METAPHILOSOPHY SERIES IN PHILOSOPHY

Series Editors: Armen T. Marsoobian and Eric Cavallero

The Philosophy of Interpretation, edited by Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore (2000)

Global Justice, edited by Thomas W. Pogge (2001)

Cyberphilosophy: The Intersection of Computing and Philosophy, edited by James H. Moor and Terrell Ward Bynum (2002)

Moral and Epistemic Virtues, edited by Michael Brady and Duncan Pritchard (2003)

The Range of Pragmatism and the Limits of Philosophy, edited by Richard Shusterman (2004)

The Philosophical Challenge of September 11, edited by Tom Rockmore, Joseph Margolis, and Armen T. Marsoobian (2005)

Global Institutions and Responsibilities: Achieving Global Justice, edited by Christian Barry and Thomas W. Pogge (2005)

Genocide's Aftermath: Responsibility and Repair, edited by Claudia Card and Armen T. Marsoobian (2007)

Stem Cell Research: The Ethical Issues, edited by Lori Gruen, Laura Gravel, and Peter Singer (2008)

Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy, edited by Eva Feder Kittay and Licia Carlson (2010)

Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic, edited by Heather Battaly (2010)

Global Democracy and Exclusion, edited by Ronald Tinnevelt and Helder De Schutter (2010)

Putting Information First: Luciano Floridi and the Philosophy of Information, edited by Patrick Allo (2011)

The Pursuit of Philosophy: Some Cambridge Perspectives, edited by Alexis Papazoglou (2012)

Philosophical Engineering: Toward a Philosophy of the Web, edited by Harry Halpin and Alexandre Monnin (2014)

The Philosophy of Luck, edited by Duncan Pritchard and Lee John Whittington (2015)

Criticism and Compassion: The Ethics and Politics of Claudia Card, edited by Robin S. Dillon and Armen T. Marsoobian (2018)

Marcia Baron is the James H. Rudy Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University. Her main interests are in moral philosophy and philosophy of criminal law. Publications include Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology (Cornell, 1995), “Manipulativeness” (2003), “Gender Issues in the Criminal Law” (2011), “Self‐Defense: The Imminence Requirement” (2011), “The Ticking Bomb Hypothetical” (2013), “Rape, Seduction, Shame, and Culpability in Tess of the d'Urbervilles” (2013), and “Rethinking ‘One Thought Too Many’” (2017).

Mavis Biss is an associate professor of philosophy at Loyola University Maryland. She specializes in Kantian ethics and conceptions of moral creativity. Her current work deals with the complexities of rational agency in the face of contested moral meaning. She was awarded the 2015 Wilfrid Sellars Prize for “Kantian Moral Striving,” Kantian Review (2015).

Claudia Card was the Emma Goldman (WARF) Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, where she also taught in women's studies, LGBT studies, Jewish studies, and environmental studies. Her books include Feminist Ethics (Kansas, 1991), Lesbian Choices (Columbia, 1995), The Unnatural Lottery: Character and Moral Luck (Temple, 1996), and a trilogy, The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil (Oxford, 2002), Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide (Cambridge, 2010), and Surviving Atrocity (forthcoming).

Victoria Davion was professor and chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Georgia and editor of Ethics & the Environment. Her primary interests were in ethics, including environmental ethics and feminist ethics, and political philosophy. Her recent work examines how concepts such as “nature” and “the natural order” are used to justify controversial ethical issues. Among her recent publications is “Feminist Perspectives on Global Warming, Genocide, and Card's Theory of Evil” (Hypatia, 2009).

Robin S. Dillon is William Wilson Selfridge Professor of Philosophy at Lehigh University. She writes on self‐respect—to which Claudia Card introduced her—and related concepts. Her publications include “Self‐Respect and Humility in Kant and Hill,” in Timmons and Johnson, eds., Reason, Value, and Respect (Oxford, 2015), and “Critical Character Theory: Toward a Feminist Theory of ‘Vice,’” in Crasnow and Superson, eds., Out from the Shadows (Oxford, 2012). She is writing a book on arrogance.

Ellen K. Feder is William Fraser McDowell Professor of Philosophy at American University in Washington, D.C., and the author of Making Sense of Intersex: Changing Ethical Perspectives in Biomedicine (Indiana, 2014) and Family Bonds: Genealogies of Race and Gender (Oxford, 2007).

Armen T. Marsoobian is professor and chair of philosophy at Southern Connecticut State University and editor in chief of Metaphilosophy. He has published on topics in aesthetics, ethics, pragmatism, and genocide studies. He has edited five books, including The Blackwell Guide to American Philosophy and Genocide's Aftermath: Responsibility and Repair with Claudia Card. His most recent book, Fragments of a Lost Homeland: Remembering Armenia, is based upon extensive research about his family during the declining years of the Ottoman Empire.

Diana Tietjens Meyers is professor emerita of philosophy at the University of Connecticut, Storrs. She currently works in four main areas of philosophy: philosophy of action, feminist ethics, aesthetics, and human rights. Her most recent monograph is Victims’ Stories and the Advancement of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2016). Her most recent edited collection is Poverty, Agency, and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2014). Her website is https://dianatietjensmeyers.wordpress.com/.

Kathryn J. Norlock is the Kenneth Mark Drain Chair in Ethics at Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario. She is the author of Forgiveness from a Feminist Perspective and the editor of The Moral Psychology of Forgiveness. Her research interests in ethical theory include moral emotions, pessimism, and relational ethics. Her interests in metaphilosophy include issues of diversity in the profession. She is a cofounder and coeditor of Feminist Philosophy Quarterly.

Eliana Peck is a doctoral student in philosophy at Vanderbilt University. She works at the intersection of ethics and social philosophy, with a special interest in the effectiveness of apology, moral repair, and punishment as responses to collectively perpetrated wrongs and structural injustices. More recently, she has been conducting research on questions emerging out of social epistemology and philosophy of race, regarding the affective component of resisting active white ignorance.

Robin May Schott is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies in the section Peace, Risk and Violence. She is a philosopher working in feminist philosophy, ethics, and political philosophy in an interdisciplinary key, and has written extensively on issues related to gender, conflict, war, and sexual violence. Among her book publications are Birth, Death, and Femininity: Philosophies of Embodiment (editor, 2010) and School Bullying: New Theories in Context (coeditor, 2014).

James Snow is a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Loyola University Maryland, where he teaches courses in philosophy and genocide and the genealogy of race. His recent publications focus on how gender is framed in genocide scholarship as well as in documentary films and docu- dramas concerned with the Rwandan genocide. He is the blog editor for the International Association of Genocide Scholars and the philosophy editor for the Journal of Perpetrator Research.

Lynne Tirrell is a professor of philosophy at the University of Connecticut, where she is also affiliated with the Human Rights Institute. Her research concerns language, power, and social justice, with a special focus on the role of linguistic practices in genocide. Researching the 1994 genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda led her to trips to Rwanda and the U.N.’s criminal tribunal in Tanzania. Her articles address genocide, hate speech, transitional justice, apology, forgiveness, metaphor, storytelling, and feminism.

ARMEN T. MARSOOBIAN AND ROBIN S. DILLON

Claudia Card epitomized the highest virtues of the philosopher‐teacher. Her passing in September 2015 was a great loss to the profession and to the innumerably many students she taught and advised in her nearly forty years in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin – Madison. She had a long and distinguished career that began at a time when being a woman in the philosophy profession was not an easy matter—not that we can assume that it is easy today. She earned her Ph.D. in 1969 from Harvard with a dissertation on theories of punishment under the direction of John Rawls, despite the fact that women were not admitted to the Harvard Ph.D. program then except under the aegis of Radcliffe College. She was a pioneer in feminist and lesbian philosophy whose trailblazing work has influenced generations of philosophers. Indeed, as her then chairperson said in nominating her in 2011 for the University of Wisconsin's Hilldale Award, “Her books and articles have become as essential to feminist thinking as Das Kapital is to labor theory. You simply can't do feminism without reading Card, and even if you don't read Card, today's feminism bears her mark so deeply that you may not even realize that you have in some other way digested her theoretical perspectives.”¹ Her influence goes beyond feminism, even beyond philosophy, however, as demonstrated by her concept of social death, which has had continuing impact in the field of genocide studies.

Card's writings in feminist philosophy and other areas in moral, social, and political philosophy take everyday life and ordinary experiences seriously, displaying a realistic sensitivity to all forms of oppression. Card's work is marked by a careful attention to and analysis of less obvious ways that oppression structures people's characters and life possibilities, and by a commitment to the necessity of fighting oppression, injustice, cruelty, and violence with integrity and without causing further damage to oneself or others, while also remaining alive to involvement with evil and one's capacity to compromise with it.

Card had a very productive career that unfortunately ended too soon. Starting with her first and still widely cited article, “On Mercy,”² she published ten monographs and edited several volumes and nearly 150 articles and reviews, and gave more than 250 talks at conferences, colleges, and universities. Her research interests included ethics and social philosophy, including normative ethical theory; feminist ethics; environmental ethics; theories of justice, of punishment, and of evil; and the ethics of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. Card published articles on mainstream topics such as gratitude and obligation, friendship and fidelity, justice, the value of persons, and the basis of moral rights. But she is most widely known for her influential work in analytic feminist philosophy and on evil. Her work in feminist philosophy was especially notable for discussions of difficult topics, such as sadomasochism, adult‐child sex, and lesbian battery, and for challenging standard feminist and lesbian positions on separatism, marriage, and motherhood, including arguing against same‐sex marriage. Card's feminist work includes ground‐breaking essays and a monograph on lesbian ethics;³ key essays and a monograph on moral agency, character, and moral luck in circumstances of oppression;⁴ and pioneering articles on dimensions of oppression, such as domestic violence, rape as a form of terrorism, gay divorce, homophobic military codes, and the evils of closeting, among many others.

In the later stages of her career, Card's attention turned explicitly to a topic whose various dimensions she had been writing and teaching about for years. In addition to more than twenty‐five articles on evils, Card was at the time of her death in the midst of finishing a trilogy of monographs on evil, the first two of which appeared in her lifetime.⁵ In the first book, The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil, she developed a secular conception of evil as foreseeable, intolerable harms produced by culpable wrongdoing, and examined the evils of rape in war, domestic violence, and child abuse, the moral powers of victims and the moral burdens and obligations of perpetrators, and the predicament of people who are at once victims and perpetrators, which she called “gray zones.” In the second book, Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide, she refined her analysis of evil, focusing on the inexcusability of atrocities and expanding her account to consider structural evil and collectively perpetrated and collectively suffered atrocities, such as genocide. But she also argued that not all evils are extraordinary and urged us to pay attention to evils that are so common that we tend to overlook them, such as racism, violence against women, prison violence and executions, and violence against animals. An important dimension of Confronting Evils was addressing the problem of how to preserve humanitarian values in responding to atrocities. The third book, Surviving Atrocity, on which she was working extensively until her death, focused on surviving long‐term mass atrocities, poverty, and global and local misogyny.

The significant contributions Card made to philosophy were acknowledged with numerous honors. The Society for Women in Philosophy, of which she was a longtime member, named her Distinguished Philosopher of the Year in 1996; the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association elected her president for 2010–2011; the APA invited her to give a John Dewey Lecture in 2008; and she was selected by the APA to deliver the prestigious 2016 Carus Lectures. She completed two of the latter lectures, “Surviving Homophobia” and “Gratitude to the Decent Rescuer,” which were delivered by two of the contributors to this volume, Victoria Davion and Diana Tietjens Meyers, respectively.

Just before her death, the Society for Analytical Feminism, of which Card was a long‐time member, organized two APA sessions that featured talks on various aspects of her work. Those papers, as well as a number of others that also explore and expand on her philosophical legacy, are contained in this volume. We are also fortunate to be able to include eleven of Card's articles, which here are brought together for the first time in one volume.⁶ These articles cover a span of twenty years, beginning in 1996, with the last article published the year after Card died, in 2016. This truly unique volume thus combines her own powerful voice with the best in recent scholarship on issues central to her own philosophical concerns.

Although Card's contributions are far‐ranging and cut across a range of topics, we have divided this volume into two parts: “War, Genocide, and Evil” and “Feminist Ethical Theory and Its Applications.” Of course, this is a somewhat arbitrary division, for Card always brings her feminist ethical insights to bear on the many social and political issues she explores. Her work on rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war, which was ground‐breaking when it first appeared in the mid‐1990s, is a case in point.

We begin part 1 of our volume, “War, Genocide, and Evil,” with “Rape as a Weapon of War” (1996), followed by “Addendum to ‘Rape as a Weapon of War’” (1997), in which Card expanded her treatment of the martial weapon of rape to include sex crimes against men. Such crimes can be as racist as they are sexist, and may be quite simply racist. The essays propose social strategies to change the meaning of rape in order to undermine its use as a martial weapon.

In “Stoicism, Evil, and the Possibility of Morality” (1998), Card explores the idea that the very possibility of morality, understood as social or interpersonal ethics, presupposes, contra Stoicism, that we do value things that elude our control. She argues that Stoic ethics is unable to recognize the validity of morality (so understood) and can at most acknowledge duties to oneself. A further implication is that moral luck, far from undermining morality, as some have held, is presupposed by the very possibility of morality.

In “Women, Evil, and Gray Zones” (2000), Card, building upon Primo Levi's reflections on “gray zone” in Nazi death camps and ghettos, contends that such zones develop wherever oppression is severe and lasting. They are inhabited by victims of evil who become complicit in perpetrating on others the evils that threaten to engulf themselves. Women, who have inhabited many gray zones, present challenges for feminist theorists, who have long struggled with how resistance is possible under coercive institutions. Card argues that resistance is sometimes possible, although outsiders are rarely, if ever, in a position to judge when. She also raises questions about the adequacy of ordinary moral concepts to mark the distinctions that would be helpful for thinking about how to respond in a gray zone.

“Genocide and Social Death” (2003) played a pivotal role in Card's two‐decade‐long eplorations into the concept and consequences of evil, beginning with The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil and culminating in Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide. Social death, central to the evil of genocide (whether the genocide is homicidal or primarily cultural), distinguishes genocide from other mass murders. Loss of social vitality is loss of identity and thereby of meaning for one's existence. Seeing social death at the center of genocide takes our focus off body counts and loss of individual talents, directing us instead to mourn losses of relationships that create community and give meaning to the development of talents.

In “The Paradox of Genocidal Rape Aimed at Enforced Pregnancy” (2008), Card explores the paradox raised in Beverly Allen's book Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia‐Herzegovina and Croatia (Allen 1996), which centers on whether enforced pregnancy is genocidal or simply a form of forced assimilation that produces “little Serbs.” Employing her concept of social death and the insight that military rape is a form of biological warfare, Card concludes that rape aimed at enforced pregnancy contributed to an overall plan of ethnic cleansing that was also genocidal in its intent, and not merely a policy of expulsion or assimilation. Producing unwanted progeny and diminishing reproductivity are a direct consequence of the trauma of rape and can lead to the annihilation of the targeted group. Such a plan was in effect in the Bosnian conflict and is thus more in line with Raphael Lemkin's original definition of “genocide” as “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (Lemkin 1944, 79).

Card's essay “Surviving Long‐Term Mass Atrocities” (2012) provides us with a glimpse into the projected final volume of her trilogy on the concept of evil. First, she addresses the conceptual issue of the meaning of “survivor” in cases of mass atrocity. Second, she suggests some answers to the question: What is morally at stake in surviving long‐term mass atrocities? The moral costs and burdens incurred by many survivors present meta‐survival issues that problematize the judgment that one has survived. The most problematic of these are raised by those who are complicit in evildoing for the sake of their own survival.

The last of Card's essays in part 1 of our volume, “Taking Pride in Being Bad” (2016), concerns the possibility of valuing something in virtue of its being bad and, indeed, of taking pride in being bad. Immanuel Kant denied that human beings were capable of such evil, which he referred to as “diabolical evil.” In making sense of such evil, Card considers the limitations of Kant's conception of evil in order to bring into focus an alternative theory of evil, the “atrocity paradigm.” Employing this paradigm allows one to make sense of diabolical evil by combining Christine Korsgaard's Kantian conception of normativity with psychologist Lorna Smith Benjamin's theory of social attachment.

The concluding five essays in part 1 are by scholars whose work directly reflects many of the themes found in Card's corpus. Lynne Tirrell, in “Perpetrators and Social Death: A Cautionary Tale,” takes up Card's balanced approach of addressing both the grave wrongs done to the victims of evil and the perpetrator of those wrongs. Card's concept of social vitality was developed to explain what génocidaires destroy in their victims. This essay brings that concept into conversation with perpetrator testimony, arguing that the génocidaires’ desire for their own social vitality, achieved through their destruction of the social world of their targets, in fact boomerangs to corrode the vitality of their own lives. This is true whether they succeed or fail in their genocidal project. Card's recent analysis of “being a badass” is brought to bear on the cultivation of evil, and the essay suggests four strategies for meeting Card's “moral challenge of avoiding evil responses to evil.”

The concept of social death is explored, defended, and criticized in James Snow's “Claudia Card's Concept of Social Death: A New Way of Looking at Genocide.” Scholarship in the multidisciplinary field of genocide studies often emphasizes body counts and the number of biological deaths as a way of measuring and comparing the severity and scope of individual genocides. The prevalence of this way of framing genocide is problematic insofar it risks marginalizing the voices and experiences of victims who may not succumb to biological death but nevertheless suffer the loss of family members and other loved ones, and suffer the destruction of relationships as well of as the foundational institutions that give rise to and sustain those relationships. The concept of social death, which Card offers as the central evil of genocide, marks a radical shift in conceptualizing genocide and provides space for recovering the marginalized voices of many who suffer the evils of genocide but do not suffer biological death.

In “Surviving Evils and the Problem of Agency: An Essay Inspired by the Work of Claudia Card,” Diana Tietjens Meyers surveys Card's views about the nature of evils and the ethical quandaries of surviving them. Meyers then develops an account of survival agency that is based on Card's insights and in keeping with the agentic capacities exercised by Yezidi women and girls who have escaped from ISIS's obscene program of trafficking in women and sexual violence. Card holds that true survival requires not only staying alive and as healthy as possible but also preserving your good moral character. The essay maintains that while exercising agency to elude evil and protect yourself often depends on your own skills and personality traits, exercising agency to restore or develop your moral character often depends on social support.

Apology is arguably the central act of the reparative work required after wrongdoing. In “Institutional Evils, Culpable Complicity, and Duties to Engage in Moral Repair,” Eliana Peck and Ellen K. Feder ask whether apology is required of persons culpably complicit in institutional evils. To better appreciate the benefits of and barriers to apologies offered by culpably complicit wrongdoers, this essay examines doctors’ complicity in a practice that meets Card's definition of an evil, namely, the nonmedically necessary, nonconsensual “normalizing” interventions performed on babies born with intersex anatomies. It argues that in this instance the complicity of doctors is culpable on Card's terms, and that their culpable complicity grounds rightful demands for them to apologize.

“Part 2: Feminist Ethical Theory and Its Applications” brings together four of Card's essays, beginning with the early and controversial “Against Marriage and Motherhood” (1996). Written nearly two decades before the U.S. Supreme Court constitutionally guaranteed same‐sex marriage, this essay has gained an unexpected saliency. Card argues that the advocacy of lesbian and gay rights to legal marriage and parenthood insufficiently criticizes both marriage and motherhood as they are currently practiced and structured by Northern legal institutions. Instead we would do better not to let the state define our intimate unions. Parenting would be improved if the power currently concentrated in the hands of one or two guardians were diluted and distributed through an appropriately concerned community.

Now that the reality of gay divorce is legally upon us, Card's “Gay Divorce: Thoughts on the Legal Regulation of Marriage” (2007) holds some timely lessons. Card argues that although the exclusion of LGBT individuals from the rites and rights of marriage is arbitrary and unjust, the legal institution of marriage is itself so riddled with injustice that it would be better to create alternative forms of durable intimate partnership that do not invoke the power of the state. Card's essay develops a case for this position, taking up an injustice sufficiently serious to constitute an evil: the sheltering of domestic violence.

Card's “Challenges of Global and Local Misogyny” (2014) is taken from a volume of essays about the work of her Harvard mentor John Rawls. Card challenges Rawls's hypothesis that the worst evils that target women and girls will disappear once the gravest political injustices are gone. Her essay explores this hypothesis in relation to women's self‐defense and mutual defense against evils of misogyny. Card extrapolates and adapts Rawls's work, especially his writing on war, for this purpose, arguing that women need principles for forming social units of defense against global and local misogyny.

The five concluding essays in part 2 take up many of Card's themes, beginning with Marcia Baron's “Hate Crime Legislation Reconsidered.” Baron examines Card's arguments questioning the value of hate crime legislation. Card had questioned whether hatred makes a crime worse and whether hatred of the sort pertinent to hate crimes is worse than a more personal type of hatred. Card doubts whether the actual message sent by hate crime legislation is the intended message. Baron questions Card's assumption that penalty enhancement for hate crimes is warranted only if the crimes are worse than otherwise similar crimes that do not count as hate crimes. Instead, it may be the case that it is the proper business of the state to take a particular interest in such crimes, in part because they enact not just any hatred but civic hatred. If hate crimes are understood as enacting civic hatred, hate crime legislation can indeed serve to counter a message that very much needs to be countered.

Robin May Schott, in “Misplaced Gratitude and the Ethics of Oppression,” examines Card's notion of misplaced gratitude, which Card explored in one of her last papers, “Gratitude to the Decent Rescuer.”⁷ Whereas typically philosophers have been interested in the problems of the failures to honor obligations of gratitude, Card is more interested in the opposite fault of misplaced gratitude. Her interest reflects her social indignation and her fundamental commitment to opposing oppression, exploitation, and injustice in all its forms. The phenomenon of misplaced gratitude becomes visible from this perspective, where one catches sight of what oppression does to people. The essay looks at the question: What does Card's analysis of misplaced gratitude tell us about her own philosophical methods and contributions? Schott discusses Card's engagement with both care ethics and Beauvoir's phenomenology of oppression to clarify the centrality of misplaced gratitude in Card's ethics of oppression.

Kathryn J. Norlock, in “The Challenges of Extreme Moral Stress: Claudia Card's Contributions to the Formation of Nonideal Ethical Theory,” argues that Card is among the important contributors to nonideal ethical theory. Following philosophers including Lisa Tessman and Charles Mills, Norlock contends that it is important for ethical theory, and for feminist purposes, to carry forward the interrelationship that Mills identifies between nonideal theory and feminist ethics. Card's ethical theorizing assists in understanding that interrelationship. In her philosophical work Card includes basic elements of nonideal ethical theory indicated by Tessman, Mills, and others, and further offers two important and neglected elements to other nonideal ethical theorists: (i) her rejection of the “administrative point of view,” and (ii) her focus on “intolerable harms” as forms of “extreme moral stress” and obstacles to excellent ethical lives. Norlock concludes that Card's insights are helpful to philosophers in developing nonideal ethical theory as a distinctive contribution to, and as a subset of, nonideal theory.

Mavis Biss, in “Radical Moral Imagination and Moral Luck,” argues that, to a greater extent than other theorists, Card's analysis of moral luck considers the impact of attempts to transform moral meanings on the development of the agent's character and responsibilities, over time and in relation to other agents. Biss argues that this wider frame of reference captures more of what is at stake in the efforts of those who resist oppression by attempting to implement radically revised meanings.

Victoria Davion's essay “The American Girl: Playing with the Wrong Dollie?” extends many of the themes central to Card's feminist critique of oppressive sexist environments, particularly as they impact character development. The American Girl Just Like You doll is the lens through which Davion explores the highly problematic messages conveyed to young girls about self‐image and identity. The doll is not emaciated or overtly sexy, and is marketed along with outfits that supposedly send girls the message that they can achieve their goals. Davion adds that the doll comes in a variety of skin, eye, and hair colors, and the line is therefore marketed as racially and ethnically sensitive. Yet Davion argues that although the Just Like You line appears to be empowering and racially sensitive on a superficial level, an in‐depth feminist analysis indicates that it is not.

As is evidenced in the essays in this volume, Claudia Card's voice continues to resonate in the work of many philosophers today. Some of us were privileged to have been in her classes, while others encountered her in many forums, either in person or in print. All of us have been enriched in doing so.