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<p>Preface x</p> <p>Source Acknowledgments xi</p> <p>1 <i>Philosophical Investigations </i>§§611–628 1<br /><i>Ludwig Wittgenstein</i></p> <p><b>Part I Action and Agency 3</b></p> <p>Introduction to Part I 5</p> <p>2 Agency 10<br /><i>Donald Davidson</i></p> <p>3 Shooting, Killing and Dying 21<br /><i>Jonathan Bennett</i></p> <p>4 The Problem of Action 26<br /><i>Harry G. Frankfurt</i></p> <p>5 Agents and their Actions 33<br /><i>Maria Alvarez and John Hyman</i></p> <p>6 Agency and Actions 48<br /><i>Jennifer Hornsby</i></p> <p><b>Part II Willing and Trying 63</b></p> <p>Introduction to Part II 65</p> <p>7 Acting, Willing, Desiring 69<br /><i>H. A. Prichard</i></p> <p>8 The Will 76<br /><i>Gilbert Ryle</i></p> <p>9 Acting and Trying to Act 83<br /><i>Jennifer Hornsby</i></p> <p>10 Action and Volition 91<br /><i>E. J. Lowe</i></p> <p><b>Part III Intention and Intentional Action 101</b></p> <p>Introduction to Part III 103</p> <p>11 <i>Intention </i>§§1–9 107<br /><i>G. E. M. Anscombe</i></p> <p>12 Knowing What I Am Doing 113<br /><i>Keith S. Donnellan</i></p> <p>13 Intending 119<br /><i>Donald Davidson</i></p> <p>14 Two Faces of Intention 130<br /><i>Michael Bratman</i></p> <p>15 Acting As One Intends 145<br /><i>John McDowell</i></p> <p>16 Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language 158<br /><i>Joshua Knobe</i></p> <p>17 The Toxin Puzzle 161<br /><i>Gregory S. Kavka</i></p> <p>18 The Ontology of Social Agency 164<br /><i>Frederick Stoutland</i></p> <p><b>Part IV Acting for a Reason 177</b></p> <p>Introduction to Part IV 179</p> <p>19 Actions, Reasons, and Causes 183<br /><i>Donald Davidson</i></p> <p>20 How to Act for a Good Reason 193<br /><i>Jonathan Dancy</i></p> <p>21 Acting for a Reason 206<br /><i>Christine Korsgaard</i></p> <p>22 Arational Actions 222<br /><i>Rosalind Hursthouse</i></p> <p>23 Agency, Reason, and the Good 230<br /><i>Joseph Raz</i></p> <p>24 Skepticism About Weakness of Will 245<br /><i>Gary Watson</i></p> <p><b>Part V The Explanation of Action 257</b></p> <p>Introduction to Part V 259</p> <p>25 Explanation in Science and in History §§1–3 263<br /><i>Carl G. Hempel</i></p> <p>26 The Rationale of Actions 270<br /><i>William Dray</i></p> <p>27 Explanation in Science and in History §§4–7 280<br /><i>Carl G. Hempel</i></p> <p>28 The Explanatory Role of Being Rational 289<br /><i>Michael Smith</i></p> <p>29 The Conceivability of Mechanism 303<br /><i>Norman Malcolm</i></p> <p>30 Action, Causality, and Teleological Explanation 315<br /><i>Arthur W. Collins</i></p> <p>31 Psychological vs. Biological Explanations of Behavior 333<br /><i>Fred Dretske</i></p> <p><b>Part VI Free Agency and Responsibility 341</b></p> <p>Introduction to Part VI 343</p> <p>32 Human Freedom and the Self 347<br /><i>Roderick Chisholm</i></p> <p>33 Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility 353<br /><i>Harry G. Frankfurt</i></p> <p>34 Responsibility, Control, and Omissions 360<br /><i>John Martin Fischer</i></p> <p>35 The Impossibility of Ultimate Responsibility? 373<br /><i>Galen Strawson</i></p> <p>36 Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency 382<br /><i>Helen Steward</i></p> <p>37 Free Will and Science 393<br /><i>Alfred R. Mele</i></p>

<p><b>Jonathan Dancy</b> is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin and at the University of Reading, UK. An internationally known specialist in ethics, epistemology, and early modern philosophy, Professor Dancy is author of five books: <i>An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology</i> (Blackwell, 1985), <i>Berkeley: an Introduction</i> (Blackwell, 1987), <i>Moral Reasons</i> (Blackwell, 1993), <i>Practical Reality</i> (2000), and <i>Ethics Without Principles</i> (2004).</p> <p><b>Constantine Sandis</b> is Professor in Philosophy at Oxford Brookes University. He is the author of <i>The Things We Do and Why We Do Them</i> (2012) and the editor or co-editor of <i>New Essays on Action Explanation</i> (2009), <i>A Companion to the Philosophy of Action</i> (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), <i>Hegel on Action</i> (2010), and <i>Human Nature</i> (2012).</p>

<p>This is the best conspectus of the philosophy of action since 1945 I have seen: an excellent selection of articles, nicely organized, with concise and reliable introductions that guide the reader deftly through each topic.”</p> <p>John Hyman, The Queen’s College, Oxford, UK</p> <p>“<i>Philosophy of Action: An Anthology</i> offers the reader thirty-seven of the best previously published<br />papers on action in the last half-century or so. It is far more comprehensive than earlier collections and has minimal overlap with them. Each of the six parts commences with a helpful overview by the editors of the issues and problems that arise in the papers. They skillfully set the stage for the papers that follow. The collection will not only become first choice as the text for courses in the Philosophy of Action, but will be of great use to the professional philosopher of action, who will have these papers collected in one convenient place for the first time.”<br /><br />David-Hillel Ruben, University of London, UK</p> <p><i>Philosophy of Action: An Anthology</i> brings together a selection of the most influential classic and<br />contemporary essays on the subject by leading scholars, from the 1960s to the present day. In creating a unique collection of essays on the subject, the book answers a pressing need for an anthology in which many voices contribute to offer an introductory and unprecedented survey of the field.</p> <p>The essays, arranged thematically and accompanied by expert introductions written by the editors, cover action and agency, volition and causation, intention and intentional action, reasons and motivation, the explanation of action, and responsibility and free agency. Edited by leading scholars in philosophy, both highly regarded for their work in the area, this is an invaluable resource for teaching upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of action, and as a general reference volume of seminal papers on the subject.</p>

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