Details

<p>Notes on Contributors ix</p> <p>Introduction to the Second Edition <i>Jonathan Cohen</i> xiii</p> <p>Introduction to the First Edition <i>Jonathan Cohen</i> xviii</p> <p><b>Part I Mental Content 1</b></p> <p><b>Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 3</b></p> <p>1 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions <i>Gabriel Segal</i> 5</p> <p>2 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content <i>Sarah Sawyer</i> 19</p> <p><b>Is Externalism About Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 33</b></p> <p>3 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent <i>Anthony Brueckner</i> 35</p> <p>4 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent <i>Michael McKinsey</i> 50</p> <p><b>Is the Intentional Essentially Normative? 63</b></p> <p>5 Resisting Normativism in Psychology <i>Georges Rey</i> 65</p> <p>6 Normativism Defended <i>Ralph Wedgwood</i> 80</p> <p><b>Is There Non-conceptual Content? 97</b></p> <p>7 The Revenge of the Given <i>Jerry Fodor</i> 99</p> <p>8 Are There Different Kinds of Content? <i>Richard Kimberly Heck</i> 110</p> <p><b>Part II Physicalism 131</b></p> <p><b>Is Non-reductive Materialism Viable? 133</b></p> <p>9 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-reductive Materialism <i>Louise Antony</i> 135</p> <p>10 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism <i>Paul M. Churchland</i> 152</p> <p><b>Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 173</b></p> <p>11 A Priori Physicalism <i>Frank Jackson</i> 175</p> <p>12 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism <i>Brian P. McLaughlin</i> 189</p> <p><b>Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 213</b></p> <p>13 Causation and Mental Causation <i>Jaegwon Kim</i> 215</p> <p>14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough <i>Barry Loewer</i> 230</p> <p><b>Part III The Place Of Consciousness In Nature 251</b></p> <p><b>Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 253</b></p> <p>15 Dualist Emergentism Martine <i>Nida-Rümelin</i> 255</p> <p>16 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness <i>David Braddon-Mitchell</i> 272</p> <p><b>Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 285</b></p> <p>17 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak <i>Michael Tye</i> 287</p> <p>18 A Case for Qualia <i>Sydney Shoemaker</i> 303</p> <p><b>Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 317</b></p> <p>19 All Consciousness Is Perceptual <i>Jesse Prinz</i> 319</p> <p>20 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I) <i>Christopher Peacocke</i> 341</p> <p><b>Part IV Perception And Mental Capacities 359</b></p> <p><b>Should Perception Be Understood in Terms of Representation, Direct Contact with the World, or a Hybrid View? 361</b></p> <p>21 Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science <i>Craig French and Ian Phillips</i> 363</p> <p>22 Naïve Realism v. Representationalism: An Argument from Science <i>Adam Pautz</i> 384</p> <p>23 Capacities-First Philosophy <i>Susanna Schellenberg</i> 406</p> <p><b>Is Perception General, Particular, or a Hybrid? 431</b></p> <p>24 Perceiving Particulars <i>Christopher S. Hill</i> 433</p> <p>25 Abstract and Particular Perceptual Content: The Best of Both Theories <i>Heather Logue</i> 449</p> <p><b>How Should We Understand the Distinction Between Perception and Cognition? 467</b></p> <p>26 The Perception–Cognition Border: Architecture or Format? <i>E. J. Green</i> 469</p> <p>27 Let’s Get Rid of the Concept of an Object File <i>Ned Block</i> 494</p> <p><b>Is Pain a Natural Kind? 517</b></p> <p>28 Scientific Eliminativism for Pain <i>Jennifer Corns</i> 519</p> <p>29 Pain Is a Natural Kind <i>Matthew Fulkerson</i> 535</p> <p><b>Do We Need Imagination Over and Above Imagery and Supposition? 551</b></p> <p>30 Against Imagination <i>Bence Nanay</i> 553</p> <p>31 Why We Need Imagination <i>Amy Kind</i> 570</p> <p>Index 588</p>

<p><b>BRIAN P. M<small>C</small>LAUGHLIN</b> is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University. He has published numerous papers in fields including philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical logic. He co-authored (with Vann McGee) <i>Terrestrial Logic: Formal Semantics Brought Down to Earth </i>(forthcoming, Oxford)<i>.</i> <p><B>JONATHAN COHEN</B> is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He has published widely in philosophy of perception, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and aesthetics. He is the author of <i>The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.</i>

<p><i>Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind</i> presents 15 sets of specially commissioned essays with opposing viewpoints on central topics in the discipline. More than 30 influential thinkers go head-to-head as they debate a series of contested questions about mental content, physicalism, the place of consciousness in the physical world, and the nature of perception and mental capacities. <p>Opening with a thorough introduction to the issues explored in each debate, this timely volume offers a dynamic presentation of the conceptual background, contentious issues, and current thinking in philosophy of mind. The lively and engaging essays showcase divergent perspectives on consciousness, intentionality, normativity, mental causation, materialism, perception, and more. <p>This newly expanded second edition features five entirely new debates on the relation between perception and cognition, whether pain is a natural kind, whether perception is best understood through representational content or direct contact with the world, whether we need imagination that goes beyond imagery and supposition, and whether perceptual contents are general, particular, or a hybrid. <p>Written for non-specialists and professional philosophers alike, <i>Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Second Edition</i> is essential reading for undergraduate and graduate students, academics, scholars, and general readers with an interest in the subject.

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