“[A]stimulating argument.”

Joseph S. Nye, International Affairs

“A subtle and compelling study of one of the great issues of our day. A work that is bound to provoke widespread debate amongst policy-makers and academics alike.”

Michael Cox, London School of Economics and Political Science

“An imaginative vision of a less centralized, more pluralistic world.”

John Ikenberry, Princeton University, Foreign Affairs

“An important contribution to the building debate over how to sustain international order in an era of profound change. Acharya foresees a more regionalized and pluralist order – a decentered world, but one linked together by networks and institutions. His vision is not just creative and provocative, but also a compelling prediction of where the world is likely headed.”

Charles Kupchan, Georgetown University

“A punchy, trenchant critique of liberal internationalist and American hopes for a sticky, post-American liberal world order.”

Robert E. Kelly, Human and Social Sciences Net Online

“A challenging vision of the future.”

Simon Reich, Political Science Quarterly

“Few works on this topic are as lucid as Acharya's The End of American World Order. He has proved once more to be a prolific writer, presenting a new idea that should be taken into consideration by policy-makers and scholars alike.”

Political Studies Review

“The End of American World Order is a punchy, provocative, innovative and incisive work. I recommend it as essential reading, not only for students of regionalism, but also for anyone interested in better grasping the power dynamics rapidly re-shaping the global order.”

Andrew Phillips, Australian Outlook 2016

“The End of American World Order contains a welcome message in favour of continued American engagement in the world, while avoiding unhelpful clichés of American decline, or an America-centric approach to world affairs.”

Gilles Andréani, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy

“[N]either anti-American nor US-focused … a compelling vision of the post-American world.”

Lauren Young, The London School of Economics Review of Books

“[E]xtremely valuable contribution to the debate about the future of global order.”

Oliver Stuenkel, The Diplomat

Copyright © Amitav Acharya 2018

The right of Amitav Acharya to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First edition published in 2014 by Polity Press

This second edition published in 2018 by Polity Press

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ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-1707-7

ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-1708-4(pb)

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Acharya, Amitav, author.

Title: The end of American world order / Amitav Acharya.

Description: Cambridge, UK ; Medford, MA : Polity, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017033813 (print) | LCCN 2017055098 (ebook) | ISBN 9781509517114 (Epub) | ISBN 9781509517077 (hardback) | ISBN 9781509517084 (paperback)

Subjects: LCSH: International organization. | World politics–21st century. | Regionalism. | Interregionalism. | United States–Foreign relations–21st century. | BISAC: POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General.

Classification: LCC JZ1318 (ebook) | LCC JZ1318 .A276 2018 (print) | DDC 327–dc23

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In January 2017, soon after the victory of Donald J. Trump in the US presidential election of November 6, 2016, the Foreign Affairs magazine published a series of essays under the title: “Out of Order? The Future of the International System.”¹ A few weeks later some of these and other essays were also compiled into a book nostalgically entitled: What Was the Liberal Order? The World We May Be Losing.²

Coming from the leading voice of America's liberal establishment, these publications clearly show that some of the staunchest defenders of the liberal order now accept that it is in deep crisis. Yet they need not have been so shocked. There were plenty of signs of the decline of the order well before Trump's presidential bid, even at the euphoric height of the Obama–Hillary Clinton era. Among the writings that warned of the fading order was the first edition of this book.

Indeed, Trump's victory can be regarded as the consequence rather than the cause of the crisis of the US-led liberal order, which I simply call the American World Order (AWO). In 2014, I had argued that the AWO was ending whether or not the US itself was declining. Trump's election attests to my argument that the US-led liberal order, despite its acknowledged contributions to world peace and prosperity, was incomplete, exaggerated, vulnerable, and in decline.

The “first myth” about the US-led liberal order, the previous edition of this book had noted, was “how far it extended for much of its history, especially during the Cold War period.” I pointed out that “The Soviet bloc, China, India, Indonesia, and a good part of the ‘third world’ were outside of it…. Despite the exalted claims about its power, legitimacy and public goods functions, that order was little more than the US-UK-West Europe-Australasian configuration.”³ Noting that the liberal order was “not so benign for many outside of it, especially in the developing world,”⁴ I argued that the liberal order should be seen as “an international order, but not the world order, of the post-World War II period.”⁵

Joseph S. Nye, perhaps the most articulate and persuasive champion of the liberal order, echoed these words when he wrote shortly after Trump's victory that the liberal order “was largely limited to a group of like-minded states centered on the Atlantic littoral” and “did not include many large countries such as China, India, and the Soviet bloc states, and … did not always have benign effects on nonmembers.”⁶

Some people argue that, with Trump, the challenge to the liberal order has shifted. Until now, it was generally assumed that the main challenge to that order would come from external factors, especially from the rising powers led by China. Now, the liberal order is imploding as well. Trump's victory, and Brexit, suggest that the challenge to the liberal international order is from within. This may well be true, but it does not mean the external challenges to the liberal order discussed in the first edition of the book have disappeared. One should not forget that the victory of Trump might not have happened without the perceived economic harm to the US caused by the China-led global economic shift.

A key argument of this edition is that the decline of the AWO cannot be reversed by Trump, no matter what course he takes as US President. Trump inherits a domestic economy which had already been turned around by Obama from the biggest economic crisis since the Great Depression. And even if he succeeds in strengthening it further while boosting America's national military power, he is unlikely to return the US to the perch of global hegemony. If Trump faithfully carries out his “America-first” policies to their logical conclusion (which is by no means certain), and weakens the US alliances and global institutions that have been foundational to the liberal order, it could well accelerate the end of that order. The nature of his policy platform is such that its success could come only at the expense of the liberal order.

But what if Trump changes course and abandons his America-first policy in favor of an internationalist posture, as some wish for? This is entirely possible and we have already seen indications of this 100 days into his presidency. But my argument is that, even with an altered course, he cannot reverse the end of the American World Order. The decline of the American World Order is rooted in multiple long-term structural factors that simply cannot be reversed either through American isolationism or American internationalism.

Hence, despite the Trump interlude, this new edition affirms the main conclusion of the first: the era of liberal hegemony is past. The emerging world is not defined by the hegemony of any single nation or idea. This does not necessarily mean the United States is in decline. This is still arguable. But it is no longer in a position to create the rules and dominate the institutions of global governance and world order in the manner it has done for much of the post-World War II period. And any elements of the old liberal order that survive would have to accommodate new actors and approaches which do not play to America's commands and preferences. They would have to compete or enmesh with other ideas in a world of growing complexity and interconnectedness: a multiplex world.

In this new edition, I make the following arguments:

1. The global outpouring of concerns surrounding Trump's election as US President vindicate the book's analysis in 2014, that the US-led liberal international order or the American World Order (AWO) was in decline, even if the US itself was not.
2. Trump is the consequence, not the cause of the decline of the US-led liberal order.
3. Despite Trump's pledge to make “America great again,” he cannot reverse the decline of the US-led world order.
4. The global power shift from the West to the Rest continues despite recent economic slowdown and political crisis in several BRICS nations.
5. While the liberal order is imploding in the West, China and India are likely to pursue globalization, albeit in a way different from the earlier Western-led globalization. China in particular is taking on a more assertive role in reshaping globalization and global governance.
6. The architecture of global cooperation developed under the liberal order is fracturing and regionalism in Europe is facing a moment of crisis with Brexit, but new forms of international cooperation are emerging, such as China's Belt and Road Initiative.
7. While there are signs of growing conflict and violence in the world, these are not necessarily due to the decline of the American World Order. Many of the sources of violence are not new, and some are directly the result of policy choices made by Western powers led by the US (Iraq, Libya, and Syria). Some global challenges such as terrorism are actually highly localized, and there are long-term and newer sources of stability in the world that can be further developed through renewed cooperation and shared leadership with the emerging powers.

A multiplex world will not be free from conflicts and disorder. But absolute peace is illusory. The goal should be to achieve relative stability, preventing major power wars and genocide and managing regional conflicts to minimize human suffering. Just because the West is losing its hegemony does not mean the world is doomed to chaos, without leadership or cooperation. The nature of leadership is changing. A multiplex world presents both challenges and opportunities for global and regional cooperation. This would require the Western nations to shed their free-riding on the US and accept shared leadership with the rising and regional powers. It would require greater partnership between global and regional bodies, public, private and civil-society groups. This is a G-Plus World and requires a reformed system of global governance that accords genuine recognition to the voices and aspirations of the Rest. America and its Western allies must give up exclusive privileges in return for their trust and cooperation in order to make the system work. If this is the view of an optimist, then let me be one.

Since the publication of the book in 2014, a number of universities and think-tanks around the world have organized talks that allowed me to receive invaluable criticisms, feedback, and suggestions for a new edition. I take this opportunity to thank Chatham House, London, the City University of New York, Transatlantic Academy, Washington DC, India International Centre, New Delhi, Freie Universität Berlin, Sciences Po, Paris, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore, and Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto.

The Chinese translation of this book, 美国世界秩序的终结 (Mei Guo Shi Jie Zhi Xu De Zhong Jie), was released by Shanghai People's Publishing House in January 2017. I am grateful for book talks arranged by Peking University, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, Fudan University, Shanghai, and Zhejiang University, Hangzhou.

Di Wu, Ji Young Kwon, and Sahil Mathur, all doctoral students at American University, provided invaluable research and editorial assistance. Louise Knight at Polity Press strongly encouraged me to work on a new edition. Her colleagues, Nekane Tanaka Galdos, Rachel Moore, Rachel Walter, and Helen Gray offered excellent editorial and promotional work on the book.

My stint in China during the 2016–17 academic year as the inaugural Boeing Company Chair in International Relations at the Schwarzman Scholars Program at Tsinghua University in Beijing offered an excellent opportunity to observe first hand the global shift in power and ideas, and the transition from the Western-dominated world order to a multiplex world.

I am grateful to all of the above, and many more colleagues and institutions not listed here but who exchanged ideas on this book, but I take sole responsibility for the views expressed here.