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<p>Notes on Contributors vii</p> <p>1 Irrealism and the Genealogy of Morals 1<br /> <i>Richard Joyce</i></p> <p>2 A Distinction Without a Difference? Good Advice for Moral Error Theorists 23<br /> <i>Hallvard Lillehammer</i></p> <p>3 Ethics Without Errors 41<br /> <i>James Lenman</i></p> <p>4 Faultless Moral Disagreement 61<br /> <i>Alison Hills</i></p> <p>5 Revolutionary Expressivism 79<br /> <i>Sebastian Köhler and Michael Ridge</i></p> <p>6 Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World? 101<br /> <i>Bart Streumer</i></p> <p>Index 121</p>

<p><b>Bart Streumer</b> is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. He is currently writing a book-length defence of an error theory about all normative judgments.</p>

<p><i>Irrealism in Ethics</i> presents a collection of six original essays contributed by prominent moral philosophers that address various forms of the philosophical position of ethical irrealism. Readings offer innovative approaches to the arguments both for and against the two major versions of ethical irrealism—the error theory and expressivism. Topics discussed include whether the facts about the evolutionary origins of morality support a moral error theory, whether or not a moral error theory makes sense of the fact that it is possible to give and receive good moral advice, and why one would continue making moral judgments if one believed in a moral error theory. Other provocative questions address whether or not the possibility of faultless moral disagreement establishes that a form of ethical irrealism is true, and whether the error theory or expressivism is the more plausible form of irrealism. Strikingly original, <i>Irrealism in Ethics</i> offers thought-provoking insights into the nature of ethics and meaning of moral language.</p>

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