Cover
Title Page
The Editors
About the Contributors
Foreword
Preface
Acknowledgements
Part I: 5G Security Overview
1. 1 Evolution of Cellular Systems
  1. 1.1 Introduction
  2. 1.2 Early Development
  3. 1.3 First Generation Cellular Systems
  4. 1.4 Second Generation Cellular Systems
  5. 1.5 Third Generation Cellular Systems
  6. 1.6 Cellular Systems beyond 3G
  7. 1.7 Fourth Generation Cellular Systems
  8. 1.8 Conclusion
  9. References
2. 2 5G Mobile Networks
  1. 2.1 Introduction
  2. 2.2 5G Requirements
  3. 2.3 5G Enabling Technologies
  4. 2.4 5G Standardization Activities
  5. 2.5 5G Research Communities
  6. 2.6 Conclusion
  7. 2.7 Acknowledgement
  8. References
3. 3 Mobile Networks Security Landscape
  1. 3.1 Introduction
  2. 3.2 Mobile Networks Security Landscape
  3. 3.3 Mobile Security Lifecycle Functions
  4. 3.4 Conclusion
  5. References
4. 4 Design Principles for 5G Security
  1. 4.1 Introduction
  2. 4.2 Overviews of Security Recommendations and Challenges
  3. 4.3 Novel Technologies for 5G Security
  4. 4.4 Security in SDN‐based Mobile Networks
  5. 4.5 Conclusions and Future Directions
  6. 4.6 Acknowledgement
  7. References
5. 5 Cyber Security Business Models in 5G
  1. 5.1 Introduction
  2. 5.2 The Context of Cyber Security Businesses
  3. 5.3 The Business Model Approach
  4. 5.4 The Business Case of Cyber Security in the Era of 5G
  5. 5.5 Business Model Options in 5G Cyber Security
  6. 5.6 Acknowledgement
  7. References
Part II: 5G Network Security
1. 6 Physical Layer Security
  1. 6.1 Introduction
  2. 6.2 WBPLSec System Model
  3. 6.3 Outage Probability of Secrecy Capacity of a Jamming Receiver
  4. 6.4 WBPLSec Applied to 5G networks
  5. 6.5 Conclusions
  6. References
2. 7 5G‐WLAN Security
  1. 7.1 Chapter Overview
  2. 7.2 Introduction to WiFi‐5G Networks Interoperability
  3. 7.3 Overview of Network Architecture for WiFi‐5G Networks Interoperability
  4. 7.4 5G‐WiFi Security Challenges
  5. 7.5 Security Consideration for Architectural Design of WiFi‐5G Networks
  6. 7.6 LiFi Networks
  7. 7.7 Introduction to LiFi‐5G Networks Interoperability
  8. 7.8 5G‐LiFi Security Challenges
  9. 7.9 Security Consideration for Architectural Design of LiFi‐5G Networks
  10. 7.10 Conclusion and Future Work
  11. References
3. 8 Safety of 5G Network Physical Infrastructures
  1. 8.1 Introduction
  2. 8.2 Historical Development
  3. 8.3 Structural Design Philosophy
  4. 8.4 Survey of Problems
  5. 8.5 Opportunities and Recommendations
  6. 8.6 Acknowledgement
  7. References
4. 9 Customer Edge Switching
  1. 9.1 Introduction
  2. 9.2 State‐of‐the‐art in Mobile Networks Security
  3. 9.3 CES Security Framework
  4. 9.4 Evaluation of CES Security
  5. 9.5 Deployment in 5G Networks
  6. 9.6 Conclusion
  7. References
5. 10 Software Defined Security Monitoring in 5G Networks
  1. 10.1 Introduction
  2. 10.2 Existing Monitoring Techniques
  3. 10.3 Limitations of Current Monitoring Techniques
  4. 10.4 Use of Monitoring in 5G
  5. 10.5 Software‐Defined Monitoring Architecture
  6. 10.6 Expected Advantages of Software Defined Monitoring
  7. 10.7 Expected Challenges in Software Defined Monitoring
  8. 10.8 Conclusion
  9. References
Part III: 5G Device and User Security
1. 11 IoT Security
  1. 11.1 Introduction
  2. 11.2 Related Work
  3. 11.3 Literature Overview and Research Motivation
  4. 11.4 Distributed Security Platform
  5. 11.5 Mobile Cloud Robot Security Scenarios
  6. 11.6 Conclusion
  7. References
2. 12 User Privacy, Identity and Trust in 5G
  1. 12.1 Introduction
  2. 12.2 Background
  3. 12.3 User Privacy
  4. 12.4 Identity Management
  5. 12.5 Trust Models
  6. 12.6 Discussion
  7. 12.7 Conclusion
  8. References
3. 13 5G Positioning
  1. 13.1 Introduction
  2. 13.2 Outdoor versus Indoor Positioning Technologies
  3. 13.3 Passive versus Active Positioning
  4. 13.4 Brief Overview of 5G Positioning Mechanisms
  5. 13.5 Survey of Security Threats and Privacy Issues in 5G Positioning
  6. 13.6 Main Privacy Concerns
  7. 13.7 Passive versus Active Positioning Concepts
  8. 13.8 Physical‐Layer Based Security Enhancements Mechanisms for Positioning in 5G
  9. 13.9 Enhancing Trustworthiness
  10. 13.10 Cryptographic Techniques for Security and Privacy of Positioning
  11. 13.11 Legislation on User Location Privacy in 5G
  12. 13.12 Landscape of the European and International Projects related to Secure Positioning
  13. References
Part IV: 5G Cloud and Virtual Network Security
1. 14 Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) Security
  1. 14.1 Introduction
  2. 14.2 Related Work
  3. 14.3 Cloudification of the Network Operators
  4. 14.4 MVNO Security
  5. 14.5 TaaS Deployment Security
  6. 14.6 Future Directions
  7. 14.7 Conclusion
  8. References
2. 15 NFV and NFV-based Security Services
  1. 15.1 Introduction
  2. 15.2 5G, NFV and Security
  3. 15.3 A Brief Introduction to NFV
  4. 15.4 NFV, SDN and a Telco Cloud
  5. 15.5 Common NFV Drivers
  6. 15.6 NFV Security: Challenges and Opportunities
  7. 15.7 NFV-based Security Services
  8. 15.8 Conclusions
  9. References
3. 16 Cloud and MEC Security
  1. 16.1 Introduction
  2. 16.2 Cloud Computing in 5G Networks
  3. 16.3 MEC in 5G Networks
  4. 16.4 Security Challenges in 5G Cloud
  5. 16.5 Security Challenges in 5G MEC
  6. 16.6 Security Architectures for 5G Cloud and MEC
  7. 16.7 5GMEC, Cloud Security Research and Standardizations
  8. 16.8 Conclusions
  9. References
4. 17 Regulatory Impact on 5G Security and Privacy
  1. 17.1 Introduction
  2. 17.2 Regulatory Objectives for Security and Privacy
  3. 17.3 Legal Framework for Security and Privacy
  4. 17.4 Security and Privacy Issues in New 5G Technologies
  5. 17.5 Relevance Assessment of Security and Privacy Issues for Regulation
  6. 17.6 Analysis of Potential Regulatory Approaches
  7. 17.7 Summary of Issues and Impact of New Technologies on Security and Privacy Regulation
  8. References
Index
End User License Agreement

List of Tables

Chapter 01
1. Table 1.1 Structure of an authentication vector.
2. Table 1.2 Structure of AUTN field of an authentication vector.
Chapter 02
1. Table 2.1 5G key requirements and corresponding technology candidates.
Chapter 03
1. Table 3.1 4G Security Threat Analysis.
2. Table 3.2 5G security threat analysis.
Chapter 04
1. Table 4.1 Security challenges in SDN.
Chapter 05
1. Table 5.1 The basic characteristics of different types of cyber‐attack.
2. Table 5.2 The security needs for different scenarios.
Chapter 06
1. Table 6.1 C_s scenario parameters.
Chapter 07
1. Table 7.1 Security issues in 5G Networks [13].
2. Table 7.2 Security issues in packet switched networks [13].
Chapter 08
1. Table 8.1 Reliability classification in accordance with Eurocodes for ULS.
2. Table 8.2 Reduction factor, K_A, for ancillary items.
Chapter 09
1. Table 9.1 CETP policy elements organized into groups.
2. Table 9.2 CES Security testing.
3. Table 9.3 Security mechanisms and their performance.
Chapter 10
1. Table 10.1 Legacy monitoring techniques vs software defined monitoring.
2. Table 10.2 Packet capture storage capacity.
Chapter 11
1. Table 11.1 Threats classification.
Chapter 12
1. Table 12.1 Potential threats between stakeholders.
Chapter 13
1. Table 13.1 Summary of main positioning technologies and their main positioning‐related features.
2. Table 13.2 Summary of positioning mechanisms in 5G.
3. Table 13.3 Summary of EU legal instruments.
4. Table 13.4 Summary of main EU and international projects somehow related to secure or privacy‐preserving positioning.
Chapter 14
1. Table 14.1 OPNFV security focus.
2. Table 14.2 TaaS security benchmark.
Chapter 17
1. Table 17.1 Summary of regulatory targets with Security and Privacy issues of high impact.
2. Table 17.2 Regulatory approaches for Security and Privacy.

List of Illustrations

Chapter 01
1. Figure 1.1 Growth of communication services encompassing the last decade.
2. Figure 1.2 GSM network architecture.
3. Figure 1.3 GSM authentication process.
4. Figure 1.4 The A3 algorithm.
5. Figure 1.5 Working principle of A3 algorithm.
6. Figure 1.6 The A8 algorithm.
7. Figure 1.7 The A5 algorithm.
8. Figure 1.8 UMTS Radio Access Network.
9. Figure 1.9 Overview of UMTS security architecture.
10. Figure 1.10 UMTS vs. LTE architecture.
11. Figure 1.11 LTE‐advanced E‐UTRAN architecture.
12. Figure 1.12 Authentication Process in LTE.
Chapter 02
1. Figure 2.1 Three main use case categories as defined by ITU in [7] and 3GPP in [8].
2. Figure 2.2 5G key requirements and some example values.
3. Figure 2.3 Millimeter‐wave bands and potential 5G bands to be studied ahead of WRC‐19.
4. Figure 2.4 An illustration of massive MIMO concept.
5. Figure 2.5 An illustration of small cells deployment.
6. Figure 2.6 (a) M2M communications and use case examples; and (b) D2D communications and use case examples.
7. Figure 2.7 (a) Cloud‐RAN concept and (b) RANaaS concept
8. Figure 2.8 Mobile Edge Computing architecture
9. Figure 2.9 (a) SDN architecture and (b) NFV architecture
10. Figure 2.10 An example of network slicing.
11. Figure 2.11 The illustration of the end‐to‐end multi‐domain management and orchestration.
Chapter 03
1. Figure 3.1 Mobile network security landscape.
2. Figure 3.2 Cell phone cloning attack in 1G network.
3. Figure 3.3 IMSI Catcher attack in 2G network.
4. Figure 3.4 4G end to end security threat landscape.
5. Figure 3.5 5G security threat landscape.
6. Figure 3.6 5G Evolved Security Model.
7. Figure 3.7 Mobile security lifecycle functions.
Chapter 04
1. Figure 4.1 5G design principles.
2. Figure 4.2 High‐Level 5G architecture integrating multiple access technologies.
3. Figure 4.3 An overview of the SDN architecture.
4. Figure 4.4 Secure network slices for different services.
Chapter 05
1. Figure 5.1 The business model’s definition
2. Figure 5.2 The 4C business model for ICT business
3. Figure 5.3 The relationship between the level of security and new revenue generation.
4. Figure 5.4 The users and issues in 5G security.
5. Figure 5.5 Scenarios for 5G security provisioning.
6. Figure 5.6 The 5G security arrangement landscape.
7. Figure 5.7 The business model options for cyber security in 5G.
Chapter 06
1. Figure 6.1 Block diagrams of the proposed protocol to analyze physical layer security.
2. Figure 6.2 iJAM’s operating principle.
3. Figure 6.3 Non‐degraded wiretap channel model with jamming receiver.
4. Figure 6.4 Transmitter structure for watermark‐based blind physical layer security.
5. Figure 6.5 Receiver structure for watermark‐based blind physical layer security.
6. Figure 6.6 Power spectra densities of proposed blind physical layer security.
7. Figure 6.7 Comparison between iJAM and WBPLSec.
8. Figure 6.8 Outage probability versus γ_M when Eve moves from Bob to Alice.
9. Figure 6.9 Protocol’s comparison of Pout versus γ_M for a selected Eve’s position.
10. Figure 6.10 Outage probability of the Cs versus γ_M varying the jamming energy when Eve is close to Bob.
11. Figure 6.11 Outage probability versus γ_M for different Eve’s positions.
12. Figure 6.12 Increment of the M γ and its effect on the secure region size.
13. Figure 6.13 Outage probability as function of .
14. Figure 6.14 WBPLSec applied to 5G network.
15. Figure 6.15 Enhancement of the WBPLSec security region in the context of cellular network.
16. Figure 6.16 Increment of the γ_M and its effect on the secure region size.
Chapter 07
1. Figure 7.1 Interoperability of WiFi with 5G Networks [3].
2. Figure 7.2 5G‐WiFi Interoperability at MAC layer.
3. Figure 7.3 5G‐WiFi Interoperability at the Network Layer.
4. Figure 7.4 5G‐WiFi interoperability at Transport layer.
5. Figure 7.5 5G‐WiFi interoperability at application layer.
Chapter 08
1. Figure 8.1 Examples of communication structures: (a) Monopole 50 metres high; (b) Lattice tower 50 metres high; and (c) Guyed mast 100 metres high.
2. Figure 8.2 Distribution of a sample of tower structures by typologies [3].
3. Figure 8.3 Structural health monitoring of a 45 metre high monopole: (a) General view; (b) Detail of the sensor on top; and (c) Interrogation monitor unit.
4. Figure 8.4 Force coefficients for three or four faces lattice structures with angle elements.
5. Figure 8.5 Inspection of a 30 metre high guyed mast: (a) Deterioration of the foundation; and (b) Corrosion of the cleavers.
6. Figure 8.6 Inspection of a 50 metre high monopole: (a) Planar imperfection; and (b) Defects in welded connections.
7. Figure 8.7 Inspection of a 40 metre high monopole: (a) Defects in welded connections and (b) Defects in welded connections.
Chapter 09
1. Figure 9.1 Customer Edge Switching.
2. Figure 9.2 Mobile network architecture.
3. Figure 9.3 CES Functionality comparison with NAT.
4. Figure 9.4 CETP signalling between two hosts in different CES networks.
5. Figure 9.5 RGW serving the connections from the legacy Internet.
6. Figure 9.6 Implementation of CES testbed.
7. Figure 9.7 CETP Connection setup delay.
8. Figure 9.8 Tackling DNS flood towards RGW.
9. Figure 9.9 Impact of inbound DNS query type (SFQDN) against versus network/ports scans.
10. Figure 9.10 Delay in assigning TCP half‐connection state due to TCP‐Splice.
11. Figure 9.11 Bot‐Detection method to mitigate SYN flood from botnets (non‐spoofed sources).
12. Figure 9.12 Security of SFQDN allocations against advanced hackers: (a) without; and (b) with RGW security.
13. Figure 9.13 CES deployment in 5G mobile networks.
Chapter 10
1. Figure 10.1 Software defined monitoring architecture for 5G Networks.
2. Figure 10.2 The deployment of the components of SDM architecture in a 5G Backhaul Network.
3. Figure 10.3 Benefits of network virtualization.
4. Figure 10.4 OpenStack monitoring based on TaaS.
5. Figure 10.5 Network descriptor.
Chapter 11
1. Figure 11.1 5G use cases and requirements [1].
2. Figure 11.2 5G IoT use case evolution.
3. Figure 11.3 IoT threats [17].
4. Figure 11.4 Attack scenario for robots belonging to a same brand.
5. Figure 11.5 Attack scenario for robots belonging to different brands.
6. Figure 11.6 Internet of robot security platform.
7. Figure 11.7 Detection dimensions.
8. Figure 11.8 Distributed security platform for robot with SIM.
9. Figure 11.9 Robot anomaly detection and mitigation procedure.
10. Figure 11.10 Robot authentication and sessions establishment.
11. Figure 11.11 Distributed security platform for SIMless robots.
12. Figure 11.12 Robot attack.
13. Figure 11.13 Robots roaming.
Chapter 12
1. Figure 12.1 Various elements in user privacy.
2. Figure 12.2 Actors/Entities in the trust model.
3. Figure 12.3 Evolution in the trust model.
Chapter 13
1. Figure 13.1 Illustration of the localization chain and players in the Location Based Services in 5G.
2. Figure 13.2 Positioning‐communication dichotomy in 5G: (a) cell‐ or network‐centric positioning; (b) device‐centric positioning; (c) cooperative positioning (device‐centric or network‐centric); (d) (network) or cell‐centric communication; and (e) device‐centric communication.
3. Figure 13.3 Principles of TOA, TDOA and AOA‐ based positioning: (a) Time of Arrival (TOA) trilateration; (b) Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) hyperbolic positioning.
4. Figure 13.4 Example of TOA accuracy and principle of AOA‐based positioning: (a) Example of TOA accuracy versus bandwidth, CRLB bound; and (b) a linear antenna array in measuring the angle‐of‐arrival of an incoming signal.
5. Figure 13.5 Fingerprinting principle in 5G positioning.
6. Figure 13.6 Cloud‐GNSS positioning.
7. Figure 13.7 Brands and Chaum’s distance‐bounding protocol [101].
8. Figure 13.8 A privacy‐preserving LBSP based on FHE, which computes a position‐related function f(p) on fully homomorphically encrypted data without learning the end‐user’s position p.
9. Figure 13.9 Chart of steps toward location privacy protection.
Chapter 14
1. Figure 14.1 TaaS stack.
2. Figure 14.2 TaaS security classification.
3. Figure 14.3 Layer‐based SDN architecture.
4. Figure 14.4 AAA requirements for cloudified network.
5. Figure 14.5 Availability requirements for cloudified network.
6. Figure 14.6 Integrity requirements for cloudified network.
7. Figure 14.7 Security requirements for cloudified network.
8. Figure 14.8 Cloud security for operators.
Chapter 15
1. Figure 15.1 A simple view of NFV.
2. Figure 15.2 ETSI NFV reference framework.
3. Figure 15.3 5G Security and NFV.
4. Figure 15.4 NFV and SDN end-to-end reference.
5. Figure 15.5 A VNFs lifecycle.
6. Figure 15.6 A VNF's trust relationship.
7. Figure 15.7 OPNFV reference platform for NFV.
8. Figure 15.8 vCPE example use case by OPEN-O integrated with OPNFV.
9. Figure 15.9 Example of GBP with NFV service chaining.
Chapter 16
1. Figure 16.1 A view of the cloud architecture.
2. Figure 16.2 Front‐end and back‐end view of the cloud architecture.
3. Figure 16.3 5G cloud computing architectures.
4. Figure 16.4 MEC system reference model.
5. Figure 16.5 MEC server platform.
6. Figure 16.6 Centralized security architecture for mobile clouds and MEC security.
Chapter 17
1. Figure 17.1 Approach to study the direct impact of new technologies on Security and Privacy Regulation.

This edition first published 2018
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Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data

Names: Liyanage, Madhusanka, editor. | Ahmad, Ijaz, 1985‐ editor. | Abro, Ahmed Bux, editor. | Gurtov, Andrei, editor. | Ylianttila, Mika, editor.
Title: A Comprehensive guide to 5G security / edited by Madhusanka Liyanage, Ijaz Ahmad, Ahmed Bux Abro, Andrei Gurtov, Mika Ylianttila.
Description: Hoboken, NJ : John Wiley & Sons, 2018. | Includes index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2017040682 (print) | LCCN 2017047712 (ebook) | ISBN 9781119293088 (pdf) | ISBN 9781119293057 (epub) | ISBN 9781119293040 (cloth)
Subjects: LCSH: Mobile communication systems–Security measures. | Wireless communication systems–Security measures.
Classification: LCC TK5103.2 (ebook) | LCC TK5103.2 .C649 2018 (print) | DDC 005.8–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017040682

Cover Design: Wiley
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The Editors

Madhusanka Liyanage

Centre for Wireless Communications, University of Oulu, Finland.

Madhusanka Liyanage received his BSc degree (First Class Honors) in Electronics and Telecommunication Engineering from the University of Moratuwa, Moratuwa, Sri Lanka, in 2009, his MEng degree from the Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand, in 2011, and his MSc degree from University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, Nice, France in 2011. In 2016, Liyanage received his PhD in Communication Engineering from the University of Oulu, Finland.

He is currently a post‐doctoral researcher and project manager at the Centre for Wireless Communications, University of Oulu, Finland. In 2011–2012, he was a research scientist at the I3S Laboratory and Inria, Sophia Antipolis, France. Also, he was a visiting research fellow at Data61, CSIRO, Australia, Infolabs21, Lancaster University, UK, Computer Science and Engineering, The University of New South Wales, Australia and department of computer science, University of Oxford, UK during 2016–2018. His research interests are SDN, IoT, Block Chain, mobile and virtual network security. He is a member of IEEE and ICT.

Madhusanka is a co‐author of over 40 publications including one edited book with Wiley. He is also a management committee member of EU COST Action IC1301, IC1303, CA15107, CA15127 and CA16226 projects. URL: http://madhusanka.com

Ijaz Ahmad

Centre for Wireless Communications, University of Oulu, Finland.

Ijaz Ahmad received his BSc degree in Computer Systems Engineering from the University of Engineering and Technology (UET), Peshawar, Pakistan. He completed his MSc (Technology) degree of Wireless Communications Engineering with a major in Telecommunications Engineering from the University of Oulu, Finland in 2012. After working as a research assistant in the Centre for Wireless Communications, he started his PhD at the University of Oulu, Finland in 2013.

Ijaz has received several awards including the Nokia Foundation Grant Awards, the Tuano Tonning Foundation Research Grant Awards, and the Achievement award as Inventor from University of Oulu, Finland, for excellent research during his PhD. He has contributed to over 20 publications including high impact factor journal articles, conference papers and book chapters. His research interest includes SDN, SDN‐based mobile networks, AI for networking, network security, and network load balancing.

Ahmed Bux Abro

VMware Inc. USA.

Ahmed Abro received his Bachelor degree in Computer Science in 1999 from the Shah Abdul Latif University and his Masters degree in Computer Science and Information Technology in 2002 from the University of Sindh with exceptional grades, he is currently a doctorate student at University of Wisconsin‐Whitewater, USA. He holds top level professional recognitions and certifications from various industry leaders such as Cisco, IBM, ISC2, Juniper, VMware. A few to name here: CCDE (Cisco Certified Design Expert), CCIE (Cisco Certified Internetwork Expert) Security, VMware Certified Implementation Expert (VCIX), and CISSP (Certified Information Systems Security Professional).

Ahmed is a technologist, strategist and contributor in multiple technology fronts such as software‐defined networking, security, cloud and data center. He has 16 years of widespread experience with focus around designing and architecting networks, cloud and virtualized data centers for Fortune 100 customers in diverse markets (North America, EMEA, Asia) and various industry sectors. Currently, he is playing a staff solution architect role at VMware, where part of his job is to help customers transform their legacy business into a digital business and legacy IT into a software‐defined enterprise IT using an architecture led approach.

He has contributed in his current and previous role for various new frameworks, architectures and standards around Cloud, Network Function Virtualization, SDN and Security. Ahmed is a chapter co‐author of a book on Software Defined Mobile Networks (SDMN), multiple drafts and research papers on the topic of SDN, security and mobility for IEEE and IETF organizations.

Andrei Gurtov

Department of Computer and Information Science, Linköping University, Sweden.

Andrei Gurtov received his MSc in 2000 and his PhD in 2004 in Computer Science from the University of Helsinki, Finland. He is presently a Professor in Linköping University, Sweden. He is also an adjunct professor at Aalto University, University of Helsinki and University of Oulu. He visited ICSI in Berkeley multiple times. He is an ACM Distinguished Scientist, IEEE ComSoc Distinguished Lecturer and Vice Chair of IEEE Finland section. Andrei co‐authored about 200 publications, including 4 books, 5 IETF RFCs, 6 patents, over 50 journal and 100 conference articles. He supervised 12 PhD theses, serves as an editor of IEEE Internet of Things. URL: http://gurtov.com

Mika Ylianttila

Centre for Wireless Communications, University of Oulu, Finland.

Mika Ylianttila is a full‐time professor at the Centre for Wireless Communications (CWC), at the Faculty of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering (ITEE), University of Oulu, Finland. Previously he was the director of the Center for Internet Excellence (2012–2015) and associate director of the MediaTeam research group (2009‐2011), and professor (pro tem) in Information Networks (2005–2010). He is also adjunct professor in Computer Science and Engineering (since 2007). He received his doctoral degree on Communications Engineering at the University of Oulu in 2005. He co‐authored more than 100 international peer‐reviewed articles on broadband communications networks and systems, including aspects on network security, mobility management, distributed systems and novel applications. His research interests include 5G applications and services, software‐defined networking and edge computing. He is a Senior Member of IEEE, and Editor of Wireless Networks journal. URL: http://www.ee.oulu.fi/~over/