Alexander Lukin is a Russian political scientist and international relations expert. He currently works as the Head of Department of International Relations at National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He received his first degree from Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 1984, a DPhil in Politics from Oxford University in 1997, a doctorate in history from the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow in 2007, and a degree in theology from St. Tikhon’s Orthodox University in 2013. He has worked at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Soviet Embassy to the People’s Republic of China, and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. From 1990 to 1993, he served as an elected deputy of the Moscow City Soviet (Council), where he chaired the Subcommittee for Interregional Relations. His books include The Political Culture of the Russian Democrats (2000), The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia’s Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations since the Eighteenth Century (2003), and Pivot to Asia: Russia’s Foreign Policy Enters the 21st Century (2016), and he has published numerous articles and policy papers on Russian and Chinese politics. He edited and contributed to the major Russian work on Russian-Chinese relations, Russia and China: Four Hundred Years of Interaction (Moscow, 2013), and is an Honorary Researcher of Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social Sciences. He was a visiting fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University from 1997 to 1998. From 2000 to 2001, he worked as a research fellow at the Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Alexander Lukin has also worked as the Director of the Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies at Moscow State Institute of International Relations, as Chair Professor at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, China, and as Distinguished Professor at Northwest University, Xian, China. He serves on the editorial boards of Asian Politics and Policy, International Problems (Belgrade), and The ASAN Forum (Seoul). In 2009 he was awarded a medal for Outstanding Contribution to the Development of Sino-Russian Relations, by China’s leader Hu Jintao, and in 2012 a medal on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for his contribution to its formation and development.

This book is an attempt to acquaint the English-speaking audience with the realities of relations between Russia and China as Russian and Chinese observers understand them. It argues that the current Russian-Chinese rapprochement is the natural outcome of developments in international relations in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the major non-Western states began working together to create a counterweight to the preponderant influence of the West and its desire to build a unipolar world. The Russian-Chinese rapprochement stems from the fact that the leadership and elite of both countries share similar views on the geopolitical situation in the world, the main trends and dangers that exist, and the favorable prospects for those relations to develop and find expression in the emergence of a multipolar world.

There is no lack of English-language literature on Russian-Chinese relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. An interested reader can find a lot of valuable material for various periods in their development in several informative academic works, such as the studies by Elizabeth Wishnick, Jeanne Wilson, Natasha Kuhrt, Gilbert Rozman, and Marcin Kaczmarski, among others. However, there are some general traits that differentiate these works from Russian or Chinese studies.¹

Several approaches to Russian-Chinese rapprochement can be found in the English-language literature on the subject. Most obviously, there is a lot more skepticism about various aspects of Russian-Chinese strategic partnership. Some observers claim that this rapprochement is fragile, even ephemeral. They point to various problems that arise between the two countries and suggest that, while outwardly in agreement, Moscow and Beijing actually pursue different interests and distrust each other.

Bobo Lo’s idea of an “axis of convenience” is the most striking here. It suggests that “Their partnership is an axis of convenience, driven by a pragmatic appreciation of the benefits of cooperation rather than a deeper like-mindedness,” while “strategic trust remains elusive.” At the same time, Bobo Lo states:

Moscow worries about China’s growing assertiveness in East Asia, the displacement of Russian influence from Central Asia, and the emergence of a China-centered or G-2 world in which Russia would play a subordinate role. It is also anxious about the growing asymmetry of the bilateral relationship, and the extent to which Russia now depends on China, both within Asia and in the international system more generally.

In addition, “Moscow and Beijing diverge fundamentally over how an eventual ‘new world order’ might look. Whereas Putin envisages a tripolar order based on the interaction between the United States, China, and Russia, the Chinese see the Americans as their only true global counterpart.”² According to a more recent study by John Watts, Sofia Ledberg, and Kjell Engelbrekt, the Russian-Chinese “still frayed defence and security relationship … remains a relationship based on convenience and only partially converging interests in the critical areas of military technology and defence posture, ultimately reflecting a long-standing strategic rivalry that will not be easily overcome.”³

Lo mitigates his approach somewhat in later work, probably bowing to the obvious fact that Russia and China have stepped up their cooperation. He writes, “the two sides agree on much, not least the undesirability of a ‘hegemonistic’ United States,” and mentions that bilateral relations have deepened considerably. In describing the history of those relations, he offers a detailed description of “how Beijing and Moscow have moved their relationship from one of cold confrontation in the 1980s to today’s ‘comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination.’” He concludes, however, that the condition of those relations “remains essentially what it has been for much of the past two decades,” calling them a “partnership of convenience” and essentially asymmetric.⁴ On the whole, this creates an impression of internal inconsistency, of someone who is reluctant to abandon his hypothesis in the face of a growing body of contradictory evidence.

Some “asymmetry” supporters acknowledge the reality of rapprochement and the fact that the leaders of both countries sincerely desire it. However, they argue that the growing economic imbalance in those relations is a sign of Russia’s dependence on China.⁵ Marcin Kaczmarski provides a typical example of this approach with his book Russia–China Relations in the Post-Crisis International Order (2015), in which he refers to the fall of Russia and the rise of China as the main features of their bilateral relations.

Finally, supporters of a third approach argue that the rapprochement is based on an understanding of common interests, common identity, shared views on the international situation, and similar foreign policy thinking.

This study offers a different approach than the one taken by the “skeptics,” whose arguments are (often) out of sync with Chinese and Russian sources. In fact, according to the official Russian position, “International relations are in the process of transition, the essence of which is the creation of a polycentric system of international relations.” This is how the Foreign Policy Concept adopted in 2013 describes it.⁶ President Putin has never spoken in favor of a tripolar world nor expressed any expectation that one would emerge. China also envisages a multipolar world in the future. As Chinese leader Xi Jinping said when he addressed the United Nations General Assembly on September 28, 2015, “The movement toward a multi-polar world, and the rise of emerging markets and developing countries have become an irresistible trend of history.”⁷ That general position is enshrined in numerous bilateral documents, including the Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World adopted in 1997. Bobo Lo offers no evidence to back up his claim that Putin “envisages a tripolar order.”

The supporters of asymmetry generally draw better-grounded conclusions, but even many of those are doubtful. First, in speaking of China’s overwhelming might, they refer primarily to the Chinese economy, which has indeed significantly surpassed the Russian economy. However, Russia continues to outstrip China in terms of military might and global political influence (not least because Beijing is in no hurry to translate its economic might into costly foreign policy and military actions). Thus, it is premature to speak of China’s overall superiority or of any broad asymmetry.

It is difficult to predict how the future will unfold for either country. History provides examples of rapidly developing countries – such as Japan – that were predicted to become the world’s leading economy,⁸ but instead fell into periods of prolonged stagnation. There are also cases of countries, such as China, that found the strength to break out of economic stagnation to achieve long-term growth. Of course, the simplest approach is extrapolate from current trends, but such predictions are often flawed.

However, even in the event that the current tendency persists and the overall power of China significantly surpasses that of Russia, it will not necessarily mean that Russia should be worried. All China threat theories are based on a West-centric assumption that China (just like Russia) is politically so different from peace-loving democratic Western countries that it strives for domination and aggression by its very nature. Meanwhile, one rarely hears that the much weaker Canada should be wary of the United States, or Belgium of France. The reason is that these countries share basic values and a worldview; they see each other as valuable partners and do not need to fear each other. It is true that in these pairs the strongest state is generally more influential, but that does not mean that the other should be wary of it. This book attempts to show that Russia and China are consistently moving toward a similar closeness (although their common vision differs significantly from that of the US and its allies). And if and when this goal is reached, the last mutual fears will be allayed.

The downside of the English-language material on Russian-Chinese relations stems from several problems common to many authors. First, many works do not draw on enough Russian and Chinese sources, particularly those available only in their native languages – and a number of works cite no such sources whatsoever.⁹ Other works, while citing a variety of English-language sources, tend to include either exclusively Russian-language or exclusively Chineselanguage sources – most often the former.¹⁰ In some cases, that creates an impression of one-sidedness and makes it difficult to understand the motives of the other side. For example, the failure to draw on Chinese analytical literature referring to the importance of relations with Russia might have led Kaczmarski to see asymmetry in their relations and to conclude that a supposedly weakened Russia was more interested in those ties than an increasingly powerful China. In addition, the lack of awareness demonstrated by the English-language literature of the motivations of the two sides at times reduces it to a source of only secondary importance for Russian and Chinese researchers, who have often long since discussed and resolved the very issues in question.

Second, such explanations often miss the mark due to the widespread desire of international relations specialists to pigeonhole Russian-Chinese rapprochement and bilateral relations as a whole according to a particular international relations theory.¹¹

Third, when writing about Russian and Chinese motives and actions, such authors often fail to discriminate between the official and dominant views that both reflect and determine countries’ foreign policies, and the unofficial and even marginal opinions that have little influence on official policy. Thus, some authors often seek to validate their views by citing individual Chinese experts whose opinions they claim represent the official position of the country and its leaders.¹² After all, when they write “China” or “the Chinese,” the reader naturally understands that to mean the official, or at least widely accepted position of the country. For example, in support of the suggestion that the Chinese are seeking bipolarity, Lo cites the opinion of Tsinghua University scholar Yan Xuetong, an expert whose views in no way reflect the official Chinese position. To the contrary, Yan Xuetong is known for advocating a Chinese-Russian alliance – the necessity for which both Russian and Chinese officials consistently reject.

In fact, some Russian researchers do express concern about Beijing’s growing might and the possibility of Russia becoming dependent on China. However, they generally represent radical pro-Western or extremely nationalistic groups – neither of which reflects the general opinion of the expert community, much less the official Russian position enshrined in numerous documents. As for Lo’s contention that China views Russia as a country in decline which cannot, therefore, serve as an equal partner, some individual Chinese experts do indeed hold this opinion and we will examine it later in this book. At the same time, some Chinese experts advocate the opposite position – arguing, for example, that China should establish a formal anti-Western alliance with Russia. However, neither reflects the official position, which is that China advocates forming an equal partnership with Russia.

Fourth, many authors – and particularly those in the press – clearly let political objectives color their interpretation of the results of analyses. In this area, it is often difficult to distinguish between strictly scientific research aimed at objective analysis, and “policy papers” written to pressure politicians into taking particular actions. This sometimes leads to a very serious bias.

Those who argue that Russia should orient itself toward the West, including commentators in the West, claim that Russian-Chinese rapprochement could turn Russia into a “satellite” or “raw materials appendage” of a more powerful and aggressive China.¹³ However, when Moscow had a similar relationship to the far more aggressive West, they said that Russia was “entering the world economy” and joining the “civilized world.” At the same time, when the West and China take almost identical actions in Russia, Western analysts interpret them differently. For example, when Western investors purchase large portions of state-controlled Russian mining companies and deposits, those analysts refer to it as profitable investments and successful privatization, but when Chinese corporations do the same thing, they portray it as an attempt to gain possession of strategic Russian reserves and as economic expansionism.

By contrast, those who advocate confrontation with the West write that Russia must inevitably form an alliance with China to put it in a stronger position to pursue an independent course.¹⁴ This approach gives inadequate attention to China itself, thereby avoiding possible diversion from their main goal of creating a simplified bipolar world. In fact, both approaches are informed more by ideological preferences than by meaningful analyses of the actual situation.

There are, however, some commentators, who, while criticizing both Russia’s and China’s regimes, call for one country to be used against the other. Some claim that “the West can find more common ground with China, which benefits from stability, than with Russia, which benefits from disruption.”¹⁵

A different group of Western analysts calls for aligning with Russia in opposition to China, the country they feel poses the greater long-term danger.¹⁶ These analysts often try to prove that China, and not the West, poses the greater threat to Russia. They claim that the West’s actions, including the expansion of its military infrastructure to Russia’s borders and its anti-Russian sanctions, not only pose no threat to Russia, but actually benefit it. At the same time, they allege that China is hatching plans for world domination, the seizure of Russian territories, demographic expansion, and to force its northern neighbor into economic submission.¹⁷

Bobo Lo, for example, describes his political goals very clearly. He criticizes “voices suggesting that the West should ease up on Putin, claiming that sanctions … have driven Russia into China’s arms,” as well as those who argue “that China, not Russia, is the main threat.”¹⁸ The logical recommendation based on these thoughts would be the continuation of a course of simultaneously confronting Russia and China that is anathema to the approach of the traditional “realists” – Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and even Zbigniew Brzezinski – that attempted to tear China away from the Soviet Union as part of the “triangle” and use one against the other.

Thus, although the arguments Bobo Lo puts forward seem sound, in reality they differ little from the baseless claims made by Constantine Menges who, without citing a single official document or source, stated that China has some sort of “stealthy strategy toward global dominance” that includes plans to use Russia and its Far Eastern regions as a tool.¹⁹ He suggests countering that strategy by supporting “democratic” (meaning pro-US) forces in both countries – a tactic that would undoubtedly drive Moscow and Beijing even closer together.

The views of those analysts who hold that Russian-Chinese rapprochement is based on the similarity of their views of the outside world, or what Gilbert Rozman refers to as their “parallel identities,” is much more grounded in reality.²⁰ It is not by accident that most of them are well read in both Russian and Chinese language sources. Unlike Bobo Lo, no one can accuse Rozman of not being familiar with official documents or of not knowing which views reflect the official position and which are marginal. He has devoted his entire career to studying the positions that the East Asian ruling elites take toward the outside world and neighboring countries. According to Rozman,

China’s rhetoric in support of Putin’s actions in Ukraine and Russia’s rhetoric endorsing Xi’s thinking about East Asia is not a coincidence. Rather, it is a feature of a new, post–Cold War geopolitical order. As long as the current political elites in China and Russia hold on to power, there is no reason to expect a major shift in either country’s national identity or in the Sino-Russian relationship. Countries hoping to create a divide between the two – including Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe – are bound to be disappointed.²¹

Jacob Stokes expresses a similar opinion: “A shared political vision for world order provides the foundation for Chinese-Russian cooperation. It is defined primarily by the desire to see an end to US primacy, to be replaced by multipolarity.”²²

Despite these authors’ occasional ill-founded assessment, this conclusion is sound. Their problem lies elsewhere. In arguing that Russian-Chinese rapprochement threatens the world order they refer not to the relationship that exists in reality, but to the one that, in their opinion, should take shape following “the end of history” – a world order in which the US and its allies dominate and the values and views of their ruling elite hold sway. The new level of cooperation between Russia and China really does threaten that order. Or, more exactly, the attempt by the West to build such a world order contributed to the current Russian-Chinese rapprochement, which in turn made it impossible for the “end of history” scenario to play out as anticipated.

This, however, does not mean that China and Russia will necessarily clash with the US, as Michael Levin predicted about a decade ago.²³ What’s more, not only does Russian-Chinese rapprochement in no way threaten the multipolar world order that is actually emerging, it actually serves as one of its major pillars.

In any case, a number of US and European authors consider the foundation of Russian-Chinese rapprochement to be the increasing similarity of their approaches to the outside world. John Garver argues that the formation of a strategic partnership with the new Russia Federation “was a major element of Beijing’s response to the ‘extremely unbalanced’ international system that emerged after the Cold War.”²⁴ Interpreting it as a result of the two countries’ dissatisfaction with that system, he even calls their coming together a “Far Eastern Rapallo” and supports his analysis with texts of numerous bilateral documents. Elizabeth Wishnick maintains that “because of normative affinities, this has always been a partnership of consequence, rather than a tactical arrangement. Sharing norms does not imply holding identical positions on all issues; rather, Russia and China share a common perception of Western pressure on their domestic choices and constraint on their freedom of manoeuvre globally.”²⁵

Such conclusions much more accurately reflect the reality of Russian-Chinese rapprochement, but their authors are not at the center of political debate and have no significant impact on US and European foreign policy. Moreover, their research often fails to take a systematic or consistent approach to ascertaining the causes of Russian-Chinese rapprochement.

This book is an attempt to fill some gaps in English-language studies of Russian-Chinese rapprochement. The author did not aim at defining Russian-Chinese relations from the point of view of an International Relations theory, but concentrated more on explaining the realities on the ground by changing perceptions of the bilateral relationship and international relations in general of the leaders and elites in the two countries. The study looks at the process by moving from the general to the particular. Examining the general, global changes in the international system – that is, its gradual evolution from a bipolar to a multipolar model – the author observes that these changes have led to significant changes in the way Russia and China view the outside world and to relations between their political elites. It was these changes – driven by attempts by the United States and the European Union to preserve the unipolar order that emerged briefly after the collapse of the Soviet Union – that contributed to a growing rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing. Having gained its own logic and momentum, that movement has had a significant impact on the global order and has led to the creation of a system of cooperation in the non-Western world. This is seen in the creation and rising influence of such organizations and groups as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and in the emergence of a new non-Western community: Greater Eurasia. This process, in turn, is increasingly driving the international system toward a multipolar (polycentric) world.

The aims of this book have determined its structure. The first chapter examines the evolution of Russian and Chinese foreign policy concepts in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries as a factor in their development as independent centers of world politics. The second and third chapters show the evolution of the approaches taken by their respective political elites, both toward each other and in bilateral relations with others – demonstrating at the same time the gradual convergence of their views of the world and their growing understanding of the need for rapprochement. The book gives particular attention to indicating which views and approaches in each country belong to the mainstream and define foreign policy, and which are of only marginal significance. The fourth chapter presents official bilateral documents and describes expanding spheres of Russian-Chinese cooperation on the world stage in order to illustrate the growing convergence of their approaches. The fifth and final chapter discusses the impact of Russian-Chinese rapprochement on the world system and prospects for its development.

Realizing that many analysts who write about Russian-Chinese relations take an ideology-based approach, this author strives for maximum objectivity. Of course, it is difficult to achieve absolute objectivity in the social sciences because every researcher holds certain convictions that influence his or her findings.

Writing over a century ago, Max Weber complained that the development of social sciences “was not, however, accompanied by a formulation of the logical distinction between ‘empirical knowledge,’ i.e., knowledge of what ‘is,’ and ‘normative knowledge,’ i.e., knowledge of what ‘should be.’”²⁶ Things have not changed much since that time.

Nonetheless, taking a cue from Weber and claiming that this study achieves a degree of scientific precision, the author takes pains to point out where he attempts to describe “what is” with respect to Russia and other countries, and where, by contrast, he makes a personal call for what “should be.” Although the latter has a place in any discussion of policy, it has no place at all in objective academic inquiry. With this as our guide, we hereby attempt to present this study of Russian-Chinese rapprochement.

The research for this book was supported by a grant from the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs of the Higher School of Economics, Moscow.

This book is derived, in part, from two articles: Alexander Lukin, “Russia in a Post-Bipolar World,” Survival, 58(1) (2016): 91–112, and Alexander Lukin, “Russia’s Pivot to Asia: Myth or Reality?” Strategic Analysis, 40(6) (2016): 573–89.