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From James Creelman

With hands big as shovels and a heart full of love . . . my Father, my Father.

To the memory of Robert Murray Creelman: 1933–2009.

From Naresh Makhijani

To my brother, Rajesh Makhijani, nothing is impossible and miracles will happen.

Introduction

The seeds of this book were sown in 2008 when the world became all too aware of that hitherto obscure term “credit crunch.” As we watched financial institutions crumble and witnessed the devastating effect of the economic tsunami that ripped its way through global economies, a number of things became abundantly clear. That the world would likely spend many years recovering from what proved to be a “near depression,” and that financial institutions, most notably the banking sector, would need to go through a radical overhaul to be “fit for purpose,” for the new post-credit crunch economy.

What being “fit for purpose,” would look like also began to become clear as the credit crunch unfolded. And as researchers, analysts and economists told the story (or at least the early versions; the actual story has perhaps yet to be told), certain words and terms began to be regularly applied. Financial institutions would, it was repeatedly argued, need to become much more “accountable,” for their performance. Their day-to-day working practices and decision-making processes would need to be far more “transparent,” than had hitherto been the case, and there would have to be a greater understanding of the risks that were inherent in the products being sold and, of course, the strategic choices that were being made.

Moreover, organizations would need to better understand, and communicate to shareholders and other stakeholder groups the non-financial drivers of future financial performance and must be at least as much concerned with managing for the longer-term as driving short-term performance and demonstrate this. And perhaps imbued with the greatest emotions (especially from the general public, who is experiencing most of the fallout from the credit crunch in terms of job losses throughout the economy and massive cutbacks in public services), compensation systems would need to be overhauled to be more reflective of actual performance and the sustainable value that is built.

As we thought about a roadmap for recovery that could contend with these challenges, our thoughts continually anchored back to the Balanced Scorecard. Since its original launch in the early 1990s (and confirmed through our consulting and research experiences) the scorecard has repeatedly proven to help organizations from various sectors and industries to overcome the myriad trials that financial institutions face.

In writing this book, and in our description of the Balanced Scorecard, we have been fully and constantly cognizant of the huge task facing the leaders of financial institutions (most notably of course from the banking sector) over the coming years and the intense scrutiny that will be under from a raft of stakeholder groups, such as shareholders, legislators, regulators and the general public. All will need a lot of convincing before they replace their trust in the beleaguered sector.

Sprinkled with case examples and advice from scorecard experts, this book provides a complete picture of how to build and implement the Balanced Scorecard within a financial services organization. Written as a practitioner's step-by-step guide the book explains how to build a causal Strategy Map of strategic objectives and select Key Performance Indicators, targets and strategic initiatives from one financial and three non-financial perspectives of customer, internal process and learning and growth, (the core components of a Balanced Scorecard) at both the strategic business unit and devolved levels. In addition to being a framework that enables the balancing of long-term performance stewardship while optimizing short-term efforts, a Balanced Scorecard also drives performance accountability and transparency deep inside the organization.

The following chapters also outline how to put in place the appropriate culture for managing with the Balanced Scorecard (particularly important as we make “risk management,” an integral part of the strategic management process) and how to select the appropriate technology for strategy management (very important for making performance fully visible and transparent). Moreover, we also explain how to rework an incentive-compensation system so it reflects the drivers of future value creation as well as historic financial performance (the most emotive of the change requirements). And we also show how to link the Balanced Scorecard framework and methodology with other key management processes such as the annual budget and other planning processes, how to link strategic and operational processes and how to reengineer management (operational, strategic and boards of directors) review meetings to drive greater clarity, focus and relevance into performance assessments. We also explain how to build the internal capability (through an Office of Strategy Management) that will inculcate the capabilities to manage with a Balanced Scorecard and to make strategy “everyone's every day job.”

This work reflects the many years experience and field observations of the two authors but would not have been possible without the involvement of others, which we here fully acknowledge. We would like to thank the case study companies that we profiled, and in particular the three from Indonesia and their representatives: Dyah Nastiti Kusumowardani,'s Director of Strategy Planning, Bank Indonesia, Wahyu Eko Wardon, Head of Corporate Strategy, Bank CIMB Niaga and Falk Archibald Kemur, Head of the President's Office, ADIRA Finance. We would like to thank present and past OTI staff for contributing their knowledge and experience and all present and past OTI clients, who have continually shown enthusiasm for the Balanced Scorecard approach, have benefited from the results and enriched our understanding of how best to apply this framework and methodology within diverse sector settings.

We also acknowledge the thought leadership of people such as Andrew Smart of the U.K.-based management consultancy Manigent and Nigel Penny of the Singapore-based ClaritasAsia who were especially useful in shaping our understanding of how to integrate risk management with strategy management within the scorecard framework. Finally we would like to thank Professor Robert Kaplan and Dr. David Norton for their work in developing and evolving the Balanced Scorecard. We truly stand on the shoulders of giants.

Chapter 1

The Curse of Living in “Interesting Times,” The Credit Crunch, and Other Challenges

Executive Summary

Introduction

An ancient Chinese adage states that it is a curse to live in interesting times. If that is true then those working in the financial services industry (most notably the banking sector) have been “cursed” over the past few years. Without question they have lived in “interesting” times.

The Impact of the Credit Crunch

The 2008 collapse of the subprime mortgage market that triggered the commonly termed “credit crunch” had a catastrophic impact on the financial services industry. In the middle of the first decade of this century, it would have been unthinkable that venerable and long-established organizations such as Lehman Brothers would be out of business before the end of the decade and that Merrill Lynch would survive only thanks to being taken over by the Bank of America. It would have been equally unimaginable that “darlings of the stock markets” such as the U.K.-headquartered Royal Bank of Scotland would only survive the decade thanks to massive bailouts from national governments.

The fallout from the collapse of banks and other financial institutions has had a profound and debilitating impact on all industries and sectors. As the full extent of the credit crunch took hold, many economists and other experts feared that we are entering a recession that might be as deep and long lasting as the great depression of the 1930s—itself essentially triggered by a collapse of confidence in the banking industry. Although, largely thanks to government bailouts as well as massive spending to get economies moving, we managed to avoid “depression,” the financial services sector will likely never be the same again and it will probably take many years before public, and perhaps more importantly, customer confidence is fully restored.

Even before the credit crunch, customer confidence in the financial services sector had badly eroded because of the uncovering of long-term issues caused by the systematic misselling of pensions and mortgages. Customer anger has been further stoked because to pay for the banking bailouts and the spending to avoid “depression,” there will be massive cuts in public sector in many countries (the U.K. being a prime example where for some years there will be severe cuts across government departments and public services. Many public sector workers will lose their jobs—and guess who they're blaming?)

The Causes of the Credit Crunch

Let's consider what caused the financial disaster that was the credit crunch. It is obvious that widescale inappropriate lending to people with poor credit ratings had a dramatic impact on those who had invested in these securities. According to the global body of professional accountants, the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), the principal cause of the credit crunch was a failure in corporate governance at banks, resulting in short-term thinking and blindness to risk.

Before looking in more depth at the ACCA findings, note that “blindness to risk,” which has been noted by most experts as a key cause of the credit crunch (or perhaps more accurately a reckless attitude to risk management) has long been a cause for concern in financial services, especially banking. Indeed, as early as 2004, Alan Greenspan, chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve noted that:

Even earlier, in 2001, the influential Risk Management Group of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision defined risk as: “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed processes, people, and systems or from external events.”¹

ACCA's policy paper, Climbing Out of the Credit Crunch,² examined five key areas of banking performance: corporate governance; remuneration and incentives; risk identification and management; management accounting and financial reporting; and regulation.

Within its wide-ranging and damning report, the failures identified for the first three of these areas are particularly interesting when considered through the lens of this book.

Corporate Governance

“A fundamental role of the board is to provide oversight, direction and control but also to challenge where necessary. This does not appear to have happened in many of the banks,” the ACCA paper noted. “No doubt this is partly owing to a lack of understanding of the complexities of the business, but more training is probably only part of the solution . . . [but] what inhibited boards and managers from asking the right questions and understanding the risks that were being run on their watch?”

As we explain in this book, one of the key strengths of the Balanced Scorecard system is that it inculcates performance transparency and accountability into organizations: from the very top down to team and even individual levels.

The existence of a well-thought-out enterprise-level Strategy Map and accompanying scorecard of metrics, targets, and initiatives provides corporate boards with an excellent and concise view of corporate financial performance and the nonfinancial drivers of that performance. As a governance tool this is clearly much more useful to corporate boards than the weighty and overly detailed board packs that they typically receive before board meetings.

Moreover, as we explain in chapter 2, it is possible to build strategy maps and scorecards for the corporate board and their constituent oversight committees (such as those for remuneration and incentives). This board scorecard system can have a powerful and positive impact on how a board discharges its corporate governance responsibilities.

Remuneration and Incentives

In the paper, ACCA stated that although executive remuneration arrangements should promote organizational performance, the existing incentive and career structures of banks meant enormous rewards reinforced short-term thinking. “If not addressed, remuneration issues will continue to frustrate other attempts for reform,” the paper noted. “Risk management and remuneration and incentive systems must be linked. Executive payments should be deferred (e.g. held in an escrow account) until profits have been realized, cash received and accounting transactions cannot be reversed.”

Sukhend Pal, managing partner at the U.K.'s Centrix Consulting made an interesting observation on the role of incentive compensation and product complexity in the cause of the credit crunch in an article that appeared in a June edition of Raconteur (a supplement distributed within the U.K.'s Times newspaper).³ “The role of structured products created by derivatives specialists as investment, such as collateralized debt obligations, has been the root cause of the financial crisis,” he said. “Many [Centrix] clients have been seriously beguiled by the structure of these products that were expensive, highly complex and simply not appropriate. Yet, investment bankers sold them for their personal gain and sky high bonuses.”

In chapter 10 of this book, we describe how remuneration and incentives can be hardwired to performance against the Balanced Scorecard system. If a risk management theme is included within the scorecard (and it most likely will be for those involved in financial services), then how this affects present and future financial results should be a key determinant of remuneration and incentive payouts.

Risk Identification and Management

The ACCA paper notes that:

In chapter 3, we explain the importance of strategic risk management as part of, or at least aligned to, the scorecard system, while in chapter 4 we consider key risk indicators. Andrew Smart, a performance and risk management expert with the U.K.-based consultancy Manigent, says: “Simply, the credit crisis arose because financial services organizations failed to develop and execute sustainable strategies that fully considered their risk environment, and they neglected to embed risk management at the heart of their strategic and operational processes.”⁴

The Southeast Asia Currency Crisis

As financial institutions begin to put in place the strategic risk and control tools to help them emerge from the credit crunch (and ensure that it doesn't happen again), we should reflect on the fact that although most of the world is witnessing a once-in-a-lifetime restructuring of banking and related industries, this is not the case in Southeast Asia. The banking industry in this region, and most profoundly Indonesia, went through massive transformation after the Asia currency crisis of 1997, precipitated when the Korean company Hanbo Steel collapsed with $6 billion of debts. As a result, Asian banks faced massive problems with nonpayments of loans, while Asian currencies sharply fell in value.

In Indonesia, the repercussion for the banking sector was dramatic, with the closure of almost 50 percent of the country's 250-plus banks. Those that survived were placed under government supervision through the Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA). As a result, banking became essentially state controlled while it was being reorganized.

Understood in relation to the present global financial sector meltdown, it might be telling that the sector in Indonesia is relatively unscathed. Indeed, while most of the world's banks were restructuring and downsizing to survive the fallout from the credit crunch, one of the case studies within this book—the Jakarta-headquartered Bank CIMB Niaga—spent 2008 aggressively growing its business and planting the seeds of future growth. That Bank CIMB Niaga found itself in this position is partly thanks to the excellent work done since the currency crisis by Bank Indonesia, which is the nation's independent and autonomous central bank. Bank Indonesia is another case study within this book.

It is likely that after the 1997 currency crisis, banks in Indonesia learnt the governance and other lessons that most of the rest of the world is, with great pain, learning today.

Although the aftermath of the credit crunch is the most pressing challenge facing the financial services sector today, it is not the only one: further proving the adage that the sector is living in “interesting times.” Over recent years, other powerful influences have been profoundly reshaping how the sector operates, goes to market and relates to customers.

Deregulation, Globalization, and Technology

Deregulation, the opening up of global markets and breathtaking advancements in information and communications technologies, has affected all organizations to some degree. But, as with the credit crunch, it is something of a struggle to identify another industry in which the effect has been as pervasive and transformational as in financial services.

Online Market Channels

For example, consider the revolutionary impact on the industry of online market channels. Today, individuals can source all of their financial products and services from the comfort of their own home, and at a click of a button can instantly compare prices and product characteristics for many hundreds of suppliers. It is a sobering thought that when the remote bank Banking 365, another case study in this book, opened its lines for business in 1996, such operations were virtually unknown.

The Collapse of Customer Loyalty

Financial services was once a sector (across the spectrum from banking to insurance through financing to investing) in which competitive advantage was largely the outcome of the quality and depth of personal relationships. Think, for example, of the historic relationships between a homeowner and an insurance salesman, or an individual investor and a broker, or even a bank employee and people who live in the neighborhood and had all their banking needs catered to by one branch.

Today, personal relationships play a substantially smaller part in the financial services supplier and customer dynamic. Naturally, this has had a profound impact on levels of customer loyalty. For example, most people find it much easier to sever links with a bank that they experience mainly through a customer contact center or on the internet than it is to “leave” a local bank manager that they have known and been friends with for many years.

Customer Loyalty Research

Not surprisingly, therefore, customer loyalty and retention have become growing concerns for most financial services organizations. Consider, for instance, the retail banking sector. A European report by the U.K.-based Datamonitor found that customer loyalty is decreasing year on year. Branch managers surveyed revealed that they believed that an increase in consumer awareness of financial services products and the growth in online banking are the principal reasons for the decrease in loyalty.⁵ Interestingly, Banking 365 set out with a mission that through remote channels it would improve the then low levels of customer satisfaction—and consequently loyalty.

The Datamonitor researchers claim that customers are increasingly looking at their financial services providers not as lifelong partners, but as providers for a short time. Moreover, their research finds that the customer loyalty issue looks set to worsen for lenders in the long run, as competition intensifies and deregulation continues.

Since this research was conducted before the financial services industry was hit by the credit crunch, we can reasonably assume that the massive erosion of customer confidence has further reduced loyalty tendencies. Indeed, banks—and most firmly their senior managers—are treated with at best deep suspicion and at worst downright hatred.

Using the Balanced Scorecard to Create a Customer Experience

That said, we would argue that through using the Balanced Scorecard, financial services companies are better able to predict and plan for customer defection, leading to much higher retention rates and, on doing so, gradually rebuilding the trust that customers have in banks and their senior employees.

Banks can do this by modeling how to configure people competencies and customer-facing internal processes so that the customer receives the type of service and experience that encourage them to continue the relationship with the supplier.

Case Example: Scotiabank

An exemplary example is the Canadian bank Scotiabank. In-depth research on its customer database at the turn of the century suggested that upcoming issues across the banking world would seriously affect loyalty and therefore profitability. Among these was the commoditization of financial services products, which meant that product differentiation would likely no longer provide competitive advantage for any length of time. Consequently, in 2001 Scotiabank introduced the Balanced Scorecard to support a new vision to “to be the best at helping its customers become financially better off, by providing relevant solutions to their unique needs.” By delivering that experience, Scotiabank believed it would retain (and also win) customers in fiercely competitive markets.

Has Scotiabank delivered on this vision? Fast forward to March 2007 and the address to the annual general meeting made by Richard E. Waugh, the corporation's president and CEO.

He continued that its research had found that its vision resonated with customers. “In fact, it's a proposition that translates into a tremendous level of customer loyalty,” said Waugh. “[And] compared to the other Canadian banks, Scotiabank customers report very high levels of customer loyalty. This higher level of commitment means that our customers are more likely to recommend our services to others. And it means they'll trust us with more of their business.”

As for 2007 success, the 60,000-employee-strong Scotiabank reported net income available to common shareholders of C$3,994 million and return on equity of 22 percent. Dividends increased by 16 percent. The total return to shareholders (share price appreciation plus dividends reinvested) was 12 percent—resulting in 13 consecutive years of positive returns to shareholders of the bank. The compound annual return of the bank's shares over the past five years has averaged 22 percent.

In the same presentation Waugh also referenced the important role of the Balanced Scorecard. “[W]hen we look at our performance as an organization, we look at more than just our financials,” he said. “We use a Balanced Scorecard [which] means financial performance [but] also means meeting our customer goals. It means operational success and, of course, it means our people.”

Of course, this presentation predates the credit crunch. So let's fast forward to the speech made by Waugh at the 2009 annual general meeting, after the credit crunch tsunami had hit the world.⁶ He said:

Despite the credit crunch, Waugh has kept his faith in managing in a “balanced” way; a faith strengthened by the bank performing much better than most in the challenging and interesting times of 2008.

Scorecard Pioneers

Scotiabank was far from the first financial services organization to introduce, and demonstrate stunning successes through the Balanced Scorecard. From the inception of the Balanced Scorecard framework and methodology back in 1992 (see chapter 2 for the history of the scorecard), financial services organizations have been among the most prolific adopters. Early success stories included the following.

Chemical Bank (Later Part of Chase Manhattan)

At the turn of the 1990s, the retail bank division of Chemical Bank faced declining margins and increased competition in its credit and deposit gathering and processing business. It decided to implement a new strategy to become a preferred financial service provider to targeted customer groups. In 1993 the division adopted the Balanced Scorecard to clarify and communicate the new strategy and to identify the key drivers for strategic success. By 1996, the results of the new strategy were becoming apparent. In the space of three years, profitability had increased by a factor of 20.

CIGNA Property & Casualty Insurance

In 1993, the Property & Casualty (P&C) division of the insurance firm CIGNA lost nearly $275 million. Although this poor performance was due in part to a few major catastrophes, most lines of business were marginal. In the opinion of the new management team brought in to turn the situation around, the division had lost control of the underwriting process—the process by which risks were evaluated and priced. The management team believed that CIGNA was pursuing an obsolete “generalist” strategy, trying to be all things to all people; therefore, a new strategy was developed. CIGNA would be a “specialist,” focusing on niches where it had comparative advantage. The division would make underwriting an asset instead of a liability. If the strategy succeeded, CIGNA would become a “top quartile” performer. The strategy was rolled out to 20 business units in 1993. The Balanced Scorecard was used as the core management process.

Again the results were rapid and dramatic. Within two years, CIGNA had returned to profitability. This performance has been sustained for four consecutive years. In 1998, the company's performance placed it in the top quartile of its industry. At the end of 1998, the parent company spun off the P&C division for a price of $3.45 billion. The Balanced Scorecard was core component of this success story.

We talk more about the CIGNA P&C success story in the following chapters. One of the authors of this books spent some time in the late 1990s uncovering the inside secrets of the CIGNA P&C scorecard success story.

Other Scorecard-Using Financial Services Companies

If Chemical Bank and CIGNA P&C were scorecard pioneers, other financial services organizations followed suit, a sample of which is listed in figure 1.1.

Conclusion

We profile many of these organizations within this book. We will explain how the Balanced Scorecard has helped them win in challenging markets and how it will continue to do so going forward. Some of the successes have been truly spectacular which we will explain later. Chapter 4 is where we begin the process of providing a practical description of how to build and implement the Balanced Scorecard. In the next chapter, however, we will explain how the Balanced Scorecard has evolved to become a truly enterprisewide strategy management system and will provide a robust description of a Balanced Scorecard framework. Getting this basic understanding in place makes it easier to succeed in the scorecard building and deployment phases.

Endnotes

1. Quoted from G. J. G. Lawrie, D. C. Kalff, and H. V. Andersen, Integrating Risk Management with Existing Methods of Corporate Governance (U.K.: 2GC, 2003). See www.2gc.co.uk.

2. Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, Climbing Out of the Credit Crunch, policy paper, 2008.

3. Simon Brooke, “Can Lean and Six Sigma Help Revive Financial Services? Or Was Their Usage Partly to Blame for Current Turmoil?”, Raconteur Media, June 8, 2010.

4. Andrew Smart, Aligning Risk Management and Exposure: The New Paradigm of Strategic Execution (London: Manigent, 2009).

5. Datamonitor, Trends in Customer Loyalty and Acquisition Strategies in Europe, 2007.

6. Presentation made by Richard E. Waugh, President and CEO, Scotiabank, to the Scotiabank annual general meeting, March, 2009.