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<p>Notes on Contributors ix</p> <p>Introduction <i>Jonathan Cohen</i> xii</p> <p><b>Part I Mental Content 1</b></p> <p><b>Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 3</b></p> <p>1 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions <i>Gabriel Segal</i> 5</p> <p>2 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content <i>Sarah Sawyer</i> 20</p> <p><b>Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 35</b></p> <p>3 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent <i>Anthony Brueckner</i> 37</p> <p>4 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent <i>Michael McKinsey</i> 53</p> <p><b>Is the Intentional Essentially Normative? 67</b></p> <p>5 Resisting Normativism in Psychology <i>Georges Rey</i> 69</p> <p>6 Normativism Defended <i>Ralph Wedgwood</i> 85</p> <p><b>Is There Non-Conceptual Content? 103</b></p> <p>7 The Revenge of the Given <i>Jerry Fodor</i> 105</p> <p>8 Are There Different Kinds of Content? <i>Richard G. Heck Jr</i> 117</p> <p><b>Part II Physicalism 139</b></p> <p><b>Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable? 141</b></p> <p>9 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism <i>Louise Antony</i> 143</p> <p>10 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism <i>Paul M. Churchland</i> 160</p> <p><b>Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 183</b></p> <p>11 A Priori Physicalism <i>Frank Jackson</i> 185</p> <p>12 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism <i>Brian P. McLaughlin</i> 200</p> <p><b>Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 225</b></p> <p>13 Causation and Mental Causation <i>Jaegwon Kim</i> 227</p> <p>14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough <i>Barry Loewer</i> 243</p> <p><b>Part III The Place Of Consciousness In Nature 265</b></p> <p><b>Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 267</b></p> <p>15 Dualist Emergentism Martine <i>Nida-Rümelin</i> 269</p> <p>16 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness <i>David Braddon-Mitchell</i> 287</p> <p><b>Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 301</b></p> <p>17 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak <i>Michael Tye</i> 303</p> <p>18 A Case for Qualia <i>Sydney Shoemaker</i> 319</p> <p><b>Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 333</b></p> <p>19 All Consciousness Is Perceptual <i>Jesse Prinz</i> 335</p> <p>20 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I) <i>Christopher Peacocke</i> 358</p> <p>Index 377</p>

"The volume succeeds in crystallizing many of the contentious issues in the field, whilst developing the conceptual landscape and identifying new issues. This is a compelling publication that is thoughtfully constructed and is essential reading for anyone with an interest in the contemporary debates in philosophy of mind." (Philosophical Psychology, 14 December 2011)<br /> <br /> <p>“McLaughlin and Cohen present a series of 10 debates dealing with the issues of mental content, physicalism, and the place of consciousness in nature. The introduction gives a useful overview of each debate and each has been given a heading making it clear what the central issue at stake is. This is a good collection that does what it promises and provides a good introduction to some important issues.” (<i>Metapsychology</i>, October 2008)</p>

<b>Brian P. McLaughlin</b> is Professor and Chair in the philosophy department at Rutgers University. He has published widely in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and is the co-editor of the classic collection on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, <i>Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson</i> (Blackwell, 1988), editor of <i>Dretske and His Critics</i> (Blackwell, 1991) and the forthcoming <i>Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind</i>.<br /> <p><b>Jonathan Cohen</b> is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He is the the author of numerous papers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and perception. Much of his recent work has focused on the metaphysics of color properties.</p>

<i>Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind</i> showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today. Ten pairs of specially written essays present substantially opposed perspectives on topics including narrow content, externalism and privileged access, normativity, mental causation, consciousness, qualia and emergentism.<br /> <p>Taken together, the essays provide an engaging and dynamic presentation of the contemporary contours of philosophy of mind, ideal for undergraduate and graduate course use.</p>

"This book gives the reader a vivid sense of the philosophy of mind as a living activity. The chapters of this book provide an excellent introduction to ongoing debates about consciousness, intentionality, and physicalism. At the same time, many of the chapters make important contributions to the subject in their own right."<br /> <i>–David Chalmers, Australian National University <!--end--></i>

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