“If Marx were to return, which phenomenon would he use to characterize today’s society? It would no longer be capital or capitalism, but rather the development of technique, the phenomenon of technical growth”¹. Control technology revolves around the assessment of techniques and tools, and its importance became apparent as early as the 19th Century. The relevant literature flourished between the 1930s and the 1980s. One name that stands out in particular is Jacques Ellul, Professor of Law at the University of Bordeaux, especially known as a legal historian and a sociologist. As a commentator on the rise of capitalism and a personalist, Jacques Ellul considers the technical tool as being at the heart of society. Ellul’s “technician system” [ELL 12] puts alienation at the center of technicist capitalism. For Ellul, tools and machines are singled out. They play an essential role in the economy and the fabric of society. The influence of Ellul’s ideas has gone beyond French borders and has reached the United States. The importance of machines has been recognized for a long time, with the growth of the working class and the bourgeoisie. It follows the rise of services and innovation. It can be seen in inventions and intellectual property law; with its international conventions², strategic analyses that commercial societies carry out to determine whether certain patents should have a limited reach, within one or several states, or whether they should reach a number of countries. Machines are often mobile: from 1980 onward and especially from the start of the 21st Century they are nearly always mobile, participating in a level of control that the users are not always aware of, or to which they are consciously indifferent. This is what appears in the “profiling of populations” [MAT 14], which breaks down and analyzes the outlines and dynamics of post-Orwellian surveillance, and sometimes even cyber surveillance.

For several decades now we have been living in the digital age. Digitization is relevant to nearly all tools and machines. Development must occur digitally. In the domain of electronic communication, where audiovisual technology is joined to telecommunications and informatics, digital technology prevails. In France, the 2016 law on digital technology was one of the most important legal contributions provided by the Valls government, and came after consultation of the various parties involved. Very high speed broadband is an objective for both states and companies. Many nations of Eastern Europe, including those previously belonging to COMECON, have successfully focused on the growth of fiber optics to compensate for their bad start with the triumph of the copper pair in Western Europe. Lithuania was ranked first among European countries in terms of the penetration of fiber optics in its plastic form or as a glass fiber, while the United Kingdom and Germany, where the copper pair had previously allowed for the installation of comprehensive networks, were placed outside of the rankings. This is also the case in Estonia, Poland and Russia (not in the European Union), and even Belarus. The European Union has established a plan for the growth of very high speed broadband that is to be finalized in 2020, which seems optimistic. European funds were made available, but have since been reduced as a result of the levels of debt that are affecting nearly all European states. The governmental public subsidies are more readily approved by the Commission when the country in question belongs to the old Soviet block, which converted to a market economy only 25 years ago, than when the country has belonged to the liberal sphere for much longer. With regard to mobile phones, while research on 5G has progressed considerably, most private telecommunication operating companies in the developed world use 4G licenses. Digital technologies are a prominent factor for growth, but the digital divide is still a reality in Africa, despite being presented as a continent that is favored for development. With regard to fiber optics, this divide is obvious between highly urbanized areas and medium-density or low-density areas. The question is whether territorial collectivities can play an active role in the complex situation. In France, since LCEN³, territorial collectivities are not only able to develop networks – which they have been able to do since 1999 because of the general code of local collectivities – but can also be network operators. Also in France, local collectivities have been granted WIMAX licenses. However, the same choice has not been given in all countries of the European Union, which, as part of a neo-liberal agenda, encourage an informed distrust of public collectivities – if they are regions – participating in the exploitation of networks, or even of communication services. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, following previous treaties that constitute it, allows for a reasoned and argued amount of leeway in terms of services of general interest, which could be technical or economic exceptions, not only for digital technologies, but also other technologies that are likely to boost the market and competition.

Digital technologies are a dominant factor among those that shape us and that we govern (unless it is these technologies that govern us). Nanotechnology is a technology that affects the state of the environment, whether these be techniques that use renewable energy or technology that deals with the various forms of the ecosystem, plant, mineral or animal matter, join together digitally to substantiate commercial exchanges between long industrialized countries or those only recently so, between emerging countries – not only Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), but also Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, members of the G20, between developing or even underdeveloped countries, but with investment zones that allow for interesting and worthwhile returns on investment. The techniques, often coupled with services, are therefore at the heart of the system – as described by Ellul – which has an economic dimension, but also a legal dimension, with a strong focus on legal rationalization, and a geopolitical dimension, since technicist systems also involve a military dimension, with satellites and drones that draw upon a civil and commercial aspect as well as a military one, linked to a military industrial complex, not only in the United States, and to alliances where the United States continues to play a determinant and predeterminant role in the context of NATO, but also with states that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but which rely on the help of NATO on multidimensional issues that pit them against other entities, states, international organizations, lobbies and various diverse companies.

The techniques and technologies mentioned above can be exploited with the goal of commercial benefits, but they can also be used for the upkeep of national security and public order. They have a lot of potential in terms of surveillance and control. As such, with regard to secret correspondence, postal letters could be opened and read, in the French “Cabinets Noirs” in the 19th Century, for example. In “Lucien Leuwen” by Stendhal, the interception of a telegraph results in the winning of an election. At the end of the 20th Century, a landline telephone could be listened on legally in certain cases. With the popularization of personal computers and mobile telephones, it has become much easier for citizens to communicate among themselves; it is also much easier for the State to intercept various methods of communication through conversations, e-mails, text messages, etc. The materials used are cheaper, as are the methods of interception. At the end of the 20th Century, operators carrying out interceptions legally have often come up against the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, as these interceptions, which constituted a public service, were deemed underfunded in the eyes of those with a background in private law, as much in the United States as in other developed countries. Public authorities, attempting to protect taxpayers’ money and the government coffers, found themselves in contradictory positions, and negotiations were long and difficult. In the 21st Century, the price of an interception is much lower and as such the number of interceptions is always increasing. The search for profit is identical for commercial societies, but the context is less rigid, and negotiations between operators working for the State and the State itself are less difficult. The interception of electronic communications is a field that has progressed, but the methods of interception have existed for a long time.

Other forms of technology have, like interceptions, boomed in the 21st Century, while having contributed to the upkeep of public order in the 20th Century, or even in the 19th Century. Robotization and the replacement of a human workforce by intelligent machines fit into this logic. However, other surveillance and control mechanisms have appeared during the 21st Century and can be added to those already in place. Among those technologies that existed previously but which have grown exponentially during the 21st Century, biometrics and CCTV are two of the most prominent examples.

Biometrics was first of all anthropometrics⁴. Fingerprints were used during the course of the 19th Century. During the 20th Century, a distinction was made between morphological biometrics and behavioral biometrics, which would not have been relevant to anthropometrics. Moreover, the rate of false negatives and false positives appeared in the 20th Century as a way of measuring the reliability of a biometric method⁵. Among these methods, fingerprints, iris recognition and retinal scanning are all very reliable. Fingerprints are currently the method most used by the State faced with an increasing demand for free circulation since the unification of passports and visas at the level of the European Union; fingerprints are also used in airports for access to reserved zones, and for sensitive routes, such as those headed toward Tel-Aviv. Iris recognition was the object of a patent in the United States, but this patent is currently in the public domain, even though iris recognition is more often used in the United States than in Europe, for reasons of intellectual property, but also for cultural reasons. The irises of monozygotic twins are different and the rate of false negatives/positives is infinitely low. Furthermore, access to the iris is not problematic with regard to the individuals concerned. Retinal scanning is as reliable as iris recognition, but requires the assistance of an ophthalmologist, and thus is limited to prison services. Palmar recognition results in a three-dimensional (3D) image of the palm of the hand and is quite reliable, but less so than fingerprints or ocular techniques. However, it is quite popular in most developed countries as it can restrict access to canteens reserved for adults, adolescents or children, and help with adherence to working hours within companies⁶. Facial recognition is less reliable, and is used more in the United States than in Europe. However, mistakes between delinquents and presumed delinquents later shown to be innocent in the United States have shown that this method is less reliable than fingerprinting. Facial recognition has been most popular in the United States during large meetings. In the United States and in most European countries, facial recognition is coupled with CCTV during sporting events. Behavioral biometrics is usually considered to be less reliable than morphological biometrics. There are a variety of behavioral biometric techniques, such as vocal recognition, typing patterns, biometric signature and shadows. Vocal recognition was the subject of a famous literary illustration in “In the first circle” by Solzhenitsyn [SOL 09]. The first circle is that of the zeks, intellectual researcher prisoners, whose knowledge and creative imagination could be massively useful for the Stalin regime. In this work, there is much reference to one prisoner’s research on vocal recognition. The prisoner is passionate about his work, but also conscious of its limitations. The regime is looking to use the system created by the zek, but in the 1950s the rate of false negatives/positives was high and it would inevitably result in the imprisonment of “innocents” alongside the sought-after “enemies of the people”. Vocal recognition has come along greatly since “In the first circle”. Various programs have been able to improve the performance of most of the existing methods. However, vocal recognition, even when improved by computer programs, is not very reliable. The same is true for nearly all behavioral biometric techniques. Biometric signatures are not accepted by the CNUDCI⁷; it is rarely used in legal proceedings. In the United States, the State of California recognizes it and allows it to be used, but Californian individuals and professionals are far more likely to use an electronic signature over a biometric one. Genetic profiling can be included as a morphological biometric, but other distinctions place it in a separate category. Contrary to popular belief, a genetic profile is not 100% reliable. However, it is without a doubt the most reliable. This being said, it is highly invasive with regard to personal and collective freedoms, and as such it is only used and centralized following very precise and detailed rules that cannot be breached. Files containing genetic profiles are problematic in terms of protecting personal data; this must be kept in mind for the future.

During the 21st century, much research has been carried out on biometric applications. Businesses gladly finance this research as the new methods are quickly used and provide a generous return on investment. This is why progress has been made for all the existing processes, and also why many possible new paths have been explored: venous system, earlobe and outline of the lips are just a few examples. Biometric processes become part of social life and allow for collective (passports, visas) or individual (adherence to work hours) methods of control. The main actors are States, commercial societies, and international organizations are also keen to be part of the biometric game⁸.

CCTV has been around for a long time, but has only become widespread in the past two decades. It appeared in Nazi Germany, which often drew upon the military⁹ and civilian aspects of science in order to achieve its goal of world domination. However, CCTV really rose to prominence after the Second World War. The first country to embrace it fully was the United Kingdom, starting in the 1950s, where it went through a boom in the 1990s. Currently, cameras (analog, and now digital too) are in place all over the United Kingdom, from motorways to public transport, shops, etc. This systematic placement of cameras has allowed British researchers to gain some insight into the installation and maintenance of such methods of systematic surveillance. It would seem that levels of delinquency and criminality are not affected by this generalization of CCTV, and yet British security ideologies draw on the need to fight them, as well as terrorism after the attacks of July 7, 2005, to justify public spending in this domain. CCTV has certain areas of brilliance: the road network – the end goal is to the combat highway code violations and reduce accidents, reduce mortality and disability; public transport – the objective is to protect travelers against various forms of delinquency; shopping centers, banks – the objective is to reduce theft; establishments open to the public, such as hospitals and universities – the objective is to guarantee the safety of users and visitors, patients, students, etc. In the United Kingdom, this is financed either publically or privately.

CCTV has spread to most developed countries and even to some developing countries. It has gained popularity most notably in the United States, but less quickly than in the United Kingdom. In France, CCTV was only used patchily up until the end of the 20th Century; the first important law regulating it is from January 21, 1995. This law, which remains an essential one, states that the film produced is of a personal nature, and must give rise to a declaration. The rise of CCTV in France is first of all the result of town councils and their councilors. In France, the installation of CCTV cameras must follow a request made to the prefect, who collaborates on this matter alongside departmental commissions. In Paris, the authorization request is submitted to the prefect of the police of the City of Paris. The aims are similar to those in the United Kingdom, and involve the safety of individuals and of their goods. The following are the main areas involved: sides of buildings that can present a risk, road traffic to prevent violations and accidents¹⁰, national Defense buildings, public transport – particularly the metro and the bus – and shopping centers. CCTV is also mainly focused around establishments open to the public. In France, all authorization requests must involve the submission of a file to the prefecture, with an overall and individual plan for the placement of each camera. The individuals involved have a right of access to any film involving them, as this corresponds to personal data via image identification. After use, the film is destroyed, except if they constitute evidence to be presented in front of a court or tribunal.

Funding in France was first rather limited, as many prefects and mayors saw little use in the installation of cameras. It was therefore political volition that led to the increasingly widespread installation of CCTV cameras. In France, an installation plan was drawn up by various successive interior ministers, and the accompanying legislation was LOPPSI 1, followed by LOPPSI 2.

In all nation states, politicians have relied on a latent feeling of lack of safety in most citizens, exploited during the broadcasting of various current affairs: crimes and especially petty delinquency. Citizens have the largely fallacious belief that they are protected by the presence of cameras, which supposedly would dissuade criminals and delinquents to commit a crime. This feeling is largely erroneous: at most criminals are led to carry out their acts elsewhere, and even then this change is usually fleeting. In France, the terminology has been changed to further propagate this popular fear, largely exploited by the media and elected officials. Since the LOPPSI 2 law of March 14, 2011, the term used is no longer videosurveillance but rather videoprotection, which seems more correct and more positive.

However, seeing as videoprotection is a method of control in most countries contingencies are planned in the case of abuse. In France, a national commission for videoprotection has been set up. Subsequently, the CNIL has been given the general mission of protecting personal and collective freedoms as protected by the European Council’s European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms¹¹, which is the European charter of the fundamental rights of the European Union¹². Complaints are submitted to the CNIL if the goal pursued by the recording is alleged to not be the safety of individuals or their goods. In nearly all industrialized countries, employees are filmed during their workday. The goal is to ensure the safety of goods, materials and collaborators; constant surveillance of the employees is incompatible with the reference texts on the matter of freedoms¹³. Even consent on behalf of the employees is incompatible with these texts. Consent does not make these types of operation legitimate. Neither the company nor the employer is within their rights to use the cameras for management to increase the efficiency of workers, or to increase competition in the company. However, it has become clear that misuses occur, and the number of complaints made to the relevant bodies has increased. In France, the CNIL receives these complaints. Formal notices made public are relatively rare, but the number of complaints is steadily increasing, suggesting that some people, despite the influence of security-driven ideologies, are not close to accepting being under surveillance during their entire working day.

While interceptions and videoprotection have existed for a long time and have become increasingly prominent in the social context of the 21st Century, some methods have only come into existence during the 21st Century: the body scanner and genetic profiling are the most notable examples.

According to Bruno Latour, “techniques are governed by means, and morals are governed by ends, even though, as declared by Jacques Ellul long ago, some techniques end up going beyond the world of ends by giving themselves their own laws, by becoming autonomous and no longer only automatic” [LAT 00]. Techniques have gone beyond the world of ends: this is the case for biometrics especially, a factor of digital identification.

The body scanner first appears to belong to the world of means, but the question of its relation to the world of ends remains unanswered. There are two types of body scanners: the millimeter wave scanner and the backscatter X-ray body scanners. The most often used is the millimeter wave scanner; this is the case in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, France and Canada. Body scanners work using microwaves. The domestic appliances that use millimeter waves play an important role in western countries inside microwave ovens,¹⁴ mobile telephones¹⁵ and WiFi networks¹⁶. Only an insignificant amount of the radiofrequency energy emitted by the scanner is absorbed at the surface of the body, while most of the radiation is reflected and detected by sensors so as to produce a 3D image. The scanners are mainly used in airports, despite the principle of freedom of movement, which is part of economic law, freedom of commercial exchange and human rights¹⁷.

Body scanners have been installed in large numbers in the United States: in 2010, 385 high-cost scanners had already been installed in more than 60 airports. The United States has also initiated the installation of body scanners in the airports of most western countries, with the goal of increasing the safety of air travel. Some countries are resisting this American pressure, but the United States’s closest allies are following its example.

In the medical domain, studies have been carried out. They have not come to definitive conclusions, but do feed into fears of cancer. Should the principle of precaution be applied? In the United States, the answer is no.

Many Americans consider that the body scanner is an affront to privacy: the scanner reveals the intimacy of the individuals scanned, if only to the TSA agents scanning¹⁸. A high number of citizens are worried that their photographs might find their way onto the Internet, including social media. A boycott movement was started on the eve of Thanksgiving Day 2010. Thanksgiving was chosen as it is a day when Americans travel a lot, many using airports. The right to intimacy and privacy, which is purportedly violated by the body scanner, was relayed by numerous human rights groups. Consequently, Epic¹⁹ lodged a complaint to suspend the use of body scanners in American airports for being “illegal, invasive and inefficient”²⁰; this complaint has not come to anything. American authorities, in the context of ever-present geopolitics, are pressing European governments to reinforce security in air travel and to introduce body scanners.

At the level of the European Union, the European Parliament has asked, in a resolution on October 23, 2008, for a report to be carried out evaluating the effect of body scanners on health and in terms of fundamental rights. The Commission has been invited to consult the controller of European data protection, the EU Fundamental Rights Agency. A debate was organized in January 2010 by the Commission on Civil Liberties during a meeting with the coordinator of antiterrorist policies²¹. The policies regarding the installation of body scanners are meant to be included as part of a bigger movement of data sharing between the European Union and the United States. The deputies of the Commission on Civil Liberties are of the opinion that before body scanners are introduced, the Schengen information system and the visa system must first be evaluated to determine whether these systems are efficient and follow the principles that govern personal data protection. A debate next took place in front of the transport select committee in January 2010. Some ambivalence was apparent in terms of privacy. Certain individuals, such as the Britain Jacqueline Foster, were favorable to profiling and information exchange to increase the reliability of technology. Others, on the contrary, were above all attached to the preservation of privacy. This required that, at the least, the images be not released to the press. Furthermore, it is vital that images, which are identifiers, be destroyed immediately after use. While airport controllers are currently not allowed to save the pictures created, it would only take the use of a mobile phone for a quick picture to be taken: any misconduct could lead to the copying of an image of an adult’s or child’s body onto a digital platform. On June 15, 2010, the European Commission presented a report on the body scanner. The goal of the scanner is to detect objects and not identify physical individuals. As a result, no image created by the scanner can be kept. If this is not the case, such as with the creation of passenger image files, the goal has been changed, violating directive 95/46 of the UN General Assembly resolution of December 14, 1990. Moreover, the person cannot be identified: as such the face must be blurred. Identification can only be made possible if dangerous objects are discovered. To ensure the anonymity of the individuals scanned, the controllers must work in pairs: one must help get the passenger into the scanner; the other looks at the visualization screen and carries out the control, but without direct contact with the passenger undergoing the control.

On May 24, 2011, the European Parliament Committee on Transport and Tourism voted for the report produced by the conservative Luis De Grandes Pascual²² from Spain, with a very large majority. The report is focused on air safety and most importantly the use of body scanners in airports.

The use of body scanners is a factor for the consolidation of air safety. The machines were trialed in the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Finland, France and Italy²³. Since 2008, when the European Parliament signaled its opposition to the introduction of body scanners, the situation has changed greatly: “four years later (…) we consider that these devices can provide added value in terms of safety, without any health risks for passengers or issues regarding their fundamental rights”. The report asks member States to “use the available technology that is the least harmful²⁴ possible for the health of individuals” and to ban scanners that use ionizing radiation, meaning scanners using X-rays, out of consideration for more vulnerable people. These include pregnant women, the elderly, children and sick people.

Privacy must be respected. Refusal to pass through the body scanner results in having to submit to another form of inspection, that is equally effective, such as a full body pat-down search. Refusal “must not be the cause of any suspicion toward the passenger”. Luis De Grandes Pascual does however recognize that a pat-down search, as seen in the United States, can complicate and delay boarding for passengers refusing to pass through the body scanners. When individuals accept to pass through the millimeter wave body scanner, a random selection is made and the passengers cannot be chosen based on discriminatory criteria: “Any form of profiling based notably on gender, race, skin color, ethnicity or nationality, genetic characteristics, language, religion or beliefs is unacceptable”. This is perfectly compatible with directive no. 95/46 and with the current regulation project. The image cannot be an absolute method of identification. Humanity dignity and intimacy must be considered. Only “stick-figure”²⁵ type outlines can be used. No images of human bodies can be saved or stored. According to the eurodeputies, the images are destroyed immediately after the security check has been carried out. Most importantly “the technique used must not allow for data preservation or recording”.

Eurodeputy Sylvie Guillaume has stated on her blog that considerable progress has been made since 2008, and that various criticisms concerning health and private life have not been ignored. However, she remains skeptical with regard to the usefulness of millimeter wave body scanners. Other control techniques, that are supposedly less intrusive, are currently being trialed in airports. The body scanner has never been shown to be particularly effective. No convincing study has even proven its added value in terms of fighting terrorism – the principal argument behind its installation in the first place. German conservative Markus Ferber is more reserved on this than Sylvie Guillaume: “Body scanners intrude on the private sphere, without any clear gains in terms of safety”. Sylvie Guillaume stresses the link between the technique and industry: several companies have placed body scanners on the market that are expensive but that are able to provide considerable return on investment for the manufacturers. The latter group constitutes an important lobby regarding control in airports and they know how to make their voices heard. They are able to modify their machines, their products, so as to make them compatible with the legal requirements regarding privacy and personal data.

Eurodeputies are asking for a form of collaboration to be set up at the level of the European Union in the domain of air safety. This would involve mutual recognition of the measures considered, as well as a single form of security control for all passengers, luggage and freight in the airports of the European Union. This is a form of coordination between the States of the European Union. Discussions are still taking place between the USA, initiators of the installation of the body scanner, and the European Union, which is undoubtedly more stringent than the United States in terms of health and the respect of privacy.

On July 6, 2011, the European Parliament passed a resolution to outline the use of body scanners, drawing from the Pascual report. The report predated the Commission’s decision to authorize the use of body scanners in airports. The Parliament is within its rights to cancel this decision, within a period of 3 months. The European deputies asked that the European governments equip themselves with the relevant technology before the end of April 2013, which marked the end of the ban on transporting liquids through the air. This is why the Commission, wishing to enforce the deadline of 2013, announced the establishment of a working group comprising representatives of the different States and prominent members of the relevant industries and the aviation sector.

The Commission stated that passengers would not be chosen “only” based on criteria such as gender, race, skin color, social background, ethnicity, religion or beliefs²⁶. However, this constitutes sensitive data, and directive 95/46 considers that the personal data of this category cannot be stored and used pre-emptively, except in cases where consent is given beforehand. Individuals chosen to be scanned by millimeter wave body scanner in this way are clearly being subjected to discrimination. There is a risk of profiling, whether racial or of another form. How often the word “only” will be applied must be determined.

The European Commission has decided that to “not risk compromising the health of citizens, only body scanners not using X-ray technology are allowed for the control of passengers in airports within the European Union. All other technology, such as that used in mobile telephones and others can be used as long as they adhere the European Union safety standards”. This was met with negative reactions in the United Kingdom in two airports using X-ray scanners, Manchester and Heathrow. Manchester airport issued the following statement: “Thorough tests have been carried out by the UK Health Protection Agency and the American health authorities have already confirmed that body scanners present a negligible risk for human health. It is irresponsible to imply that, since Europe has not yet finished its health study, our passengers should be concerned. This week European legislation approved the use of millimeter wave technology, another form of body scanning technology, for permanent use in airports…Given that all competent authorities allow for the use of X-ray scanners, it shall continue to be used”. At Heathrow, the situation is different. The airport had previously used X-ray scanners as part of a trial of the different body scanning technologies, but once the evaluation had ended the airport exclusively used millimeter wave body scanners. In France, Aéroports de Paris was lucky to have anticipated the correct choice, as experiments in Paris used the millimeter waver scanner. In France, it is the LOPPSI 2 law²⁷ that regulates body scanners. It follows recommendations made by the G29²⁸ and the CNIL.

The observation of images is limited to competent and experienced personnel within areas not open to the public. Those carrying out the control are of the same gender as the passenger. These arrangements had been previously introduced for pat-down searches. The preservation of images is limited to the amount of time necessary to carry out the test. Observation of the images is done in areas closed to the public and limited to the relevant staff. Most importantly, bag searches can only be carried out with consent from the person being controlled. If this is refused, the person can go through another form of control, usually a pat-down search, which causes problems itself with regard to intimacy and privacy. The body scanner cannot be used without clear and informed consent. Analysis of the images observed is done by operators who do not know the identity of the individuals themselves and who are unable to observe the physical individual at the same time as their image produced by the body scanner.

Genetic files, which relate to biometrics, but which are used by the police, involve the use of effective technology that appeared and started to be exploited at the end of the 20th Century and at the start of the 21st Century.

Genetic “fingerprints” are assimilated to biometric data. Biometrics, according to the dictionary definition²⁹, is “the science that studies, using mathematics (statistics, probabilities), the biological variations within a determined group”. This definition can be applied perfectly to DNA. Moreover, regulatory authorities, such as the CAI³⁰ in Quebec or the CNIL in France, also add the analysis of genetic fingerprints to the distinctions mentioned above between morphological biometrics and behavioral biometrics. British and French genetic files quickly raised issues with regard to the equilibrium between security, public order and the preservation of privacy.

On December 4, 2008, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found the United Kingdom guilty of violating article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms³¹.

Two British citizens, S³² and Michael Marper³³, were at the origin of this affair.

The first claimant was arrested on January 19, 2001, and indicted with attempted theft with assault; he was 11 years old at the time, a minor. The police obtained his fingerprints and DNA samples. He was acquitted on June 14, 2001. The second claimant was arrested on March 13, 2001, and indicted with harassment of his partner. The police obtained his fingerprints and DNA sample. Michael Marper’s partner later reconciled with him, and abandoned the charges: on June 14, 2001, the case was closed.

The claimants asked that their fingerprints and DNA samples be destroyed, and were denied by the police. They decided to take this to court. On March 22, 2002, the administrative tribunal³⁴ rejected their claim³⁵. On September 12, 2002, the court of appeals confirmed the decision of the administrative tribunal with a majority of two votes to one. On July 22, 2004, the House of Lords also rejected the claim. The result was announced by Lord Steyn, in the name of the majority.

Having exhausted all internal routes, S and Marper submitted an individual request to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Their claim was against the storage of their fingerprints, cell samples and genetic material. They focused on articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and claimed that article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms regarding privacy had been violated. The court first looked at whether the preservation of fingerprints, cell samples and DNA profiles of the claimants could be considered a form of mismanagement of their private life. The ECHR judged that the general and undifferentiated character of the storage of fingerprints, biological samples and DNA profiles of individuals suspected of having committed a crime, but not convicted, does not constitute a “just balance” between the public and private interests: it was therefore a disproportionate violation of the rights of claimants, the respect of privacy and is unnecessary in a democratic society. Article 8 of the convention had indeed been violated, and there was no need to separately examine the claim regarding article 14 of the convention. The United Kingdom had to pay 42,000 euros to the claimants for fees and expenses.

The British government states that the risk of intervening in private life is limited by the law and the technological processes of extraction³⁶. The ECHR mentions that a distinction has already been established between the preservation of fingerprints, cell samples and DNA profiles. The issue of respecting private life must be analyzed separately for the storing of cell samples, DNA profiles and fingerprints. Previously³⁷, the ECHR has judged that in the case of cell samples, systematic storage of these elements was too intrusive. “Moreover, the samples contain unique genetic code of great importance to the person concerned as well as their family”. The court also mentions that the concept of a private life is a broad one. “…The simple act of storing data relative to the private life of an individual goes against article 8”. An act of mismanagement is considered essential for achieving a legitimate goal in a democratic society if it is proportionate to the legitimate goal in question, and if the reasons stated by the national authorities seem to be “pertinent and sufficient”³⁸³⁹

The ECHR judges that there has been a disproportionate violation of the rights of the claimants. The general and undifferentiated nature of the storage of fingerprints, biological samples and DNA profiles of individuals suspected of having committed crimes, but not convicted, does not constitute a fair balance between the public interests of national authorities and the private interests of those concerned: furthermore, the United Kingdom has overstepped any possible margin for leeway in the matter. The ECHR did not examine the criticisms made by the claimants regarding certain aspects of the data storage, such as the ease of access to these data, too great according to them, and a lack of protection against improper use and abuse. “Therefore, the disputed storage can be considered a disproportionate violation of the claimants’ right to privacy and cannot be considered necessary in a democratic society”.

Among these democratic States, a comparison can be made between the United Kingdom and France.

In the United Kingdom, the DNA database was created in 1995, but only for criminal cases. In France, the FNAEG (Fichier national automatisé des empreintes génétiques) DNA database was set up by Guigou law of June 18, 1998⁴⁰ exclusively to gather genetic fingerprints of individuals involved in crimes of a sexual nature.

In the 21st Century, offences for which genetic material is taken are increasingly frequent. In the United Kingdom, the law changed in 2001 and again in 2004. Since 2004, the DNA of individuals involved in any way in an offence can be kept for an unlimited amount time by police and tracked, and retrieved anywhere in England, Wales or Northern Ireland.

In France, article 706-55 of the penal procedure code defines the cases in which DNA material can be taken and stored: for individuals convicted of any of the offences mentioned in article 706-55 of the penal procedure code, for individuals against whom serious evidence can be held and possibly lead to a conviction, for individuals who are reasonably suspected of having committed a crime or an offense. Furthermore, according to article R. 53-10 of the penal procedure code, it is also possible to take a sample in the following scenarios: biological traces from unknown individuals are collected as part of a preliminary inquiry, the investigation of a crime or obvious offense, or a preliminary investigation; biological samples are taken from unidentified corpses and biological traces are taken from unknown individuals; they are gathered in the context of an investigation into the cause of death, or as part of the search into an unsolved disappearance; biological samples coming from an individual declared missing, and collected as a part of an investigation into an unsolved disappearance; biological samples are taken, with consent, from the relatives of a missing person, as part of an investigation into unsolved disappearance.

The databases reflect the size of the phenomenon. The United Kingdom has the larger database, with 4.3 million genetic fingerprints in 2008, with at least 850,000 belonging to witnesses, victims or individuals not pursued by the courts or acquitted.

The genetic fingerprints that are stored are therefore particularly intrusive and the databases tend to get steadily larger. This is also true for centralized police files.

Technology is therefore used with increasing frequency to control the population.

To what extent has the emergence of digital technologies brought lawyers and politicians to use the controls to monitor not only the enemies of democracy, but a large part of the population.

Human rights are an ideology that is continuously evolving. Are these questioned through the use of this technology?

The goal of this book is to determine whether the balance between public order and the preservation of fundamental rights is still achievable today, when it would seem the side of security is currently winning it. This is not a theoretical study, but rather an empirical one. It draws on law, and to a certain extent political sciences.

The diachronic aspect of the question is highlighted: first the mythical time period when public order and privacy lived alongside each other shall be discussed.

Secondly, this book shall examine the time period around the start of the 21st Century, marked by an apparent victory of security, with its economic, financial and legal aspects, over the utopia of human rights.

Lastly, after the economic crash of 2008 comes the current era where the dominance of security clashes with ideas of jurisprudence, which come back into touch with the fundamental text relating to human rights.