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Preface xi <p>Acknowledgments xiii</p> <p>1 The best case for skepticism about the external world?<br /> (Stroud, “The Problem of the External World”) 1</p> <p>2 Proving the external world exists<br /> (Or: Let’s all give Moore a hand!)  (Moore, “Proof of an External World”) 6</p> <p>3 Some ways of resisting skepticism<br /> (Moore, “Four Forms of Scepticism”) 10</p> <p>4 Plausibility and possibilities<br /> (Moore, “Certainty”) 15</p> <p>5 Skeptic on skeptic<br /> (Klein, “How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism”) 19</p> <p>6 Realism in epistemology<br /> (Williams, “Epistemological Realism”) 24</p> <p>7 Socratic questions and the foundation of empirical knowledge<br /> (Chisholm, “The Myth of the Given”) 31</p> <p>8–9 The foundation of empirical knowledge?<br /> (Sellars, “Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?” and “Epistemic Principles”) 36</p> <p>10 It’s not a given that empirical knowledge has a foundation<br /> (BonJour, “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?”) 44</p> <p>11 Interpretation, meaning and skepticism<br /> (Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”) 49</p> <p>12 Blending foundationalism and coherentism<br /> (Haack, “A Foundherentist Theory of Epistemic Justification”) 54</p> <p>13 Foundationalism, coherentism and supervenience<br /> (Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid”) 60</p> <p>14 Infinitism<br /> (Klein, “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons”) 67</p> <p>15 The Gettier problem<br /> (Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”) 73</p> <p>16 Some principles concerning knowledge and inference<br /> (Harman, Thought, Selections) 77</p> <p>17 The essence of the Gettier problem<br /> (Zagzebski, “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems”) 83</p> <p>18 Knowledge is an unanalyzable mental state<br /> (Williamson, “A State of Mind”) 85</p> <p>19 Closure, contrast and semi-skepticism<br /> (Dretske, “Epistemic Operators”) 92</p> <p>20 Closure, contrast and anti-skepticism<br /> (Stine, “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure”) 99</p> <p>21 Keeping close track of knowledge<br /> (Nozick, “Knowledge and Skepticism”) 103</p> <p>22 Moore wins<br /> (Sosa, “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore”) 111</p> <p>23 The closure principle: dangers and defense<br /> (Vogel, “Are There Counter examples to the Closure Principle?”) 116</p> <p>24 Evidentialist epistemology<br /> (Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism”) 123</p> <p>25 Non-defensive epistemology<br /> (Foley, “Skepticism and Rationality”) 129</p> <p>26 Reliabilism about justification<br /> (Goldman, “What Is Justified Belief?”) 135</p> <p>27 Reliabilism: a level assessment<br /> (Vogel, “Reliabilism Leveled”) 141</p> <p>28 Against externalism<br /> (BonJour, “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge”) 146</p> <p>29 Against internalism<br /> (Goldman, “Internalism Exposed”) 151</p> <p>30 A skeptical take on externalism<br /> (Fumerton, “Externalism and Skepticism”) 156</p> <p>31 A friendly take on internalism<br /> (Feldman and Conee, “Internalism Defended”) 159</p> <p>32 Warrant<br /> (Plantinga, “Warrant: A First Approximation”) 164</p> <p>33 Intellectual virtues<br /> (Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind) 169</p> <p>34 Virtue epistemology<br /> (Greco, “Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology”) 172</p> <p>35 Knowledge, luck and virtue<br /> (Pritchard, “Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues”) 176</p> <p>36 Epistemic value and cognitive achievement<br /> (Sosa, “The Place of Truth in Epistemology”) 181</p> <p>37 Giving up on knowledge<br /> (Kvanvig, “Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?”) 187</p> <p>38 Giving up on (exact) truth<br /> (Elgin, “True Enough”) 192</p> <p>39 Naturalized epistemology advertised<br /> (Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized”) 196</p> <p>40 Naturalized epistemology criticized<br /> (Kim, “What is ‘Naturalized Epistemology’?”) 203</p> <p>41 Naturalized epistemology radicalized<br /> (Antony, “Quine as Feminist”) 207</p> <p>42 A apriori justification and unrevisability<br /> (Putnam, “There is at Least One A Priori Truth”) 211</p> <p>43 A priori justification and revisability<br /> (Casullo, “Revisability, Reliabilism, and A Priori Knowledge”) 215</p> <p>44 Philosophical method and empirical science<br /> (Bealer, “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy”) 219</p> <p>45 Experimental epistemology<br /> (Weinberg, Nichols and Stich, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”) 226</p> <p>46 Natural kinds, intuitions and method in epistemology<br /> (Kornblith, “Investigating Knowledge Itself”) 230</p> <p>47 Contextualism and skeptical puzzles<br /> (DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem”) 235</p> <p>48 Contextualism and infallibilist intuitions<br /> (Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge”) 240</p> <p>49 Contextualism and intuitional instability<br /> (Cohen, “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems”) 244</p> <p>50 Knowledge and action<br /> (Stanley, “Knowledge and Practical Interests, Selections”) 247</p> <p>51 Rationality and action<br /> (Fantl and McGrath, “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification”) 252</p> <p>52 One invariantist’s scorecard<br /> (Hawthorne, “Sensitive Moderate Invariantism”) 258</p> <p>53 A relativist theory of knowledge attributions<br /> (MacFarlane, “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions”) 264</p> <p>54 Rationality and trust<br /> (Baker, “Trust and Rationality”) 270</p> <p>55 Testimony and gullibility<br /> (Fricker, “Against Gullibility”) 273</p> <p>56 Some reflections on how epistemic sources work<br /> (Burge, “Content Preservation”) 277</p> <p>57 Testimony and knowledge<br /> (Lackey, “Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission”) 282</p> <p>58 Memory and knowledge<br /> (Huemer, “The Problem of Memory Knowledge”) 286</p> <p>59 Perception and knowledge<br /> (McDowell, “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge”) 291</p> <p>60 Skills and knowledge<br /> (Reynolds, “Knowing How to Believe with Justification”) 295</p> <p>Index 299</p>

<p>“The author fosters an excellent bridge to the primary sources and presents the material in a way that scarcely could be made more palatable.  Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above.”  (<i>Choice</i>, 1 December 2014)</p> <p> </p>

<p><b>John Turri </b>is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo, Canada. He specializes in epistemology, philosophy of language, experimental philosophy, and cognitive science. He is editor of <i>Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa </i>(2013) and coeditor of <i>Contemporary Debates in Epistemology </i>(2nd edition, Wiley Blackwell, 2013) and <i>Virtue Epistemology: Contemporary Readings </i>(2012).

<p>“This is a superb companion to <i>Epistemology: An Anthology</i>. It consists of sixty commentaries, one for each of the sixty entries in that anthology. Turri is an extremely lucid writer, with a wonderful knack for finding and laying out argumentative structure, and for explaining crucial concepts. His commentary will greatly aid student comprehension and enhance class discussion.”<BR> <i>Ernest Sosa, Rutgers University</i> <p>“Turri’s discussions are engaging and lucid. They are written for beginning students and will serve that purpose beautifully, but they are so well done that even veteran epistemologists will find them helpful.”<BR> <i>John Greco, Saint Louis University</i> <p><i>Epistemology: A Guide </i>is a straightforward and accessible introduction to contemporary epistemology for those studying the topic for the first time. It introduces and explains the main arguments of the most influential publications in the field from the last 50 years. <p>Balancing simplicity of argument with accuracy and detail, this guide covers the central topics of theory of knowledge, including skepticism, epistemic justification, epistemic closure, virtue epistemology, and naturalized epistemology. Instead of artificially treating themes in isolation, it provides a clear context for key topics and concepts. Designed to stand alone or to accompany the second edition of <i>Epistemology: An Anthology </i>(Wiley Blackwell, 2008), this is a deft and concise introduction to a foundational topic in philosophy.

<p>“This is a superb companion to <i>Epistemology: An Anthology</i>. It consists of sixty commentaries, one for each of the sixty entries in that anthology. Turri is an extremely lucid writer, with a wonderful knack for finding and laying out argumentative structure, and for explaining crucial concepts. His commentary will greatly aid student comprehension and enhance class discussion.”</p> <p>—Ernest Sosa, Rutgers University</p> <p>“Turri's discussions are engaging and lucid. They are written for beginning students and will serve that purpose beautifully, but they are so well done that even veteran epistemologists will find them helpful.”</p> <p>—John Greco, Saint Louis University</p>

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