Social Interdisciplinarity Set
coordinated by Georges Guille-Escuret
Volume 2
First published 2018 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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The rights of Georges Guille-Escuret to be identifiegd as the author of this work have been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018954711
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A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978-1-78630-200-7
“The traditional division that separated a theory from its application was unaware of this need to incorporate the conditions of application into the very essence of the theory”.
Gaston Bachelard1
Going back to a cooperation project between the social sciences and ecology, or the relationship between nature and culture as a research object, seems rather incongruous in the face of the abundance of texts that resonate behind the solemn and irrevocable refutation of “major sharing”: to begin with, it might probably be better to excuse this intention, which is paradoxically retrograde due to its progressive character.
Nowadays, the dream of interdisciplinarity is fading in favor of “indisciplinarity”, wishing to free itself not only from the shackles of the different disciplines, but from discipline itself. To hell with procedures, protocols and programs, let us admire opportunism, knighted by the sophisticated term “serendipity” (the unexpected discovery prompted by circumstances). While premeditation may inhibit discovery, the unexpected may galvanize it [CAT 13]. So be it, but does not serendipity risk, in the same way as providence, keeping us waiting, or worse, eagerly watching out for it? In short, a daunting wave of suspicion hovers over science, theory and procedure, as soon as we step beyond the fortresses protected by sharp technicity [ANI 17] and analyze the organization of people, or the distribution of living human beings. Not only does this defiance challenge one specific science, theory, or method among others, but it attacks the essential arrogance underlying their intrinsic practice. Curiously enough, nobody wonders whether the sudden hope placed on serendipity could not somehow be related to a general weariness of methods and theories.
We are undergoing an avalanche of “post”, supposed to draw its energy from the salutary Fall of the Berlin Wall. Except that, contrary to the Battle of Jericho, the wall fell here before the trumpets could sound and glorify a postmodern2, post-historic and post-ideological era. With its recent overbid: the ineffable post-truth, which conditions access to the post-factual paradise (probably a pleonasm, since paradise is reputed as relatively calm). In a balance of sterility, the “post” prefix seems to proliferate over classical ideas during periods of disappointment, whereas optimistic times make the “neo” prefix teem over recused values. In the first case, the wise one simulates deliverance from persistent and unknown evil. In the second case, they intend to correct valuable thought by removing the poison that gnaws at it, or by inoculating an additive. A “post” here or a “neo” there are relatively acceptable, but when one or the other burst uncontrollably, it is worth wondering whether an idle intelligentsia is not attempting to hide its incompetence under hollow proclamations.
If we have to capitulate to the formal imperatives of fashion, the coming pages will wish to reach the standard of conceptual post-nihilism, animated by the hope of recovering neo-scientificity. And this effort will be rooted in the same domain which, 40 years ago, used to elicit the most fervent ambitions of interdisciplinarity, under the dual aegis of meticulous method and permanent discussion: the whole of the interactions between environments and societies, between nature and culture, or between ecosystems and social structures.
The more it clashes with the context, the more the undertaking calls for justification. The main explanation states that the philosophical disqualification of the project was never supported by any kind of scientific invalidation, which means we have to question ourselves about the increasing permeability of science to the injunctions of metaphysics, despite the practical imperatives underlying such a search: ten billion human beings submerged under a swarm of dislocated environments in the near future.
The haunting contrast of two personal memories triggered my decision to engage in this counter-flow essay: the use of the first person will facilitate this rendering, before reframing these memories against a more general context.
The first memory, a rather bitter one, dates back to the mid-1980s: as a young researcher with a dual background in zoology and anthropology, I had the privilege of attending several round tables, or study sessions, bringing together a wide range of specialists on the theme “ecosystems versus social systems”, with the declared intention to stimulate collaboration between the natural sciences and the social sciences. Despite the presence of prestigious specialists, of the undoubted sincerity of all participants and of the praiseworthy efforts deployed for hours in order to clarify interdisciplinary ambiguities and to reconcile key concepts, all these meetings were a complete failure. After some agreements on basic principles, reiterated at the beginning on the serious errors that should be avoided, no significant or objective progress occurred to enliven an approach which had been likely to amalgamate common research. The long-awaited founding moment missed the call and the institutional authorities quickly gave up rushing its advent: goodwill is not enough. I have also explained in another context how, thanks to fatigue, these confrontations can get lost in speculative philosophical exchanges, offering a dissimulating screen to defeat [GUI 14].
The second experience, a more anecdotal but also more exciting one, took place 20 years later, at an evening of informal discussion hosted by the “Agrarian Systems and Development” Department of the INRA3. Among the participants, some belonged to the social sciences, both to universities in terms of applied research as well as specialized engineers (crop experts and zoo-technicians, for example). Such a meeting is not self-evident, because, in the eyes of many human sciences academics, agriculture remains a perverted district, corrupted by its submission to capitalist economy, a frantic quest for productivity and ethnocentric utilitarianism. From the 1980s onwards, however, a significant part of farming technologists, striving to expand their research media (from the crop to the plot of land, then to exploitation, or even home produce), quickly became aware that, on this path, economic rationality confronts disturbances caused by social relationships which obey different imperatives. Hence, the desire to find a balance regarding obstacles and the upcoming difficulties by means of a confrontation of approaches.
The resulting interdisciplinary dialogue proved to be of exceptional quality and puzzling intensity. The side of suspected “technocrats” precisely described the practical obstacles in seeking concrete ways to overcome them, and these illustrations forced their interlocutors to identify analysis conditions directly related to the aforementioned problems. On the contrary, these exchanges suddenly revealed to me something I had been deprived of as a result of being in contact with social sciences researchers – my own community – due to the predominance acquired by relativistic inspiration and its “post”: the quest for scientific solutions likely to be field tested. In return, for a moment I regained the reassuring feeling that the fixedness of discussions is in no way an inexorable curse.
In the long run, the opposition of these episodes became necessarily obsessive for an individual whose professional career had been, since the beginning, focused on a desire for effective conciliation between the methods of ecology and those of the social sciences4. An initial, fairly obvious conclusion immediately arose: the goals imposed on applied research assume a driving and essential role to make interdisciplinary communication progress, while the “territorial” reflexes of disciplines act as a powerful brake in delaying progress with purely conceptual confrontations. In other words, the technical nature of the application promotes transgressions, some of which may prove to be decisive or constructive. On the other hand, the concern for theoretical accuracy induces a defensive and restrictive behavior.
A priori, this observation seems to advocate for “indisciplinarity”, or to utterly reject the methodological dictatorship inspired by Paul Feyerabend [FEY 79]. Nonetheless, a total disavowal of this sort favors a general orientation to the detriment of an inventory of pitfalls, which could challenge reliability. Truth be told, it took me years to overcome the discouragement distilled by the antinomy of these two reminiscences: the brilliant failure of the large, multidisciplinary conferences of the 1980s eclipsed the actual fact that, in the second image, it was the technicians who required theoretical clarifications depending on the repetition of some practical inconveniences. And it was them, too, who refined the questioning starting from this empirical substrate, by controlling the adequacy of responses step by step.
Implemented techniques contain satisfying procedures. Or at least temporarily. The assertion applies as much to reasoning techniques as to material production techniques, since it controls the possibility of identifying technical knowledge [GUI 17]. In return, the need to review the type of reasoning emerges from the perplexity of technicians when they find themselves embarrassed by accidental roadblocks or unexpected instabilities. As soon as stated, the assertion looks like a trivial point, and yet we are constantly experiencing the power of its obliteration by means of informal competition: a speech regarding the construction of knowledge, first diluted in epistemology, sociology or anthropology, but finally extracting its resources from philosophy, by literally hovering over the scramble. In this light, the inherent failure in the first memory no longer refers to “disciplinary protectionism” exclusively: when hampered by a technical fault, discussions fatally find their way towards philosophical extrapolations.
A few years ago, a prestigious sociologist asked me in a skeptical tone what novelty I was to announce regarding biologists. By reflex, I replied that I had nothing to say about them, because my problem had always been working with them. Social sciences, certainly, would be more than wrong not to commit themselves to the analysis of established networks between naturalists and sociologists, in a specific nation or during a particular time frame. As long as we remember that this does not exhaust the topics for discussion and that these disciplines should cooperate on rough terrain where neither biologists nor sociologists occupy the “lead-role”: let us not so quickly overlook the few other billion bipeds obsessed with non-academic environments.
Throughout the last quarter century, the proportion of researchers agreeing to acknowledge the relationship between environment and society, both as a theoretical and a practical problem, has decreased like Balzac’s “Magic Skin”. Between a cultural relativism enveloping nature, a “naturist” morality parasiting science, and an ontological anthropology on the one hand, and mechanicism intoxicated by the omnipotence of molecular biology, on the other hand, everything contributes to the dissociation of global representation from factual analysis. While interdisciplinarity officially remains a prominent hope, we no longer search for its spine: we are going through a “post-methodological” phase in which dissemination adds to compartmentalization, both on the sphere of the means, as well as on the goals pursued. Accordingly, an opaque screen stands before the main, crucial questions.
The worst thing is that apparently, direct discussion of such topics is close to impropriety: regardless of its controversial character, the debate itself now has unwelcome features. Thus, a scientific journal requested three book reviews concerning L’écologie kidnappée [GUI 14], a text reflecting the concern about the weakening of rationality in human ecology: none of the commentators addressed the central arguments, but each mimicked the position of a teacher who corrects a student’s paper on contentious issues. Funny, though distressing, the repetition of the operation reflected an evasive spirit in front of controversy more than cunning. In parallel, booksellers did not place this volume on the shelves reserved for anthropology, nor on those devoted to the life sciences: it was exclusively among the political ecology titles, where it felt somehow uncomfortable. “Post-ideological” science still seems quiet and distant.
In these conditions, why strive to write this essay and who will it address but a few “living fossils” of rationalism? Let us not give up too fast: it is unclear how basic research could indefinitely boast of its modesty and advocate for an understanding that thrives in the form of the benevolent contemplation of living room anchorites. If necessary, applied research will once more take up the development of procedures that interpret less, but operate better.
This is the reason why, once past the introductory gloom, the coming pages will no longer content themselves with a criticism of the current situation, with its dismal notes, its denials, or its defections. They will not dispute the current atmosphere, because they will adhere to a post-“post-” reconstructive point of view. Even if it means preaching in the desert, it is preferable to turn towards the future, as an optimistic prophet. The famous “willingness to do science” having fully immersed itself in the registry of sufficiency, the alternatives boil down to exculpating oneself by showing some honor, or to impassively assuming effrontery. As a result, this book is intended as an epistemological and theoretical work, destined for readers who are reluctant to epistemology and theory, although these “lead to everything, when they succeed”, and precisely because they have the habit of never succeeding: it is destined to a public who, in an already complex situation entangled by socio-ecological “nodes”, does not resign to sigh a vanitas vanitatum, before moving on to something else. A few candles will be fervently lit to the gods of materialism so that the audience somewhat reunites more than the handful of agronomists met a dozen years ago. However, these will always remain as imaginary interlocutors, so as not to lose sight of the intended reconstruction of the debate. The denigration of utilitarianism was transformed into an unconditional rejection of usefulness, and the condemnation of productivity turned into an aversion to achievement. But these surreptitious downfalls are ultimately useful only for hypocritical conservatism.
Let us be clear: it will entail moving from the general to the particular, turning back to the past in numerous places, searching, for example, the history of invasive or confusing concepts, and also narrowing hackneyed theoretical difficulties. The first chapter will have the “taste” and the “allure” of philosophy, even in the efforts exerted to keep it at a distance. Incidentally, when attacking neuralgic points, it will provisionally focus on anthropology, at the expense of ecology. The significant difference will be that, for once, the expected result will not seek to get the final word on the matter, nor even to make a hint at this, but to establish the currently desirable use: making a latent error visible, or identifying a short-term type of benefit in the reasoning. The game will then focus on the short-term need to the detriment of the search for “pure” truth near the horizon, and the project supported here will attempt to outline a defensive methodology, driven by a clear priority given to the means for recognizing and avoiding pitfalls, against the recipes developed to discover delicate ideality. If only for the purpose of detecting possible traps within so-called “heuristic” processes which fluctuate according to intellectual fashion regarding the conquering side of methodology: precisely the terrain in which schools of thought develop a fierce competition. This essay will have reached its goal if it helps biologists and sociologists wanting to establish a productive dialogue to jointly protect themselves against calamitous vices.
The fascination exerted by the structure, or the system, often ends up obliterating the prerequisites for contending on one area or another. This explains to a large extent that between the social sciences and ecology, cooperation is revealed as highly embarrassed by what these rationalities willingly or unwillingly share, except for the obvious differences between their aspirations and their inspiration: if a model jointly seduces the vision on nature and culture, it immediately becomes the means for a jousting, because the authority acquired on this construction by science is translated into the right to develop a viewpoint regarding the problems conceived by other sciences around this topic. Jean-Luc Jamard rightly observed that a matrix, designed by a science X, but eventually dead at this point, can legitimately continue to galvanize the inspiration of a discipline Y [JAM 93]. Why extend a right of ownership to something discarded, if not to dictate a way of thinking to remote knowledge?
When pragmatism is involved in exploration, a lucid approximation suddenly deserves more attention than unattainable perfection. In biology, as well as in sociology, systems and structures have more than a fleeting relationship with original elaborations, and the question is then: why do these concepts embed themselves as essentially unavoidable, against all odds? The answer probably emerges in parallel with the misfortunes of other concepts, such as society, ethnicity, culture, and even primitive, which, despite prohibitive convictions, still have not evaporated: they persist with “rigorous quotation marks”, indicating that the author has not been fooled, but that, for the time being, that does not matter so much. Perhaps, in the long run, discomfort will pervade the proliferation of these quotation marks, which signal the growing number of mental swamps that should be avoided.
A major failure generally undermines contemporary critical thought when it weighs the available reasoning tools: in the scientific field, the rejection of a concept should lead to its complete replacement by another one, or several others. Otherwise, criticism vegetates in a pernicious state of incompletion. In other words, it does not suffice to confirm that the idea under criticism cannot answer the questions involved, but it is necessary to forge a term which, free from deplorable orientations, can preserve the aforementioned questions. Otherwise, the refutation of the incorrect abstraction could lead to the abandonment of a request for information whose need, intact or modified, has not yet vanished. At this level, conventional quotation marks indicate a pending requirement and a lack of means to suitably express it. Relativism turns dissatisfaction into acquiescence.
Given the desirable brevity of a reflection intending to provide a medium for interdisciplinary communication using clear pointers, the coming chapters will strive to highlight clear proposals, in an admissible language for all the sectors involved: possibly questionable – since only Nature, with its capital letters, holds theoretical neutrality – but devoid of ambiguities, as far as possible. Equal distance will have to be kept from the esoterism of technocracy as well as from metaphysics, which bloom when exchanges start to creak. The counterpart of this desire to extract functional statements occasionally manifests in a sharp tone, with an oscillation between disruptive verdicts and a pontificating compendium. We implore the reader to kindly excuse us, but the desire to be protected against analogous slippages calls for this inconvenience: without any intention of being trivial, the ambiguous title of the following chapter prompts the reader to consider this harshness with a smile. The stated “non-negotiable conditions” will remain questionable, the absence of negotiation connoting a clash of radically incompatible positions. So much for that, controversy only kills arguments and, besides, some of them are reborn with the snarky face of a phoenix having changed the color of its plumage.
In the same state of mind, a number of allegations will be shamelessly characterized as “methodological assertions” and designated as such with two figures: the first one referring to the chapter in which they appear and the second one indicating the order of arrival in the chapter. Once again, we reckon that the process is horrifying for various reasons (heaviness, boastfulness, excess, etc.). However, to its credit, we can only mention that it will considerably simplify the transverse trajectories of this volume, thus stimulating the overall understanding of the line of argument, and facilitating a critical perspective. Furthermore, it should encourage future debates. Finally, this will help the uncompromising pragmatism of some specific readers not to be discouraged by some outrageously abstract passages: particularly, in the first chapter. Methodological assertions (MA) will provide anchor points and summarized assumptions. They will point out a strategic spot of controversy, at the same time that they will pave the way for the rest of the argument: as a consequence, the reader will be able to go back to certain points, if they later feel that the reasoning surrounding an affirmation justifies a rebound back to the source. So, never mind literary fluidity: it is the milestones which have priority.
Let us add that, in essays which have a summarizing vocation, the author is generally tempted to reinforce his point by an abundance of illustrations. We will rather follow the opposite, less attractive, but more persuasive approach, in the long run: coming back several times to specific research points in order to consider their implications from various angles.
The reader may also wonder why these illustrations have not been extracted from applied research. An accessory but painful and absurd impediment comes from the general disdain of the human sciences for applied research: it is supposed to receive fundamental lessons, but presumably may have no theoretical grounding to provide in return. Together with this parasitic factor lies a more solid reason: a local situation in a final survey demands a full description, that is to say, a long text, while fundamental research knows how to isolate distinct topics so as to focus the presentation on a specific question. Each of the chapters that follow could at least become a book if they had to be transcribed within the context of practical considerations. In addition, applied research spontaneously exposes interdisciplinary cooperation to empirical boycott, whereas our endeavor is to clarify the prerequisites of an encounter between sciences which have only learned to soliloquize. Everything comes down to one thing: this book will be successful if, and only if, it becomes a beginning.