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<p>Preface  ix</p> <p>Acknowledgments xv</p> <p>Introduction xvii</p> <p><b>Part 1. Pluralism between Ethics and Politics in the Context of Prevention 1</b></p> <p>Introduction to Part 1 3</p> <p><b>Chapter 1. Burdens of Judgment and Ethical Pluralism of Values  11</b></p> <p>1.1. The “burdens of judgment” at the root of the “fact of reasonable pluralism” 13</p> <p>1.2. Burdens of judgment: a critique 17</p> <p>1.2.1. Burdens of judgment: a starting point, not an obstacle  17</p> <p>1.2.2. The variable geometry of pluralisms  22</p> <p>1.3. Ethical pluralism of values, from relativism to monism  26</p> <p>1.4. Relativisms and commitments  32</p> <p>1.4.1. Three types of relativism 32</p> <p>1.4.2. Commitments in response to values 33</p> <p>1.5. Opposing monism: conditionality, incompatibility and incommensurability of values 36</p> <p>1.6. Conclusion: decompartmentalizing conflicts of values 38</p> <p><b>Chapter 2. Ethical Pluralism of Ethical Theories at the Heart of Evaluation  43</b></p> <p>2.1. Ordinary morality, anti-theory and skepticism 44</p> <p>2.2. What is an ethical theory? 47</p> <p>2.3. Main ethical theories 50</p> <p>2.4. Pluralism in practical reasoning 55</p> <p>2.4.1. Formal practical reasoning  56</p> <p>2.4.2. Substantial practical reasoning  58</p> <p>2.5. Interactions between normative factors and foundational normative theories  60</p> <p>2.6. Conclusion: conflicts and deliberation in the context of ethical theories 64</p> <p><b>Chapter 3. Deliberative Democracy Put to the Test of Ethical Pluralism 71</b></p> <p>3.1. Participatory exposure 72</p> <p>3.2. Rawls and Habermas: opposing views in support of deliberation 74</p> <p>3.2.1. Rawls: restricted ethics  75</p> <p>3.2.2. Habermas: reliance on undefined arguments  77</p> <p>3.3. Deliberating in a democracy 80</p> <p>3.4. Desperately seeking arguments…  85</p> <p>3.5. Conclusion: pluralism of moral and political philosophers  88</p> <p>Conclusion to Part 1: Mapping the “Should-be” of the Public Sphere  95</p> <p><b>Part 2. Ethical and Political Pluralism in a Context of Precaution 105</b></p> <p>Introduction to Part 2 107</p> <p><b>Chapter 4. Deciding on, and in, Uncertainty Using the Precautionary Meta-principle 113</b></p> <p>4.1. Careless criticisms of the precautionary principle 116</p> <p>4.2. Precautionary principle: components and trigger factors  122</p> <p>4.3. To act, or not to act  126</p> <p>4.4. Clashing scenarios and “grammars” of the future  129</p> <p>4.5. Typology of political decisions in the context of uncertainty 132</p> <p>4.6. Conclusion: the deliberative as genre for uncertain futures  135</p> <p><b>Chapter 5. Between Sciences and Ethics: A New Quarrel of Faculties? 143</b></p> <p>5.1. Scientists between attachment and independence  144</p> <p>5.2. Politics of nature  152</p> <p>5.3. The prominent role of values in paradigm changes 160</p> <p>5.4. Relationships between scientific facts, epistemic values and ethical values  162</p> <p>5.5. Conclusion: a Republic of Letters dealing with facts and values  165</p> <p><b>Chapter 6. Co-argumentation in a Context of Disciplinary Pluralism 173</b></p> <p>6.1. Epistemic pluralism and competitive positions 177</p> <p>6.2. Tensions and cooperation due to pluralism internal and external to disciplines  180</p> <p>6.3. Types of argumentation and dialogue  184</p> <p>6.4. Co-dependence between ethical argumentation and scientific investigation 191</p> <p>6.5. Confrontation of hypotheses 194</p> <p>6.6. Conclusion: structuring of inter- and intra-disciplinary pluralisms thanks to the precautionary meta-principle 200</p> <p>Conclusion 207</p> <p>Bibliography 225</p> <p>Index 245</p>

<strong>Bernard REBER</strong>, Senior Fellow in the Center National for the Scientific Research (CNRS), Sciences Po Paris, (Political Research Center).

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