Details

A New Swing-Contract Design for Wholesale Power Markets


A New Swing-Contract Design for Wholesale Power Markets


IEEE Press Series on Power and Energy Systems 1. Aufl.

von: Leigh Tesfatsion

127,99 €

Verlag: Wiley
Format: PDF
Veröffentl.: 15.12.2020
ISBN/EAN: 9781119670131
Sprache: englisch
Anzahl Seiten: 288

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Beschreibungen

<p><b>Provides comprehensive information on swing contracts for flexible reserve provision in wholesale power markets</b></p> <p>This book promotes a linked swing-contract market design for centrally-managed wholesale power markets to facilitate increased reliance on renewable energy resources and demand-side participation. The proposed swing contracts are firm or option two-part pricing contracts permitting resources to offer the future availability of dispatchable power paths (reserve) with broad types of flexibility in their power attributes.</p> <p><i>A New Swing-Contract Design for Wholesale Power Markets</i> begins with a brief introduction to the subject, followed by two chapters that cover: general goals for wholesale power market design; history, operations, and conceptual concerns for current U.S. RTO/ISO-managed wholesale power markets; and the relationship of the present study to previous swing-contract research. The next eight chapters cover: a general swing-contract formulation for centrally-managed wholesale power markets; illustrative swing-contract reserve offers; inclusion of reserve offers with price swing; inclusion of price-sensitive reserve bids; and extension to a linked collection of swing-contract markets. Operations in current U.S. RTO/ISO-managed markets are reviewed in the following four chapters, and conceptual and practical advantages of the linked swing-contract market design are carefully considered. The book concludes with an examination of two key issues: How might current U.S. RTO/ISO-managed markets transition gradually to a swing-contract form? And how might independent distribution system operators, functioning as linkage entities at transmission and distribution system interfaces, make use of swing contracts to facilitate their participation in wholesale power markets as providers of ancillary services harnessed from distribution-side resources? In summary, this title:</p> <ul> <li>Addresses problems with current wholesale electric power markets by developing a new swing-contract market design from concept to practical implementation</li> <li>Provides introductory chapters that explain the general principles motivating the new market design, hence why a new approach is required</li> <li>Develops a new type of swing contract suitable for wholesale power markets with increasing reliance on renewable energy and active demand-side participation</li> </ul> <p><i>A New Swing-Contract Design for Wholesale Power Markets</i> is an ideal book for electric power system professionals and for students specializing in electric power systems.</p>
<p>Preface xiii</p> <p>Author Biography xiv</p> <p>Acknowledgments xv</p> <p><b>Chapter 1 </b><b>Introduction 1</b></p> <p><b>Chapter 2 </b><b>US RTO/ISO-Managed Wholesale Power Markets: Overview 9</b></p> <p>2.1 Chapter Preview 9</p> <p>2.2 General Goals for Wholesale Power Market Design 9</p> <p>2.3 US RTO/ISO-Managed Market Operations 10</p> <p>2.4 Stresses Faced by Current US RTO/ISO-Managed Markets 14</p> <p><b>Chapter 3 </b><b>Motivation For Current Study 17</b></p> <p>3.1 Chapter Preview 17</p> <p>3.2 Problematic Design Aspects of US RTO/ISO-Managed Wholesale Power Markets 17</p> <p>3.2.1 Artificial Distinction Between Energy and Reserve 17</p> <p>3.2.2 Problematic use of Hedonic Pricing 18</p> <p>3.2.3 Revenue Insufficiency and Incentive Problems 19</p> <p>3.2.4 Computational Fragility of LMP Derivations 20</p> <p>3.2.5 Performance Payment in Advance of Performance Delivery 22</p> <p>3.2.6 Minimal Direct Representation of Retail Customer Interests 23</p> <p>3.2.7 Reliance on Overly Simplistic Cost Conceptions 24</p> <p>3.2.8 Use of Spot-Market Pricing for Forward Markets 26</p> <p>3.3 Relation of Current Study to Previous Swing-Contract Work 26</p> <p><b>Chapter 4 </b><b>Swing Contracts For Iso-Managed Wholesale Power Markets 29</b></p> <p>4.1 Swing Contract Overview 29</p> <p>4.2 Swing Contracts: General Formulation 29</p> <p>4.3 Swing Contracts in Firm or Option Form 31</p> <p><b>Chapter 5 </b><b>Illustrative Swing-Contract Reserve Offers 35</b></p> <p>5.1 Chapter Preview 35</p> <p>5.2 A Simple Energy-Block Swing Contract in Firm Form 37</p> <p>5.3 An Energy-Block Swing Contract in Option Form 40</p> <p>5.4 Swing-Contract Implementation of Standard Supply Offers 41</p> <p>5.5 A Swing Contract Offering Continuous Swing (Flexibility) in Power and Ramp 47</p> <p>5.6 A Swing Contract Offering Battery Services 49</p> <p>5.7 Swing-Contract Facilitation of Private Bilateral Contracting 52</p> <p><b>Chapter 6 </b><b>Swing-Contract Market Design 55</b></p> <p>6.1 Chapter Preview 55</p> <p>6.2 General Swing-Contract Market Formulation 55</p> <p>6.3 Financial and Physical Feasibility of Swing-Contract Offers 58</p> <p>6.4 Reserve Bids 58</p> <p>6.5 Handling of Fixed Reserve Bids and Non-Dispatched Power 60</p> <p>6.6 Performance Penalties and Incentives 60</p> <p>6.7 ISO Cost Allocation 61</p> <p><b>Chapter 7 </b><b>Swing-Contract Market Optimization: Base-Case Milp Formulation 67</b></p> <p>7.1 Chapter Preview 67</p> <p>7.2 General Assumptions and Notation 68</p> <p>7.3 Discretization of the ISO’s Optimization Problem 69</p> <p>7.4 ISO Objective Function 73</p> <p>7.5 Complete Analytical MILP Formulation 74</p> <p>7.6 Additional Discussion of Optimization Aspects 76</p> <p>7.7 Five-Bus Test Case 78</p> <p>7.8 Thirty Bus Test Case with Adaptive Reserve Zones 81</p> <p><b>Chapter 8 </b><b>Inclusion Of Reserve Offers With Price Swing 85</b></p> <p>8.1 Chapter Preview 85</p> <p>8.2 Cost Function Preliminaries 86</p> <p>8.3 MILP Tractable form of Reserve Offers with Price Swing 87</p> <p><b>Chapter 9 </b><b>Inclusion Of Price-Sensitive Reserve Bids 93</b></p> <p>9.1 Chapter Preview 93</p> <p>9.2 Incorporation of Benefits 94</p> <p>9.3 Modeling of Price-Sensitive Reserve Bids 96</p> <p>9.3.1 Standard Demand Function Formulation 96</p> <p>9.3.2 Reserve Bids with Time-of-Use Pricing 97</p> <p>9.3.3 Reserve Bids with Price Swing 97</p> <p>9.3.4 Reserve Bids Directly Expressed as Benefit Functions 99</p> <p>9.4 MILP Tractable Approximation of Benefit Functions 100</p> <p><b>Chapter 10 </b><b>The Linked Swing-Contract Market Design 105</b></p> <p>10.1 Chapter Preview 105</p> <p>10.2 Multistage Optimization and Time Inconsistency 107</p> <p>10.3 Settlement Time-Consistency of Swing-Contract Markets 109</p> <p>10.4 Swing-Contract Long-Term Forward Markets 111</p> <p>10.5 Swing-Contract Short-Term Forward Markets 112</p> <p>10.6 Swing-Contract Very Short-Term Forward Markets 113</p> <p>10.7 Swing-Contract Deployment in Real-Time Operations 114</p> <p><b>Chapter 11 </b><b>Illustration: Linked Day-Ahead And Hour-Ahead Swing-Contract Markets 117</b></p> <p>11.1 Chapter Preview 117</p> <p>11.2 Hour-Ahead Market with Reserve Offers Consisting of Swing-Contract Portfolios 117</p> <p>11.3 SCED Solution for Hour-Ahead Swing-Contract Market 122</p> <p>11.3.1 Overview 122</p> <p>11.3.2 Power Balance 122</p> <p>11.3.3 Coverage of the ISO’s Uncertainty Set 123</p> <p>11.3.4 Constrained Minimization of Expected Cost 125</p> <p>11.4 Linked Day-Ahead and Hour-Ahead Markets 126</p> <p><b>Chapter 12 </b><b>Standard Modeling Of A Competitive Market 131</b></p> <p>12.1 Chapter Preview 131</p> <p>12.2 Key Definitions 131</p> <p>12.3 Standard Competitive Market Assumptions 132</p> <p>12.4 Law of One Price for Commodities 132</p> <p>12.5 Competitive Market: Basic Formulation 133</p> <p>12.6 Net Surplus Extraction 136</p> <p>12.7 Market Efficiency Metric 137</p> <p>12.8 Market Efficiency and Pricing Rules 139</p> <p>12.9 Strategic Trade Behavior and Trader Market Power 140</p> <p><b>CHAPTER 13 </b><b>US RTO/ISO-Managed Markets: Efficiency And Market Power 143</b></p> <p>13.1 Chapter Preview 143</p> <p>13.2 Daily Market Operations 144</p> <p>13.3 Illustrative Analytical DAM Formulation 146</p> <p>13.4 Net Surplus Extraction in the Illustrative DAM 147</p> <p>13.5 Market Power in the Illustrative DAM: Type-I Error 152</p> <p>13.6 Market Power in the Illustrative DAM: Type-II Error 156</p> <p>13.7 Market Inefficiency in the Illustrative DAM 160</p> <p>13.8 DAM Performance: General Assessment 163</p> <p>13.9 Scheduling of Bilateral Contracts 165</p> <p><b>Chapter 14 </b><b>Comparisons With Swing-Contract Markets 167</b></p> <p>14.1 Chapter Preview 167</p> <p>14.2 Product Definition in US RTO/ISO-Managed Markets 168</p> <p>14.3 Wholesale Power and the Law of One Price (Not) 170</p> <p>14.4 Differential vs. Uniform Pricing 171</p> <p>14.5 Comparison of SC and Current US DAM Designs 172</p> <p><b>Chapter 15 </b><b>Advantages Of The Linked Swing-Contract Market Design 175</b></p> <p>15.1 Chapter Preview 175</p> <p>15.2 SC Markets are Physically-Covered Insurance Markets 176</p> <p>15.3 Longer-Term SC Markets Support New Investment 177</p> <p>15.3.1 Energy-Only Market 179</p> <p>15.3.2 Centrally Managed Capacity Market 181</p> <p>15.3.3 LSE Bilateral Contract Obligations 182</p> <p>15.4 SC Markets Ensure Revenue Sufficiency 183</p> <p>15.5 SC Markets Ameliorate Merit-Order Concerns 184</p> <p>15.6 SC Markets are Robust-Control Mechanisms 185</p> <p>15.7 SC Markets Reduce Rule Complexity 186</p> <p>15.8 SC Markets Reduce Gaming Opportunities 187</p> <p>15.9 SC Markets have Smaller-Sized Optimizations 189</p> <p>15.10 Additional Advantages of SC Markets 190</p> <p>15.10.1 Ensure a Level Playing Field for Resource Participation 190</p> <p>15.10.2 Permit Co-Optimization of Diverse Reserve 191</p> <p>15.10.3 Appropriately Remunerate Diversity and Flexibility 191</p> <p>15.10.4 Encourage Accurate Forecasting and Dispatch Following 191</p> <p>15.10.5 Ensure Settlement Time-Consistency 191</p> <p><b>Chapter 16 </b><b>Gradual Transition To Linked Swing-Contract Markets 193</b></p> <p>16.1 Chapter Preview 193</p> <p>16.2 A DAM Formulation Permitting Gradual Transition 195</p> <p>16.3 Cost Function Preliminaries for the Transitional DAM 197</p> <p>16.4 MILP SCUC/SCED Optimization for the Transitional DAM 201</p> <p><b>Chapter 17 </b><b>Swing-Contract Support For Integrated Transmission And Distribution Systems 209</b></p> <p>17.1 Chapter Preview 209</p> <p>17.2 Transactive Energy System Design for ITD Systems 211</p> <p>17.3 Role of Distribution Utilities 215</p> <p>17.4 An IDSO-Managed Bid-Based TES Design for Households 216</p> <p>17.5 IDSOs as Grid-Edge Resource Aggregators 219</p> <p>17.6 Swing-Contract Support for IDSO Participation in Wholesale Power Markets 220</p> <p><b>Chapter 18 </b><b>Design Evaluation Via The ITD TES Platform 221</b></p> <p>18.1 Chapter Preview 221</p> <p>18.2 Design Readiness Levels 222</p> <p>18.3 An ITD TES Platform Permitting TES Design Evaluation 223</p> <p>18.4 Illustrative Test Cases: Overview 226</p> <p>18.5 Illustrative Test Cases: Report 229</p> <p>18.5.1 IDSO Peak-Load Reduction Capabilities 229</p> <p>18.5.2 IDSO Load-Matching Capabilities 229</p> <p>18.5.3 Household ITD Test Cases: Discussion 233</p> <p><b>Chapter 19 </b><b>Potential Future Research Directions 235</b></p> <p>19.1 Effective use of Option Swing Contracts 235</p> <p>19.2 Representation of Reserve Bids 236</p> <p>19.3 Compensation for Storage Services 236</p> <p>19.4 Compensation for Reliability Services 236</p> <p>19.5 Representation of Power-Paths 237</p> <p>19.6 Implementation of Contract-Clearing Optimizations for Swing-Contract Markets 237</p> <p>19.7 Gradual Transition to a Swing-Contract Market 238</p> <p><b>Chapter 20 </b><b>Conclusion: The Dots Keep Connecting 239</b></p> <p>Appendix A Appendices 241</p> <p>References 249</p> <p>Index 259</p>
<p><b>LEIGH TESFATSION</b> received the Ph.D. degree in economics from the University of Minnesota, Mpls., in 1975, with a minor in mathematics. She is Research Professor of Economics, Professor Emerita of Economics, and Courtesy Research Professor of Electrical & Computer Engineering, all at Iowa State University. Her principal current research areas are electric power market design and the development of Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) platforms for the performance testing of these designs. She is the recipient of the 2020 David A. Kendrick Distinguished Service Award from the Society for Computational Economics (SCE) and an IEEE Senior Member. She has served as guest editor and associate editor for a number of journals, including the IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, the IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, the Journal of Energy Markets, the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, the Journal of Public Economic Theory, and Computational Economics.
<p><b>Provides comprehensive information on swing contracts for flexible reserve provision in wholesale power markets</b> <p>This book promotes a linked swing-contract market design for centrally-managed wholesale power markets to facilitate increased reliance on renewable energy resources and demand-side participation. The proposed swing contracts are firm or option two-part pricing contracts permitting resources to offer the future availability of dispatchable power paths (reserve) with broad types of flexibility in their power attributes. <p><i>A New Swing-Contract Design for Wholesale Power Markets</i> begins with a brief introduction to the subject, followed by two chapters that cover: general goals for wholesale power market design; history, operations, and conceptual concerns for current U.S. RTO/ISO-managed wholesale power markets; and the relationship of the present study to previous swing-contract research. The next eight chapters cover: a general swing-contract formulation for centrally-managed wholesale power markets; illustrative swing-contract reserve offers; inclusion of reserve offers with price swing; inclusion of price-sensitive reserve bids; and extension to a linked collection of swing-contract markets. Operations in current U.S. RTO/ISO-managed markets are reviewed in the following four chapters, and conceptual and practical advantages of the linked swing-contract market design are carefully considered. The book concludes with an examination of two key issues: How might current U.S. RTO/ISO-managed markets transition gradually to a swing-contract form? And how might independent distribution system operators, functioning as linkage entities at transmission and distribution system interfaces, make use of swing contracts to facilitate their participation in wholesale power markets as providers of ancillary services harnessed from distribution-side resources? In summary, this title: <ul> <li> Addresses problems with current wholesale electric power markets by developing a new swing-contract market design from concept to practical implementation</li> <li> Provides introductory chapters that explain the general principles motivating the new market design, hence why a new approach is required</li> <li> Develops a new type of swing contract suitable for wholesale power markets with increasing reliance on renewable energy and active demand-side participation</li> </ul> <p><i>A New Swing-Contract Design for Wholesale Power Markets</i> is an ideal book for electric power system professionals and for students specializing in electric power systems.

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