or server API. Alternatively, you may be able to download specific performance information in a digestible and easily processable data format (e.g., Excel or CSV) from the credit rating agencies; this could either relate to individual deals you hold or you may also be able to source benchmark information (e.g., Fitch’s and S&P’s credit card index data) so that you can compare the performance of your deal(s) against the performance of the whole market sector by benchmarking your transaction(s).

2.6 DEFINITIONS