Cover Page

For Peter

Models of Democracy

Third Edition

DAVID HELD

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Figures and Tables

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Tables

Preface to the Third Edition

Although it is easy to overgeneralize from one time period and from the culture of one’s homeland, the development of the third edition of Models of Democracy is written in unsettling times. The events of 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003) have created a ripple of change across the globe. Democracy, which seemed relatively untroubled in the 1990s, is experiencing intense pressures, from within and without. Security challenges, the ‘war on terror’, the attempt to impose ‘regime change’ on Iraq and to transform other Middle Eastern countries have been accompanied by a widespread sense of unease about whether democracies can deliver security to their citizens, whether they can sustain prosperity in tumultuous times and whether they embed ideals that can be defended adequately against, on the one hand, widespread despondency and apathy within and, on the other hand, fierce opponents, who do not hesitate to use indiscriminate violence, from without. The rise of fundamentalist elements in Islam, alongside the development of Christian and Jewish fundamentalist groupings elsewhere, raise questions about the legitimacy of contemporary political institutions, the separation of church and state, and the very possibility of democracy in the face of challenges to its underlying conception of human beings as free and equal, as active moral agents, with capacities for self-determination and political choice. There is a marked risk that in Western democracy a concern with security above all else will undo some of the important achievements of democracy and certain of the rights and liberties it presupposes. And there is a risk that cultures and religious forces that oppose the separation of politics and religion, state and civil society, will see ‘democracy’ as one of their enemies.

Elsewhere, most recently in Global Covenant (2004), I have analysed some of these trends and reactions. In Models of Democracy my aim is to clarify why democracy is so important in human affairs, why it is so contested and why, despite its vulnerabilities, it remains the best of all possible governing arrangements. Democracy is not a panacea for all human problems, but it offers the most compelling principle of legitimacy – ‘the consent of the people’ – as the basis of political order. It is important to understand this principle and the many debates it has given rise to, if an attractive and defensible conception of democracy is to be promulgated in the century ahead.

Given the difficulties of the present period it is easy to forget that, if there was ever an age of democracy, it is the present one. State socialism, which appeared so entrenched just a few decades ago, has crumbled in Central and Eastern Europe. In many of its essentials, democracy appears not only quite secure in the West but also widely adopted in principle beyond the West as a suitable model of government. Throughout the world’s major regions there has been a consolidation of democratic processes and procedures. In the mid-1970s, over two-thirds of all states could reasonably be called authoritarian. This percentage has fallen dramatically; less than a third of all states are now authoritarian, and the number of democracies has grown. Democracy has become the leading standard of political legitimacy in the current era.

The tale of democracy from antiquity to the present seems, therefore, to be a relatively happy one. In more and more countries citizen-voters are, in principle, able to hold public decision-makers to account, while the decision-makers themselves represent the interests of their constituents – ‘the people’ in a delimited territory. However, the tale of democracy does not conclude with such developments. Although the victory of democratic movements across Central and Eastern Europe was of great moment, as was the transformation of political regimes in other places like South Africa, these events have left unresolved many important questions of democratic thought and practice. Democracy, as an idea and as a political reality, is fundamentally contested. Not only is the history of democracy marked by conflicting interpretations, but also ancient and modern notions intermingle to produce ambiguous and inconsistent accounts of the key terms of democracy, among them the proper meaning of ‘political participation’, the connotation of ‘representation’, the scope of citizens’ capacities to choose freely among political alternatives, and the nature of membership in a democratic community.

These are significant and pressing matters, and the stock of a great deal of contemporary political debate. But even these important concerns by no means fully define the current agenda of democratic thought and practice. For any engagement with the contemporary meaning of democracy has to examine additional questions – questions not only about the ‘internal’ or ‘domestic’ character of democracy, but also about its ‘external’ qualities and consequences. This is so because one of the most conspicuous features of politics in the new millennium is the emergence of issues which transcend national democratic frontiers. Processes of economic globalization, the problem of the environment and the protection of the rights of minorities are increasingly matters for the international community as a whole. The nature and limits of national democracies have to be reconsidered in relation to processes of environmental, social and economic globalization; that is, in relation to shifts in the transcontinental or inter-regional scale of human social organization and of the exercise of social power.

Of course, there is nothing new about the emergence of global problems. Although their importance has grown considerably, many have existed for decades, some for centuries. But now that the old confrontation between East and West has ended, regional and global problems such as the spread of AIDS, the debt burden of the ‘developing world’, the flow of financial resources which escape national jurisdiction, the drugs trade, international crime and terrorism have an urgent place on the international political agenda. None the less, profound ambiguity still reigns as to where, how and according to what criteria decisions about these matters can be taken.

Democratic theory’s exploration of emerging regional and global problems is still in its infancy. While democratic theory has examined and debated at length the challenges to democracy that emerge from within the boundaries of the nation-state, it has not seriously questioned whether the nation-state itself can remain at the centre of democratic thought. The questions posed by the rapid growth of complex interconnections and interrelations between states and societies, and by the evident intersection of national and international forces and processes, remain largely unexplored.

The challenges facing democratic thinking now are both numerous and substantial. Models of Democracy, as published initially in 1987, had two prime purposes: the first, to provide an introduction to central accounts of democracy and, above all, to those of the Western tradition from ancient Greece to the present day; the second, to offer a critical narrative about successive democratic ideas in order to address the question, raised directly towards the end of the book: what should democracy mean today? These remained the objectives of the second edition, published in 1996, but in order to ensure their thorough execution it became necessary to revise the original text in a number of ways. Models needed revision in order to take account of transformations in politics some of which were either unanalysed or unanticipated by the first edition. It needed revision, moreover, in order to examine the considerable research and scholarship undertaken in political thought in the last decade, some of which has changed our understanding of aspects of the classic democratic heritage as well as of contemporary political ideas and notions. And it needed revision because the author of Models had altered the balance of his views in some respects, alterations which could usefully be reflected in a new text.

A similar set of issues lies behind the third edition. It has been updated to take account of political changes that are now shaping our world, and in the light of new theoretical and historical work that alters how we should interpret aspects of earlier political traditions. It has been revised because debates in political and social theory have led to new innovations in democratic thinking. Thus, a new chapter has been added on deliberative democracy (chapter 9), which is concerned with the quality of democratic reasoning and the justification for political action. Deliberative theorists focus on the development of citizenship, on how to encourage ‘refined’ and ‘reflective’ political preferences and on political rationality as inseparable from the idea of justification to others. These are important notions worthy of careful analysis in a separate chapter.

The first two editions of Models of Democracy emerged, in part, as a set text for an Open University course, ‘Democracy: From Classical Times to the Present’. Many of my colleagues at the Open University offered detailed commentaries on them. I would like to thank, in particular, Donna Dickenson, Bram Gieben, David Goldblatt, Paul Lewis, Tony McGrew and David Potter for their extensive advice. Moreover, in the preparation of the first and second editions I benefited enormously from the comments of friends and colleagues at other universities. I would like to thank David Beetham, Richard Bellamy, John Dunn, Anthony Giddens, John Keane, Joel Krieger, Quentin Skinner, Michelle Stanworth and John B. Thompson, among others.

Nearly twenty years after its inception, the Open University course has been phased out, but Models of Democracy continues to be used as an introduction to democratic thought throughout the world. Cillian McBride has been extraordinarily helpful in the development of the third edition. He has guided me through the deliberative democracy literature (now vast) and has been a sounding board when needed. I am deeply indebted to him. Ann Bone, Neil de Cort, Anne DeSayrah, Ellen McKinlay, Gill Motley, Breffni O’Connor, Sue Pope and Marianne Rutter provided indispensable aid in the process of the manuscript’s publication. I am very grateful to them all.

I owe a special debt to my father, Peter Held, to whom the third edition is dedicated. He is a wise and reflective citizen, and a great supporter and interlocutor.

Finally, I want to acknowledge my children, as I did in previous editions, for constantly showing me that there is more to life than the polis and for being good enough citizens – just! Thank you Rosa, Joshua and Jacob.

DH

Introduction

The history of the idea of democracy is curious; the history of democracies is puzzling.

There are two striking historical facts. First, political leaders of extraordinarily diverse views profess to be democrats. Political regimes of all kinds describe themselves as democracies. Yet what these regimes say and do is often substantially different from one to another throughout the world. Democracy appears to legitimate modern political life: rule-making and law enforcement seem justified and appropriate when they are ‘democratic’. But it has not always been so. From ancient Greece to the present day the majority of political thinkers have been highly critical of the theory and practice of democracy. A general commitment to democracy is a very recent phenomenon.

Second, while many states today may be democratic, the history of their political institutions reveals the fragility and vulnerability of democratic arrangements. The history of twentieth-century Europe alone makes clear that democracy is a remarkably difficult form of government to create and sustain: fascism, Nazism and Stalinism came very close to eradicating it altogether. Democracy has evolved through intensive social struggles and is frequently sacrificed in such struggles. This book is about the idea of democracy, but in exploring the idea we cannot escape too far from aspects of its history in thought and practice.

While the word ‘democracy’ came into English in the sixteenth century from the French démocratie, its origins are Greek. ‘Democracy’ is derived from demokratia, the root meanings of which are demos (people) and kratos (rule). Democracy means a form of government in which, in contradistinction to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule. Democracy entails a political community in which there is some form of political equality among the people. ‘Rule by the people’ may appear an unambiguous concept, but appearances are deceptive. The history of the idea of democracy is complex and is marked by conflicting conceptions. There is plenty of scope for disagreement.

Definitional problems emerge with each element of the phrase: ‘rule’? – ‘rule by’? – ‘the people’? To begin with ‘the people’:

The idea of ‘rule’ evokes a plethora of issues:

Does ‘rule by’ entail the obligation to obey?

The potential areas for disagreement do not stop here. For, from ancient Greece to the contemporary world, there have also been fundamentally different opinions expressed about the general conditions or prerequisites of successful ‘rule by the people’. Do the people have, for instance, to be literate before becoming democrats? Is a certain level of social wealth necessary for the maintenance of a democracy? Can democracies be maintained during times of national emergency or war? These and a host of other issues have ensured that the meaning of democracy has remained, and probably always will remain, unsettled.

There is much significant history in the attempt to restrict the meaning of ‘the people’ to certain groups: among others, owners of property, white men, educated men, men, those with particular skills and occupations, white adults, adults. There is also a telling story in the various conceptions and debates about what is to count as ‘rule’ by ‘the people’. The range of possible positions includes, as one commentator usefully summarized them:

  1. 1 That all should govern, in the sense that all should be involved in legislating, in deciding on general policy, in applying laws and in governmental administration.
  2. 2 That all should be personally involved in crucial decision-making, that is to say, in deciding general laws and matters of general policy.
  3. 3 That rulers should be accountable to the ruled; they should, in other words, be obliged to justify their actions to the ruled and be removable by the ruled.
  4. 4 That rulers should be accountable to the representatives of the ruled.
  5. 5 That rulers should be chosen by the ruled.
  6. 6 That rulers should be chosen by the representatives of the ruled.
  7. 7 That rulers should act in the interests of the ruled. (Lively, 1975, p. 30)

Positions taken derive in part from different ways of justifying democracy. Democracy has been defended on the grounds that it comes closest among the alternatives to achieving one or more of the following fundamental values or goods: rightful authority, political equality, liberty, moral self-development, the common interest, a fair moral compromise, binding decisions that take everyone’s interest into account, social utility, the satisfaction of wants, efficient decisions. Within the history of the clash of positions lies the struggle to determine whether democracy will mean some kind of popular power (a form of life in which citizens are engaged in self-government and self-regulation) or an aid to decision-making (a means to legitimate the decisions of those voted into power – ‘representatives’ – from time to time). What should be the scope of democracy? To what domains of life should it be applied? Or, alternatively, should democracy be clearly delimited to maintain other important ends?

These are extremely difficult questions. Analysis of the variants of democracy, the chief task of this book, does not resolve them, although it may help to illuminate why certain positions are more attractive than others. In focusing on the chief variants, this volume will set out some of the political options we face today. But it is as well to say that these options do not present themselves in a simple, clear-cut manner. The history of democracy is often confusing, partly because this is still very much an active history, and partly because the issues are very complex (R. Williams, 1976, pp. 82–7). It is important to say also that my account of the myriad of issues is helped, as are all such accounts, by a particular position within this active history: a belief that democratic ideas and practices can in the long run be protected only if their hold on our political, social and economic life is extended and deepened. The precise nature of this view and the reasons I have for holding it will, I hope, be clarified later, but it does mean that I am inevitably more sympathetic to some democratic theorists than others.

The book is divided into three parts. Part One sets out four classic models of democracy: the classical idea of democracy in ancient Athens; the republican conception of a self-governing community (elaborated in two variants: protective and developmental republicanism);1 liberal democracy (again, elaborated in two different variants: protective democracy and developmental democracy); and the Marxist conception of direct democracy. Part Two explores five more recent models that have spawned intensive political discussion and conflict: competitive elitist democracy, pluralism, legal democracy, participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. Part Three examines some of the central problems of democratic theory and practice, and addresses the question: what should democracy mean today? This question is pursued by means of an appraisal of the contemporary relevance of the democratic heritage within the context of the nation-state as well as against the background of the development of dense interconnections among states and societies.

Thus, the concerns of Models of Democracy span some of the earliest conceptions of democracy, the eclipse of these ideas for nearly two millennia, the slow re-emergence of democratic notions in the course of the Renaissance and, from the late sixteenth century, during the struggle of liberalism against tyranny and the absolutist state, the reformulation of the idea of democracy in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in both the liberal and Marxist traditions, and the clash of contemporary perspectives. In focusing Models of Democracy in this way, prime attention is given to the development of democracy in the West. This is because the story of the development of different variants of democracy is in part the story of the formation of certain political ideas and practices which crystallized most clearly in the West. Debates about the nature of democracy have been particularly intensive within the European and North American intellectual traditions, although to state this is by no means to claim that everything of importance about the nature of democracy originated in, or was fully understood or expressed in, Europe and North America alone (see Bernal, 1987; Springborg, 1992). Although the emphasis here will be on the Western democratic tradition, the significance of other strands of thought and of other political regions will be introduced later.2

The models of democracy at the centre of the following chapters are set out in figure 1, as are the very general relations between them. All but one of the models could reasonably be divided into two broad types: direct or participatory democracy (a system of decision-making about public affairs in which citizens are directly involved) and liberal or representative democracy (a system of rule embracing elected ‘officers’ who undertake to ‘represent’ the interests and/or views of citizens within the framework of ‘the rule of law’).3 These broad classificatory labels will occasionally be used for the purpose of grouping together a number of models. However, they will be deployed only on a highly restricted basis; for one of the central purposes of this volume is to explicate and assess a far wider range of arguments about democracy than are suggested by these two general notions alone. There is a great deal to be learned, for instance, about the differences between classical democracy, developmental republicanism, direct democracy and participatory democracy, even though they all might be labelled a type of ‘direct democracy’. To focus on them merely as forms of the latter is to risk missing significant divergencies between them – divergencies which justify a more complex classificatory system. A similar point can be made about ‘variants’ of liberal democracy. Accordingly, the terms listed in figure 1 will be generally used. The context of their use should clarify any ambiguity about the type of democracy under discussion and the similarities and differences between them.4

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Figure 1 Variants of democracy

The development of democracy encompasses a long and much contested history. The field of democratic theory comprises a vast range of considerations and debates. Both this history and the debates need to be understood if the changing meaning of democratic discourse over time – its key concepts, theories and concerns – is to be grasped. In cutting a path through this terrain, Models of Democracy offers a map of the key positions and arguments, as well as a series of critical reflections upon them. However, although the book covers a substantial range of issues, it is as well to stress that it is selective. In including four classic models (and some of their variants), I have been guided by the supposition that a fairly extensive coverage of a number of the most central ideas and theories is preferable to a superficial glimpse of them all. Therefore, I have not included an analysis of certain political traditions which, in some people’s lexicon, have made significant contributions to democratic theory, for example, that of the anarchists. There are other lacunae. I had originally planned to dwell at considerable length on the origin, source and context of each major theoretical trajectory in democratic theory. It was necessary to forgo this in order to keep the length of the volume to a manageable level, although I have tried to provide a brief historical and theoretical introduction to each model. In addition, I should perhaps emphasize that I have selected only those ‘models of democracy’ which I consider to be of central importance to classic and/or contemporary political debate.

There are three additional matters I should like to stress about the approach taken in this book and about the assumptions that underpin it. First, a word about the notion of ‘models’.5 As I use the term here it refers to a theoretical construction designed to reveal and explain the chief elements of a democratic form and its underlying structure of relations. An aspect of public life or set of institutions can be properly understood only in terms of its connections with other social phenomena. Models are, accordingly, complex ‘networks’ of concepts and generalizations about aspects of the political realm and its key conditions of entrenchment, including economic and social conditions.

Moreover, models of democracy involve necessarily, as will presently be seen, a shifting balance between descriptive-explanatory and normative statements; that is, between statements about how things are and why they are so, and statements about how things ought to or should be. While the classical Greek theorists often intended their work to be both descriptive and prescriptive, offering a unified teaching of ethics, politics and the conditions of human activity, many ‘modern’ theorists from Hobbes to Schumpeter claimed to be engaged in an essentially ‘scientific’ exercise which was non-normative, as they saw it. Hobbes fundamentally altered the tradition of political theory by sharply separating morals and politics; for him political analysis was to be a ‘civil science’ built upon clear principles and closely reasoned deductions. The rise of the social sciences (in particular, the disciplines of ‘government’ and sociology) in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries added momentum to the view that the study of democracy must be based on the pursuit of science. There has been a marked shift in the weight granted to ‘scientific method’ in the explication of the meaning of democracy. But ‘science’ has by no means triumphed everywhere over ‘philosophy’; and a purely empirical approach to democratic theory has been extensively criticized. Furthermore, irrespective of the proclaimed method used in political analysis, one can find in all models of democracy an intermingling of the descriptive and the normative. As one observer put it:

Some democratic theorists have seen clearly enough that their theories are such a mixture. Some have not, or have even denied it. Those who start from the tacit assumption that whatever is, is right, are apt to deny that they are making any value judgements. Those who start from the tacit assumption that whatever is, is wrong, give great weight to their ethical case (while trying to show that it is practicable). And between these two extremes there is room for a considerable range of emphasis. (Macpherson, 1977, p. 4)

In examining past, present and perhaps future models of democracy, it is important to inquire into their key features, their recommendations, their assumptions about the nature of the society in which democracy is or might be embedded, their fundamental conceptions of the political capabilities of human beings, and how they justify their views and preferences. And in assessing these models we must attend to the nature and coherence of theoretical claims, to the adequacy of empirical statements and to the practicality of prescriptions.

Second, in presenting a diversity of democratic models, I have tried to keep my own ‘prejudices’ under tight rein, so that an accurate representation of these models is given. But all ‘representation’ involves interpretation – interpretation which embodies a particular framework of concepts, beliefs and standards. Such a framework is not a barrier to understanding; on the contrary, it is integral to it (see Gadamer, 1975). For the framework we bring to the process of interpretation determines what we ‘see’, what we notice and register as important. Accordingly, particular interpretations cannot be regarded as the correct or final understanding of a phenomenon; the meaning of a phenomenon is always open to future interpretations from new perspectives. Interpretations are, therefore, always open to challenge. In the story that I tell some of my concerns, standards and beliefs – ‘prejudices’ – do inevitably appear. While I believe that the most defensible and attractive form of democracy is one in which citizens can, in principle, extend their participation in and deliberation about decision-making to a wide array of spheres (political, economic and social), I do not think any one existing model alone provides a satisfactory elucidation of the conditions, features or rationale of this democratic form. Part of my approach to assessing ‘models of democracy’ involves considering not only what democracy has been and is, but also what it might be.

Finally, in focusing above all on democratic ‘ideas’, I do not mean to imply that these ideas alone have been decisive in shaping political and social life. Rather, in general, I believe that it is only when ideas are connected to propitious historical circumstances and structural forces that they develop sufficient influence to alter the nature and workings of institutional forms. However, this statement itself needs careful qualification; for there are unquestionably circumstances in which the impact of particular political ideas has either lingered with potent effects or had the most dramatic consequences. The place of ideas in the historical process does not lend itself to easy generalization. But whatever the relation between ‘ideas’ and ‘social conditions’, an examination of models of democracy has its own justification, especially in a world like our own where there is pervasive scepticism and cynicism about many aspects of political life. In such a world it is more important than ever to examine the possible ways in which politics – democratic politics – might be transformed to enable citizens more effectively to shape and organize their own lives. It is hard to see how this task is possible without, among other things, an attempt to come to terms with the development and fate of democratic ideas, practices and institutions.

Accordingly, the chapters which follow have four overall objectives: first, to introduce leading models of democracy in terms of their central ideas and broad historical conditions; second, to set out the distinctiveness of each model in contrast with previous models; third, to explore the strengths and weaknesses of each model both in relation to what critics have said and in relation to the general argument developed in the book as a whole; and, fourth, by way of a conclusion, to present a novel understanding of democracy, albeit one that leaves further questions to be addressed. Throughout, I have tried to ensure that the reader has the clear opportunity to reflect upon arguments and positions independently, but obviously I hope to interest the reader in the critical views I develop. Models of Democracy is both an introduction and an interpretative work, a work which takes one from the politics of city-states to nation-states and, ultimately, to the terrain of international politics and global transformations. The story of democracy, thus told, is the story of fundamental alterations in the nature of political community and some of the key political possibilities that we face, now and in the future.

PART ONE
CLASSIC MODELS